



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 487

It has been 3,407 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 122 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

Due to heavy rains and severe thunderstorms over wide areas of Ukraine, the operational tempo was significantly reduced. Additionally, the Russian information space remains partially paralyzed after the failed insurrection and statements by Yevgeny Prigozhin and Russian President Vladimir Putin. There appeared to be an aversion to dumping more bad news into the cycle after Ukrainian advances in six areas of operation during the last 36 hours and the re-establishment of a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro River.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. We assess that while the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

2. The loss of the Chongar Bridge between occupied Kherson and Crimea and additional attacks on the ground line of communication to Melitopol have created supply and logistics issues for Russian forces.
3. We assess the Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group will cease to exist in Russia as it was known based on new laws passed by the Russian State Duma and statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin. It is unlikely that the Wagner Group will play a significant role in the theater of war within Ukraine unless there is a regime change in the Russian Federation.
4. We maintain the current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
5. We maintain the Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces. The dissolution of the private military company structure within the Russian Federation will not fix these fundamental problems.
6. Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of




military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

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TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the *Moskva* and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)




UKRAINE WEATHER



The ECMWF Euro ensemble weather forecast model forecasts a stormy pattern through June 29. Winds up to 55 kph are forecasted for June 27 and 28, with thunderstorms, some severe, on June 28 and 29. Temperatures from 17° to 31° Celcius, with cooler weather through June 30. Lows temperatures will be from 11° to 20°. The full moon will be on July 3.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



July 4, 2023, GFS forecast predicts soil saturation will range from 25% to 70% to 40 centimeters deep across the theater of war within Ukraine.

The soil saturation model does not consider flooding in the Dnipro River basin. Soil saturation is between 50% to 80% after severe thunderstorms with torrential rain moved across most of Ukraine. The operational tempo dropped more due to the severe weather than tractability issues. Soil conditions will continue to deteriorate through June 30.

RUSSIAN FRONT




Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

There was no significant activity.

KHARKIV




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

There was no significant activity.


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




Svatove Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported failed Russian attacks west of [Karmazynivka](#) and in the direction of [Stelmakhivka](#).^{1 2}

¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)




Kreminna Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense reported positional fighting and harassment between squad and platoon sized units in the [Kyzmyne](#) area.³


³ https://t.me/mod_russia/27857 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections


Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



Siversk Operational Area

RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of [Spirne](#).⁴ Because of the official policy of the Russian Information Agency to always report advancement and victory, we only share where the Kremlin reports fighting and not their reported outcomes unless there is an independent second source to validate their claims.

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/27857 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Soledar Operational Area

In the Soledar Operational Area, mutual combat continued north of Soledar from [Rozdolivka to Vesele](#).^{5 6 7}

⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

⁶ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13492>




Bakhmut Operational Area

Russian forces are attempting to force Ukraine to reallocate their forces by launching attacks in the direction of [Minkivka](#), [Hryhorivka](#), and [Bohdanivka](#).^{8 9} None of the attacks were successful.

⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)




Klishchiivka Operational Direction

There was little change south of Bakhmut, with Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reporting a Russian attempt to advance in the direction of [Ivanivske](#), which failed, and Ukrainian forces on the offensive northwest of [Klishchiivka](#) and the administrative border of [Kurdyumivka](#).¹⁰ WarGonzo claimed that Ukrainian forces were able to advance in the direction of both settlements, but there are no pictures or videos for independent verification, per our editorial standards.

¹⁰ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13492>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,


destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Avdiivka Operational Area

The only fighting reported was a Russian attack, which failed, on the eastern edge of [Pervomaiske](#).¹¹

¹¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)




Marinka Operational Area

Fighting continued in [Marinka](#) but at a reduced tempo.¹² ¹³
 There was no change in the situation, and neither the Russian Ministry of Defense nor Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov has recently commented on the status within the city.

¹² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)


¹³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13492>



Vuhledar Operational Area

The 1st Army Corps attempted to advance toward [Novomykailivka](#) from the east and were unsuccessful.¹⁴

14 14



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Ukrainian forces pushed the Russian 394th Regiment out of [Rivnopil](#), and as we assessed on June 5, the loss of the Russian strongpoint would force a withdrawal to Staromaiorske. Ukrainian forces were able to advance from the east and south to the edge of [Staromaiorske](#) as well as advance to the edge of [Pryyutne](#) [Zaporizhia-Donetsk administrative border] after capturing Rivnopil, expanding the operational success into tactical gains.¹⁵ ¹⁶ The map was adjusted. Ukrainian forces have liberated 135 square

¹⁵ <https://t.me/rybar/49063>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13492>




kilometers of territory since June 5 in Donetsk and Zaporizhia.

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ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians


Free Zaporizhia

Russian forces carried out 43 fire missions, targeting 15 settlements along the Zaporizhia line of conflict.¹⁷ The more than 50% reduction in artillery fire is likely related to the weather and logistics issues with the ground lines of communication (GLOC – supply line) from Crimea into Melitopol compromised by Ukrainian missile interdiction and insurgent sabotage.

RMOD reported fighting near Myrne but did not specify if this was in the Hulyaipole or Orikhiv area of operation. There were no changes in territorial control claimed.¹⁸

¹⁷ https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/19843

¹⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/27857 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Orkiv Operational Area

WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces did not make a deep advance but were able to move the line of conflict further south along a 10-kilometer axis just north of [Robotyne](#).¹⁹ The map was adjusted using terrain analysis. Russian forces continued their attempts to advance toward [Novopokrovka](#) to regain lost territory without success.²⁰

¹⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13492>

²⁰ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

It was verified that Reactors 1 through 4, and number 6, of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), were in cold shutdown. Reactor 5 remained in hot shutdown to generate steam for plant operations.²¹

United Kingdom Minister of Defense Ben Wallace was asked by MPs in the House of Commons of the British Parliament about the threats against ZNPP, saying, "We monitor it very closely. We work with the international community to make sure that everything that can be done is done to protect that nuclear power station."²² John Kirby, Communications Coordinator of the White House National Security Council, told reporters, "I'm not going to get into specific intelligence. I would tell you that we're watching this very closely. We've seen that reporting. We have, as you know, the ability near the plant to monitor radioactivity, and we just haven't seen any indication that threat is imminent. But we're watching it very, very closely."²³

²¹ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8619

²² <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/26/7408658/>

²³ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/27/7408699/>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) reported four Black Sea Fleet vessels were on patrol with no missile carriers.²⁴

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale


Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Free Kherson

Kherson Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA), Alexander Prokudin, reported that Russian forces carried out 55 fire missions, firing 264 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad rockets fired by multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS), indirect tank fire, drone-delivered IEDs,

²⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/102977>

and bombs.²⁵ Fourteen munitions hit the city of Kherson, with strikes killing three and wounding five.²⁶ ²⁷ Streetcar service will be suspended through June 28 after a Russian artillery strike targeted city transit's electrical infrastructure and vehicles, killing three workers and wounding three more.




Fighting continued near [Dachi](#) and on the approach to [Oleskhy](#), with Ukrainian forces expanding their bridgehead. Russian milblogger Romanov reported that a company of Storm-Z penal mercenaries, with 📷 [at least two soldiers](#)

²⁵ <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/794>

²⁶ <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/794>

²⁷ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8627

[with no shoes](#), attempted to retake the dachas west of the Antonovskyy Bridge and suffered catastrophic losses, confirming an earlier report of the failed counterattack on June 25.²⁸ Adding to Russian woes, the Russian Airforce (VKS) provided close air support (CAS) but was operating in a danger close environment, accidentally dropping at least two FAB-500S-E UPMK glide bombs on Russian positions. Ukrainian forces also remotely mined the approach to the remains of the Antonovskyy Bridge,  [destroying at least one Russian BMP-2](#) infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).²⁹

The water level of the Dnipro River rose 4 centimeters due to heavy rains and thunderstorms across Ukraine, returning flooding to two settlements and impacting two homes. There has been no update by Ukrainian officials on the status of the 109 people still listed as missing.³⁰

²⁸ https://t.me/romanov_92/39548

²⁹ <https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1673453983258615809>

³⁰ https://t.me/shtab_kakhovska_hes/1236

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There was no significant activity.

THEATERWIDE

Somebody change the sign – it has been zero days since someone in the Russian government threatened nuclear war. Sergey Karaganov, a member of the Scientific Council under the Russian Security Council, published a second article that Russia has to launch a nuclear strike on Europe. Titled, *There is no choice: Russia will have to launch a nuclear strike on Europe*, Karaganov wrote, "I hope that we will never use nuclear weapons, but the fact that we refuse to use them in all situations, except in the

event of a deadly danger to the state itself, seems frivolous to me."³¹

President Zelenskyy congratulated and handed out awards of meritorious service to the members of the 3rd Battalion of the Separate Presidential Brigade during a trip near Velky Novosilka.³² Later, Zelenskyy stopped at a local gas station for tea and met with patrons in the store for photo opportunities and brief talks.

At the Anti-Shahed Drone Hackathon in Ukraine, more than 200 developers, engineers, cyber specialists, and enthusiasts competed for grants while demonstrating advanced systems and technologies to detect, track, and destroy drones. Three winners were selected by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with each team receiving a grant of \$1 million to kickstart further development and scale production.³³

Germany announced they would provide Ukraine with long-range precision-guided 155 mm Vulcano artillery rounds, with a published range of 80 kilometers, almost double the

³¹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/26/7408686/>

³² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/103037>

³³

<https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/26/7408678/>

range of the United States Excalibur shell. The Vulcano is fired exclusively from the German Pzh-2000 155 mm self-propelled howitzer.³⁴

Poland has agreed to send "thousands" of assault rifles, machine guns, and millions of small arms ammunition to Ukraine for use by border services and other rear-echelon state security units.³⁵

Troels Lund Poulsen, the acting Minister of Defense of Denmark, announced that the Baltic nation would retire its fleet of F-16 fighter jets early to accelerate the transfer to Ukraine.³⁶ The planes can't be provided before the end of 2023, and a formal decision on the transfer has not been made.

The table for equipment losses has been updated using data through June 25, 2023, and includes the losses suffered during the insurrection in Russia on June 23 and 24.

³⁴ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/4966

³⁵ https://t.me/Nazars_look/15017

³⁶ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/22028>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to June 25, 2023. 10,819 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 3,737 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1923	221	8.70:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	138	330	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	892	291	3.07:1	↓
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2444	584	4.18:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	317	279	1.14:1	—
MRAPs	43	100	0.43:1	↓
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	192	328	0.59:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	244	15	16.27:1	↓
Engineering Vehicles	313	69	4.54:1	↓
Towed Artillery	245	129	1.90:1	↑
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	428	171	2.50:1	—
MLRS	215	46	4.67:1	↑
SAMs	119	113	1.05:1	↑
Mobile Radars	35	64	0.55:1	↑
EW/ECW	41	4	10.25:1	↓
Winged Aircraft	84	68	1.24:1	↑
Helicopters	103	31	3.32:1	↑
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR

The Russian State Duma has passed two decrees that will effectively gut PMC Wagner and other private military companies. The first bans private companies from recruiting mercenaries in penal colonies, giving authority only to the Russian Ministry of Defense.³⁷ The second measure, reported by Pavel Krasheninnikov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Legislation and State Construction, will force any existing mercenary with a criminal record to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. "There was a time when PMCs could take those who are under sentence and conclude contracts with them. Now a different procedure has been adopted by law, that contracts are concluded only with the Ministry of Defense. The procedure is completely spelled out," Krasheninnikov said.³⁸

United State Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the chaos caused by the actions of Yevgeny Prigozhin could last for weeks or months to come. "Tensions have been building for months," he said, adding, "The effectiveness of the Russian military in Ukraine could be jeopardized...We

³⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/102987>

³⁸ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/34922>

know Putin has a lot to answer for in the weeks and months ahead."³⁹

Commander of the United Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Serhii Naev, dismissed fears that the events were just a ruse to move PMC Wagner forces to Belarus for an attack on northern or central Ukraine. "I want to assure everyone that the situation in the northern operational zone remains stable and under control. Our troops continue to build up defense structures. All services, from intelligence to engineering troops, operate in an enhanced mode. Currently, there is no increase in the enemy's equipment or manpower. The state border is under reliable protection 24/7. If this happens and the enemy tries to cross the state border, it will be nothing but suicide for them."⁴⁰

At the time of publication, a private jet that Yevgeny Prigozhin frequently uses flew from Rostov-on-Don to Minsk, but there was no confirmation that he was onboard.

³⁹ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/34846>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2349>

Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War

Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.