



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 526

It has been 3,446 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 161 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Today is a condensed combat-only report.

- Russian forces renewed efforts to advance on Synkivka
- Fighting continued across the theater of war in the usual places, Bilohorivka, Klishchiivka, Adviiivka, Marinka, Staromaiorske, Pryyutne, Novopokrovka, and Robotyne-Verbove
- International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors were granted access to the roof and turbine halls of Reactors 3 and 4 at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
- The Russian oil tanker SIG was struck by a Ukrainian Mk.5 uncrewed surface vessel, disabling the ship
- Russian officials announced they were tightening port security in Sochi due to expanding Ukrainian attacks
- The Project 775 Ropucha-Class large landing ship Olenegorski Gornjak reached is docked at Berth 8 in Novorossiysk and supported by a rescue tugboat to prevent it from sinking or capsizing

- Tensions are rising on the border of Belarus, with Latvia joining Poland in taking stronger security measures

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. With a successful strike on the Russian-flagged Sig, Ukraine has demonstrated they have expanded its reach of power in the Black Sea, and the new Mk.5 uncrewed surface vessel, with 450 kilograms of explosives and a better mesh Internet connection, has solved the technical issues of earlier models.
2. We assess that the earlier Stavka held by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, limited to security and military leaders with a secret briefing, was related to the new uncrewed surface vessel campaign in the Black Sea.
3. Due to a lack of troop rotation, growing ammunition shortages, and weak commanders, Russia is pushing combat ineffective and combat destroyed units to the forwardmost line of friendly troops (FLOT), engaging in attritional warfare against Ukrainian units.


4. We maintain that the current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
5. We have growing concerns that Ukrainian forces may be incapable of setting conditions for a breakthrough attack in 2023. However, we maintain that signals from Kyiv indicating the next phase of the summer offensive is being prepared, and there are three operational areas where the next phase could start.
6. Despite Ukraine's plans to move to the next phase, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
7. We assess that Russian and Belarusian aggression and threats on the borders of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Black Sea coast will continue to expand and lead to an international incident if Ukraine's allies do not take a stronger posture.
8. Russian President Vladimir Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection, and there continues to be a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt.
9. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between

penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.

10. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
11. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
12. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the *Moskva* and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure




Dvorichna Operational Area

The Ukrainian source DeepState reported that fighting in the direction of [Synkivka](#) restarted, which could potentially align with the August 3 claim by the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) of an offensive in the area of [Vilshana](#).¹

¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17282>


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections


Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



Svatove Operational Area


Fighting continued in the area of [Novoselivske](#), with Russian forces held at the P-07 Highway and the railroad station area.² The situation here is very difficult for Ukrainian troops, with Russia concentrating significant combat potential in Luhansk.

² https://t.me/mod_russia/28943 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Kreminna Operational Area

Intense positional fighting of platoon-sized units with artillery support continued in the [Serebryanskyi Woods](#). Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to trade defensive positions in the Siverskyi Donets River floodplain and along the powerlines in the woods south of Dibrova, Kuzmyne, and Kreminna.




Lysychansk Operational Area

Significant mutual fighting continues northeast and southeast of [Bilohorivka](#) [Luhansk], with Russian forces attempting to push Ukraine off of the heights in the northeast and Ukrainian forces attempting to push Russian forces away from the water pumping station in the southeast.³ The situation in the northeast is very difficult for Ukrainian troops.


³ https://t.me/mod_russia/28943 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




Bakhmut Operational Area

Fighting has not stopped northwest of Bakhmut, but there has been a lack of specific intelligence. The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive “in the area of” [Paraskoviivka](#).

Through prior analysis, RMOD’s idea of “offensives in the area of” includes drone attacks, harassment attacks, and touches. Ukraine holds fire control of the M-03/E-40 and T-513 Highway ground line of communications (GLOCs) south of Paraskoviivka. In our assessment, the Russian claim does not indicate that Ukrainian forces achieved a breakthrough at Berkhivka or Yahidne.

Northwest of Bakhmut, the front has become frozen, with neither combatant able to move their FLOTs. Ukrainian forces don't want to advance deeper into Berkhivka because Russian forces still hold the heights around Dubovo-Vasylivka. The Russian 200th Separate Arctic Motor Rifle Brigade has defied our earlier assessments and has executed a masterful defense of the salient.



Klishchiivka Operational Area

There is no change in the situation at [Klishchiivka](#), [Andriivka](#), and [Kurdyumivka](#). Fighting continues, and Russian troops are actively remote mining the gray area to




their west, stymying Ukrianian advances. We have additional intelligence in this area that will require significant analysis and will be shared during the week of August 7.⁴

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⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10855>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




Avdiivka Operational Area

The operational tempo remains low due in part to the earlier reallocation of Russian equipment, ammunition, and troops to the Bakhmut AO.

Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo walked back their claim of success near [Vesele](#), stating that Ukraine counterattacked and recaptured the positions.⁵ Ukrainian

⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14184>

sources reported that Russian troops made another head-on attack on Ukrainian defenses in [Avdiivka from Kruta Balka](#), ending with losses and a retreat to previously established defensive positions.⁶ RMOD claimed that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of [Pervomaiske](#).⁷




⁶ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17282>

⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/28943 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Marinka Operational Area

Good news! There is a change. RMOD claimed that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive toward [Staromykailivka](#).⁸ Mutual fighting continued in [Marinka](#), with no change in the situation.^{9 10}




⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/28943 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10855>

¹⁰ https://t.me/mod_russia/28943 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Vuhledar Operational Area

Russian sources continued to report significant fighting in the area of [Mykilske](#) and expressed concern that Ukraine is setting conditions to advance on Volnovakha.^{11 12}



¹¹ <https://t.me/rybar/50440>

¹² <https://t.me/wargonzo/14184>

Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Fighting expanded with reports that the combat destroyed Russian 247th Parachute Regiment (VDV) was pushed back to the FLOT. The unit has suffered documented catastrophic losses and had two platoons riot last week.

Russian forces attempted to advance in the direction of [Blahodatne](#) without success.¹³ Ukrainian sources reported that fighting was ongoing in [Urozhaine](#) while Russian forces continued attempts to push back into [Staromaiorske](#) from the west.¹⁴ ¹⁵ Ukrainian forces reportedly intensified attacks on the northern edge of [Pryyutne](#) but remained unable to push into the village itself.¹⁶ ¹⁷

ASSESSMENT: An analysis of recorded artillery and drone strike videos south of Urozhaine confirms our earlier assessment that Ukrainian forces have no interest in attacking the settlement head-on or enabling Russian troops to retreat through the one remaining GLOC.¹⁸ Ukraine holds total fire control over Zavitne Bazhannya and the T-518 Highway that connects Urozhaine to

¹³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10855>

¹⁴ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17282>

¹⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14184>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17282>

¹⁷ <https://t.me/rybar/50440>

¹⁸ <https://twitter.com/albir2024/status/1687377904521338880>


Staromlynivka. Over the last two days, Russian forces attempting to enter or leave Urozhaine have been devastated by artillery, first-person view (FPV) kamikaze drones, and rockets launched by HIMARS. Ukraine is using a significant amount of M30A1 fragmentation rockets and 155 mm 864 DPICM (cluster munitions) rounds to maximize casualties. To quote the Ukrainian source DeepState, "katsaps [*A slur directed at Russians – Ed.*] taste American democracy to the fullest."

Occupied Donetsk

Insurgents in Mariupol report that the temporary concrete plant was sabotaged and is out of commission. The factory was producing dragon teeth and concrete slabs for Russian fortifications.¹⁹


¹⁹ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/12275>

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Orikhiv Operational Area

In our assessment, the unofficial ceasefire to support the International Atomic Energy Agency personnel rotation continued in the Kamyanske area. There were no reports of fighting or significant artillery fire in the area. If the area remains quiet, Russian and Ukrainian forces may be concentrating combat potential in the [Robotyne](#) and [Verbove](#) area.

Very intense positional fighting continued on the edge of Robotyne and northwest of Verbove.²⁰ We tried to confirm reports that Ukrainian troops had reached the dragon teeth intermediate defensive line northwest of Verbove and taken Russian positions, but at this time, we cannot authenticate the claim.

Fighting is extremely difficult for Ukrainian forces due to the number of Russian landmines, insufficient demining equipment, and catastrophic losses of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) engineers. Ukrainian EOD troops have to demine by hand while being exposed on the front lines and are aggressively targeted by Russian troops.

Russian forces launched a counteroffensive from [Novopokrovka](#), attempting to take back lost positions near the T-0803 Highway without success.²¹

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

The IAEA reported that the team of observers was allowed to inspect the roofs of Units 3 and 4 and the turbine halls and found no mines or explosives. According to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, inspectors are still barred

²⁰ https://t.me/mod_russia/28943 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10855>


from accessing the roofs and turbine halls of the other four reactors.

Maintenance activity continued on Unit 5, including inspecting and testing the safety systems and cleaning the heat exchanger. However, Rosatom officials have not complied with the IAEA request to see their maintenance plan and observe all ongoing work. Director General Grossi expressed concern due to the limited supply of spare parts and the reduced staff.

The IAEA reported that the supply of cooling water remains "sufficient water available for many months" and that Russian occupiers had taken adequate steps to reinforce the inlet channel and the cooling water reservoir.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

The Russian oil tanker SIG was attacked by a Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessel (USV),  [being struck amidships directly on the starboard side pump room](#) and just fore of

the engine room.²² A high-resolution video of the strike was released a few hours after the attack. The engine room is flooded, and the SIG is incapable of moving under its own power, according to its captain. Two Russian rescue tugs were deployed to assist the vessel.

The 6,000-ton SIG was built in 2014 and has been used to openly transport aviation fuel from Novorossiysk, Russia, to Baniyas, Syria, once a month with her sister vessel, the YAZ. St. Petersburg, Russia-based Transpetrochart Company Limited, owns the Russian-flagged SIG, YAZ, and three other vessels. The company is on the United States Department of Treasury OFAC Sanctions List for violating sanctions against Syria.²³

While Moscow insists the ships owned by Transpetrochart are civilian, they operate as defacto auxiliary vessels of the Russian Navy and have repeatedly violated the Montreux Convention since February 2022.²⁴

Russian news source Baza released pictures that confirmed the  [engine room was completely flooded, and the blast](#)

²² https://twitter.com/Flash_news_ua/status/1687683453045665792

²³ <https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-gbVPgQpMXgWVTRLLUDQ6cR/>

²⁴ <https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-violating-spirit-montreux-using-civilian-ships-war>

damaged the bridge and other areas.²⁵ There were also indications that the hull was buckled, hinting that the strike had left the SIG irreparable. There was no fire and no claims of cargo or fuel leaks.

ASSESSMENT: While the strike on the SIG sends a signal to the world that Russia can't protect its military and economic interests in the Black Sea and provides a morale boost to Ukraine, there are significant geopolitical impacts. The SIG carried aviation fuel to Baniyas, Syria, to support the Russian Air Force and army aviation (VKS) in the Middle East. The Russian-controlled airfields in Syria are also used as fuel stops by Russian military aircraft flying to and from Mali and the Central African Republic. The loss of the SIG halved the illegal fuel deliveries.

It is unclear what Ukraine's motivation was for attacking the SIG. The empty tanker returning from Syria could simply have been a target of opportunity. But with the coup in Niger on the brink of turning into a multinational war in western Africa, the timing and the target can't be dismissed as mere coincidence. Additionally, with Russian aviation repeatedly harassing the United States Air Force and damaging a second RQ-9 drone, reducing the number of

²⁵ <https://t.me/informnapalm/18334>

sorties Russian aviation can fly supports Syrian rebels and complicates fighting for PMC Wagner mercenaries, Russian troops, and Assad regime soldiers. For Ukraine, the strikes are a blow to the Russian economy and have sent a clear message, Russian military and military-adjacent shipping anywhere in the Black Sea can be struck at will. It is also worth noting that nothing has been heard or seen from the two Russian corvettes that claimed to have been under attack at the start of the week.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this area.

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale


Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this area.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

The crippled Russian Project 775 large landing ship Olenegorski Gornyak Ukrainian was towed to Berth 8 in the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Even on  [satellite images, the ship has a visible list](#). It is supported by a rescue tug that maintains water pumps and is on the port side to prevent the vessel from capsizing at the dock.²⁶ The Gornyak's fuel tanks were ruptured, and booms were placed around the vessel.

ASSESSMENT: In early February 2022, Russia had 12 large landing ships in the Black Sea, including Ropucha-class I, Ropucha-class II, and Alligator-class vessels. The flotilla included three vessels from the Northern Fleet and three from the Baltic Fleet. Five of the 12 ships are sunk or disabled, representing an estimated 11,850 tons and 42% of the fleet's large landing ship capacity.

- Ceasar Kunikov, Ropucha-class, was heavily damaged on March 24, 2022, with casualties, including the death of the ship's commander Captain of the 3rd rank Alexander Chirva, irreparable due to a lack of spare parts

²⁶ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5727

- Novocherkassk, Ropucha-class, was moderately damaged on March 24, 2022, irreparable due to a lack of spare parts
- Saratov, Alligator-class, sunk on March 24, 2022, and the first warship in history destroyed by a short-range ballistic missile
- Azov, Ropucha-class, in drydock for scheduled maintenance when Russia expanded its war of aggression against Ukraine, irreparable due to a lack of spare parts

With the loss of almost half of its landing ships positioned in the Black Sea and the 810th Naval Infantry reconstituted twice by mobiks, Russian combat potential for amphibious assaults is in a combat destroyed state.

THEATERWIDE

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a Stavka with a public readout. The three-hour meeting was described as "tense." In his evening address to the nation, Zelenskyy said, "Many issues that needed special attention. Front reports in all directions. Chief Zaluzhnyi, commanders Syrskiy, Tarnavskiy. Offensive and defensive operations, support, and logistics. The Grain Corridor

Reports of Vice-Prime Minister Kubrakov, Minister Kuleba, Commander Neizhpapa, and our intelligence. We understand our responsibility to the world. We involve the maximum number of countries in the region to ensure global food stability. Development of military industry. Minister Kamishin's report. We are simplifying the procedures for our defense enterprises as much as possible so that they deal with weapons and shells, not papers[work]. [And an] analysis of the use of high-precision weapons. Now is not the time to voice the details. But we are satisfied with the results."²⁷

During today's Military Media Center press briefing, Commander of the Armed Forces Support Forces, Brigadier General Dmytro Hereha, talked about the situation in Zaporizhia. "The enemy has set up a multi-echelon system of engineering barriers in the occupied territories, which consists of several lanes with a length of 10 to 40 kilometers each. Their density is abundant [and] big. Barrier strips include antitank minefields, non-explosive barriers in the form of antitank trenches, concrete pyramids – the so-called 'dragon's teeth' – antitank Czech hedgehogs, [and] wire barriers. The enemy uses mines insidiously, including in such a way that they cannot be removed. To overcome such barriers, a significant number

²⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/108581>

of engineering and sapper units are needed, the personnel of which must be able to make passages in the enemy's mine-explosive barriers both manually and with the help of special engineering equipment, the availability of which is insufficient for [so many] barriers. In order to increase the capabilities of the Defense Forces in overcoming mine and explosive barriers of the enemy, five engineering and sapper battalions were formed in the grouping of forces and means of support."²⁸

Joining Poland and Romania, Latvia has increased its defensive posture by deploying additional troops, armored vehicles, and defense assets to its border with the Russian puppet state of Belarus.²⁹

Lithuania announced closing two border checkpoints with Belarus, adding to regional tensions and thickening the new Iron Curtain.³⁰

The Polish Embassy in Minsk handed over detailed information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the puppet state of Belarus, with Polish officials saying it "indisputably

²⁸ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2761>

²⁹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5726

³⁰ <https://t.me/DPSUkr/12731>

confirms the fact of the violation of Polish airspace on August 1, 2023, by two Belarusian military helicopters."³¹

Belarusian officials declared the evidence was not indisputable and denied violating Poland's airspace.

Bulgaria has agreed to transfer up to 100 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers to Ukraine.³² The eight-wheeled APCs were developed in the 1960s and are considered obsolete, even with earlier upgrades. The BTR-60 also has significant design flaws, exposing dismounts to enemy fire and restricting the ability to enter and exit quickly.

The table for equipment losses was **updated on July 31, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

³¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/108597>

³² <https://www.24chasa.bg/bulgaria/article/15064821>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to July 31, 2023. 11,495 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,067 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2047	250	8.19:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	141	345	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	936	305	3.07:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2595	671	3.88:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	337	313	1.08:1	—
MRAPs	46	134	0.34:1	↓
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	198	344	0.58:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	245	16	15.31:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	327	73	4.48:1	—
Towed Artillery	266	142	1.87:1	—
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	473	188	2.52:1	↑
MLRS	251	50	5.02:1	↑
SAMs	139	118	1.18:1	↑
Mobile Radars	40	70	0.57:1	—
EW/ECW	49	4	12.25:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	85	69	1.23:1	—
Helicopters	107	31	3.45:1	↑
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—

Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War


Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.