

MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

June 19, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 480

It has been 3,400 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 115 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

DAILY ASSESSMENT


We assess the following:

1. The infighting between Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Private Military Company leader Yevgeny Prigozhin is reaching a culmination point, with Prigozhin having less than 48 hours to sign an agreement with the Kremlin that would put Wagner Group under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
2. A compelling body of evidence indicates that on June 6, 2023, between 02:25 and 02:50 hours local time, Russian occupiers blew up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, dam structure, or both, causing its catastrophic failure, which was further reinforced by a recent New York Times and separate Associated Press story.

3. We continue to assess the current activity as subordinate offensives, and the main operation has not started. We do not fully agree with the Insitute for the Study of War's assessment that Ukrainian forces have entered a theaterwide operational pause to reevaluate tactics.
4. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
5. Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)




UKRAINE WEATHER



The ECMWF Euro ensemble weather forecast model is little changed, with a chance of scattered thunderstorms in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea through the rest of the week. Thunderstorms in Crimea could be severe, producing torrential rain, flooding, hail, and damaging winds. Skies will be mostly clear through June 25, with temperatures from 22° to 32° Celcius and lows from 12° to 24°. The full moon will be on July 3, and the summer solstice will be on June 21.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



June 27, 2023, GFS forecast indicates that dry conditions will be across most of Ukraine, with soil saturation from 20% to 50% to 40 centimeters deep.

The soil saturation model does not consider flooding in the Dnipro River basin. Soil saturation is between 15% to 60% across almost all of Ukraine. The GFS model did not update today.

RUSSIAN FRONT




Russian Objective: Repel Russian partisan attacks, stabilize the border, and maintain civil order

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Belgorod Region

Since our last Situation Report, Belgorod Regional Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov reported approximately 150 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad rockets, and drone-delivered IEDs hitting 21 settlements in the Belgorod region.¹ There were no reports of major damage or injuries. Residents of Valuyki reported air defense was active.²

continued cross-border shelling with no significant damage.³ At the time of publication, images and videos  [showed the impact of shelling on Valuyki](#) during the morning of June 19 local time, with Russian sources claiming seven people were wounded and one killed.⁴ ⁵ We can validate the shelling occurred, but we could not confirm the casualty reports at the time of publication.

Udmurt Region

Russian state media source Shot reported that railway equipment in Udmurtia caught fire, and there is an ongoing investigation that it was an act of sabotage.⁶ On June 17, Five trains were delayed near the village of Sundukovo.

¹ <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2723>

² https://t.me/belgorod_informant/4942


³ <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2715>

⁴ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/33793>

⁵ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/81836>

⁶ https://t.me/shot_shot/52960

KHARKIV




Russian Objective New: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychne and Kupiansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

Free Luhansk

Head of the Severodonetsk district military administration, Roman Vlasenko, reported that Russian forces went on the offensive, intensifying their activity in the Kreminna and Lysychansk Operational Areas.⁷ Vlasenko also reported that private military company units are increasingly abandoning their positions.


Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar said, "The situation in the east is difficult now. The enemy has raised its forces and is conducting an active offensive in the Lyman and Kupyansk directions, trying to seize the initiative from us. High activity of enemy shelling is recorded. Hot battles continue. The enemy does not abandon his plans to reach the borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Currently, this is the enemy's main offensive line. Therefore, he concentrated a significant number of his units in the east, in particular the airborne assault units."⁸

⁷ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/11469>

⁸ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/4552


The Russian 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division has reportedly become active in the area.

Operational Command East (OKE) spokesperson Colonel Serhii Chervaty reported that Russian forces fired 555 munitions from Dvorichna in Kharkiv to Bilohorivka in Luhansk, a marginal increase from June 18.



Svatove Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported fighting in the area of [Noveselivske](#) with no change in the situation.⁹



Kreminna Operational Area


There was alignment between GSAFU and the Russian Ministry of Defense, with both sources reporting fighting in the direction of [Yampolivka](#) and west of [Dibrova](#).^{10 11} GSAFU

⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

¹⁰ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

¹¹ https://t.me/mod_russia/27591 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

reported that Russian attacks in the direction of [Torske](#) failed, and RMOD reported fighting in the area of [Kreminna](#) between squad and platoon-sized units.^{12 13}




Ukrainian source DeepState reported that a significant Russian attack in the [Serebryanskyy Woods](#) failed to gain new territory, with Ukrainian forces suffering significant casualties defending their existing lines. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems (FIRMS) supported the report, showing many thermal anomalies.¹⁴

¹² https://t.me/mod_russia/27591 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

¹⁴ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16890>



Lysychansk Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces attempted to advance in “the vicinity” of [Hryorivka](#).¹⁵ Ukrainian defensive lines east of Bilohorivka weren’t breached. This was likely an attempt to advance south toward the Siverskyi Donets River from the Serebryanskyy Woods. Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported fighting continued east of [Bilohorivka](#), with Russian forces failing to advance.¹⁶

¹⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

¹⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>

There were mixed reports about the situation in the industrial areas near [Bilohorivka](#) [Luhansk], with Ukrainian source DeepState reporting heavy fighting while Luhansk Oblast Administrative and Military Governor Artem Lysohor reported only airstrikes on the village.¹⁷ ¹⁸ GSAFU reported that a Russian attack in the direction of the settlement failed.¹⁹


ASSESSMENT: This is likely a Russian attempt to pull Ukrainian reserves into this operational area. Without committing more resources, the attacks are unlikely to break through existing and well-established Ukrainian defenses to the point of activating reserves meant for offensive operations in other areas.

¹⁷ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/11450>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16882>


¹⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




Siversk Operational Area

Russian forces continued offensive operations near [Spirne](#), supported by the Russian army aviation and airforce (VKS) but were unable to move the line of conflict.^{20 21}

²⁰ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

²¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)




Soledar Operational Area

WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces advanced in the direction of [Krasnopolivka](#) from the north and were able to move the line of conflict. The source did not specify if the advance was from Vasyukivka, Sakko I Vantsetti, or Mykolaivka.²² There is an unconfirmed report that Ukraine advanced from Rozdolivka, flanking Mykolaivka.²³

²² <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>

²³ <https://twitter.com/Vijesti11111/status/1670167270570569730>

ASSESSMENT: We maintain that Ukrainian forces are attempting to collapse the north flank of Bakhmut and continue to wear down Russian defenses.



Bakhmut Operational Area


Russian forces attempted to regain their lost positions near [Orikhovo-Vasylivka](#) on the edge of the M-03 Highway without success.^{24 25 26} DeepState and WarGonzo verified

²⁴ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

²⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

²⁶ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16890>

our assessment on June 18 that Ukraine had collapsed the small salient north of the village.²⁷ ²⁸ WarGonzo reported that fighting was ongoing at [Berkhivka](#) and [Yahidne](#), with Russian forces under increasing pressure.



Fighting continued northwest of [Klishchiivka](#), with Ukrainian forces now 1,500 meters away from the administrative boundary of the settlement.²⁹ ³⁰ More significantly, Ukrainian forces only have to advance


²⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>

²⁸ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16890>

²⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>

³⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16890>


another 500 to 750 meters to recapture the high ground northwest of the Russian logistics hub.



WarGonzo also reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Ozarianivka](#).³¹

³¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,


destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Avdiivka Operational Area

A Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces had launched a significant offensive push between [Kamyanka](#) and [Kruta Balka](#), supported by artillery and armored vehicles, in the direction of [Avdiivka](#).³²


³² <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16890>



A Russian source reported that a Russian attack out of [Vodyane](#) failed, while RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces continued to be on the offensive in the area of [Pervomaiske](#).^{33 34}


³³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>

³⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/27591 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Marinka Operational Area

Russian forces expanded their offensive efforts, launching subordinate attacks on [Krasnohorivka](#) and [Pobjeda](#) while maintaining the main offensive effort on [Marinka](#).^{35 36 37 38}

Russian forces have employed an additional  [Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices \(VBIED\) attacks](#) southeast of Pobjeda on the same tree line held by Ukrainian forces.³⁹


³⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

³⁶ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

³⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>

³⁸ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16890>

³⁹ <https://twitter.com/HKaaman/status/1670886640275845120>



Vuhledar Operational Area


Fighting east of [Novomykhailivka](#) continued, with Russian forces unable to advance.^{40 41 42} Supported by the VKS, Russian forces continued attempts to advance in the Mykilske dachas in the direction of [Vuhledar](#) and suffered significant losses.⁴³

⁴⁰ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

⁴¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

⁴² <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>


⁴³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

RMOD reported that fighting was ongoing on the edge of [Staromaiorske](#) and near [Pryyutne](#).⁴⁴ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine spokesperson Andriy Kovalev reported that Ukrainian troops were able to advance closer to Pryyutne and had partial success in [Rivnopil](#).⁴⁵

Occupied Donetsk


A geolocated video showed an apparent  [HIMARS strike](#) in Russian-occupied Volnovakha.⁴⁶ There were six separate strikes.

⁴⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/27591 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁴⁵ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2293>

⁴⁶ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/81897>


ZAPORIZHZIA




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhia



Russian forces carried out 68 fire missions and two airstrikes on 17 settlements along the line of conflict, and  [two missile strikes](#) on the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Rozumivka.⁴⁷



⁴⁷ https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/19636?single

Orikhiv Operational Area

Fighting continued on the edges of [Novopkrovka](#), in the direction of [Robotyne](#), and on the outer edge of [Zherbyanky](#).^{48 49} GSAFU spokesperson Kovalev reported that Ukrainian forces were able to advance in the direction of Robotyne.⁵⁰ Zaporizhzhia Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Yuriy Malashko is appealing for residents in [Pyatykhatky](#) to shelter in place due to intense Russian shelling, making it unsafe to evacuate those who want to leave. During a live broadcast with Radio Svoboda, he assured residents through Radio Svoboda that humanitarian aid would be delivered.⁵¹

The city of Zaporzhzhia was attacked   [by Shahed-136 kamikaze drones](#), S-300 anti-aircraft missiles used for a ground attack, and Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM).^{52 53 54} Governor Malashko said, "Another insidious large-scale attack by the enemy shook Zaporizhzhia and its suburbs. The targets of the Ruscists' [*Russians - Ed.*] were utilities, property, and equipment belonging to an agricultural and farming business and a

⁴⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/27591 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13342>

⁵⁰ <https://t.me/zaborzp/46974>



⁵¹ https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/19640

⁵² <https://t.me/zaborzp/46999>


⁵³ <https://t.me/zaborzp/46998>

⁵⁴ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/10878>

popular resort. Fortunately, there were no reports of casualties."⁵⁵ Russian sources shared an eight-second video claiming an ammunition depot was destroyed but too cropped to be geolocated. NASA FIRMS did not show any unusual thermal anomalies.

On June 18, we shared a graphic video from the Ukrainian 73rd Naval Infantry Special Operation Forces showing their unit clearing a Russian trench in the Zaporizhia region. In the video, there is a Russian fighter that has more than a passing resemblance to WarGonzo leader Semyon Pegov, which has sparked wild rumors that he was killed. The WarGonzo channel has posted a denial that Pegov was killed in the raid. The video is NSFW and not for children; viewer discretion is strongly advised. You can watch the content with translated subtitles by   [clicking here](#).

Occupied Zaporizhia

A Russian Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter suffered  [mission kill damage for an unknown reason](#) while conducting a sortie but was able to return to base and land normally. Russian sources claim a MANPAD caused the damage, while our team believes the damage was a mid-flight structural failure, with no evidence of a missile

⁵⁵ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/20/7407594/>

strike. The loss of the tail assembly ended the mission (hence mission kill) and left the airframe disabled.⁵⁶

Another six rockets fired by HIMARS reportedly hit Tokmak.⁵⁷

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There was no update on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

At the time of publication, Operational Command South (OKS) reported three Black Sea fleet vessels on patrol, including one frigate capable of launching up to eight Kalibr cruise missiles.⁵⁸

Mykolaiv

⁵⁶ https://t.me/grey_zone/19210

⁵⁷ https://t.me/tokmak_ukraine/3802

⁵⁸ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/33834>

Mykolaiv Oblast OVA Vitaly Kim reported that three Shahed-136 kamikaze drones were shot down without further incident during the night of June 19 – 20.⁵⁹

Governor Kim also reported, "Out of 375 houses that were flooded, all 375 are no longer flooded," adding, "The two bridges that went underwater, which the Konotop Road Repair Regiment is building with the help of UNITED24 have survived and are now open for traffic...We still have 50 centimeters of water in Snihurivka, but this is already below the critical point. We can say that Mykolaiv Oblast is no longer flooded."⁶⁰

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale



Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

⁵⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/101953>

⁶⁰ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/19/7407479/>

Free Kherson

Four settlements continue to have flooding, with 832 residential buildings impacted. The water level is now 40 centimeters above the pre-flood level, with the decline continuing to slow. We do not have enough data to determine if this will be the "new normal" along the west bank in free Ukraine.⁶¹ Flood waters have receded from the Korabel District with emergency stabilization efforts completed.⁶² Residents were permitted to return to their homes. The death count jumped to 18, 14 from drowning and four from being shot by Russian troops during evacuation attempts. Thirty-one people are still reported missing.⁶³

In the city of Kherson,  [a gas station](#), a  [bus terminal with 12 buses](#) for evacuation, and an excavator used for recovery efforts were destroyed by Russian shelling of the Ship District – no injuries were reported during the overnight attack.⁶⁴ ⁶⁵

⁶¹ <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/7138>






⁶² https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8410

⁶³ https://t.me/shtab_kakhovska_hes/1037

⁶⁴ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8409

⁶⁵ <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/7130>

Occupied Kherson

In Hola Prystan, Kardashynka, Kikhany, and Oleshky,   [dead bodies](#) and the   [bloated remains of livestock](#) were still being discovered while civilians under occupation  [received little humanitarian aid](#).^{66 67 68}

Bread and canned goods are handed out sporadically as well as drinking water. People cook in front yards over fires, trying to salvage belongings. The Ukrainian National Resistance Center estimates 500 people in occupied Oleshky died due to the flooding.⁶⁹

Dnipropetrovsk

Kryvyi Rih officials reported that up to 550,000 people in the city and surrounding settlements have about a month of water left with continued aggressive conservation measures. Work has already started to build three 30-kilometer-long pipelines to the Inhulets River.⁷⁰

Additionally, a shorter emergency pipeline is being built to the KRESiv Reservoir, which could provide up to three months of water as a stopgap until the Inhulets project can

⁶⁶ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8407

⁶⁷ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8390

⁶⁸ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8397

⁶⁹ https://t.me/Nazars_look/14883

⁷⁰ <https://t.me/vilkul/3614>

be completed. If the water will run out, city officials believe it won't happen until September or October.

Lviv

At the time of publication, officials in Lviv were reported that a Shahed-136 kamikaze drone hit critical civilian infrastructure.⁷¹

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Sumy

Russian forces conducted 16 fire missions in the Sumy region, using 101 artillery rounds, mortars, rocket-

⁷¹ https://t.me/zinkevich_igor/6520

propelled grenades, and drone-delivered IEDs, fired at seven hromadas.⁷² In Yunakivka, a mortar attack hit a house, killing one civilian and wounding another. In Krasnopillya, mortars and artillery rounds damaged residential buildings, injuring a teenager.

THEATERWIDE

Operational Command South (OKS) spokesperson captain Nataliya Humenyuk said, "At this stage, we can state that there have been fewer of them, and they are used in more compact groups of four to seven units. This may be due to the fact that they expect new supplies and literally in a few days these attacks will be intensified. They have agreements, they have supplies, and they have plans to continue using drones."⁷³

Hours later, Russia launched 35 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones across Ukraine, with 32 intercepted.⁷⁴ About 20 UAVs were intercepted in the Kyiv region.⁷⁵

⁷² https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/17115

⁷³ https://t.me/our_odessa/48891

⁷⁴ https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1671036773613330432

⁷⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/101945>

French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that the jointly developed French-Italian air defense system is deployed in Ukraine, "I am glad to be able to announce, together with my Italian counterpart Giorgia Meloni, that the Franco-Italian SAMP/T air defense system is now being deployed and functioning in Ukraine, where it is protecting key facilities and people's lives."⁷⁶ SAMP/T can also intercept ballistic missiles with a range of 25 kilometers and a ceiling of 25 kilometers. It can intercept aircraft and sub-sonic cruise missiles up to 100 kilometers away.

According to Colonel Margo Grosberg, Head of the Estonian Defence Forces Intelligence Center, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been carrying on the first phase of their offensive, conducting reconnaissance to find weaknesses in the defensive positions of the Russian occupying forces. "The initiative is obviously in the hands of the armed forces of Ukraine, which means that they get to pick the time, place, and means by which they will attack the enemy's units."⁷⁷

The Ministries of Defense of Ukraine, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic signed a joint memorandum of intent to cooperate in purchasing and operating up to 1,000 Swedish

⁷⁶ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/19/7407581/>

⁷⁷ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/18/7407349/>

CV90 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV).⁷⁸ Designed to maneuver in the marshy terrain of Sweden, it is considered an ideal IFV for Ukrainian terrain.

⁷⁸ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/4546

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to June 10, 2023. 10,609 Russian vs. 3,585 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1893	204	9.38:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	132	323	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	879	284	3.10:1	↓
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2393	562	4.25:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	312	273	1.14:1	↓
MRAPs	43	71	0.61:1	↓
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	190	320	0.59:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	243	13	18.69:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	310	60	5.16:1	↓
Towed Artillery	232	126	1.84:1	↑
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	414	166	2.49:1	↓
MLRS	206	45	4.58:1	↑
SAMs	118	114	1.03:1	↑
Mobile Radars	32	62	0.52:1	—
EW/ECW	40	2	20.00:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	82	68	1.21:1	↓
Helicopters	90	30	3.00:1	—
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.