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SUMMARY – DAY 564

It has been 3,484 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 199 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- Fighting restarted north of Synkivka, with Russian forces being pushed back
- Significant fighting continued east of Novjehorivka with no change to the situation
- South of Bakhmut, Ukrainian forces have cleared the administrative borders of Klishchiivka and Andriivka
- Ukrainian forces captured Russian soldiers in Opytne as a planned Russian withdrawal turned into a rout
- Fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka across a broad front, but there remains significant fog of war
- A large warehouse in occupied Makiivka was hit by artillery and destroyed
- Fuel shortages have spread to occupied Mariupol
- At the time of publication, there were numerous reports that Ukrainian forces were advancing with armor forces **into** Novoprokopivka from the east after breaking through engineered Russian defenses
- Over the period of several weeks, Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) captured the strategically

important Boiko Towers – four gas platforms in the Black Sea

- The prime minister of the United Kingdom, Rishi Sunak, said that Russia attempted to sink a civilian cargo ship on August 24, but Ukrainian air defense intercepted the missiles targeting the vessel
- The self-declared president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, said that PMC Wagner mercenaries that remain in his country could work for his private military company
- The U.K. is providing Ukraine with 15 FV432 armored personnel carriers
- Germany announced it would provide Ukraine with 40 more Marder infantry fighting vehicles
- United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken answered questions about Elon Musk's interference with Starlink Internet service in Ukraine
- Russian propagandist Gennady Dubovoy was killed in occupied Donetsk when he was run over by a car
- The former Minister of Health of Chechnya, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic Elkhan Suleymanov, has been missing for months, with rumors swirling that Ramzan Kadyrov had him executed
- Russian mercenary milblogger Andrei Morozov, better known as Murz, announced he would stop providing radio equipment and other aid due to a spat with his commanding officers

- Two humanitarian aid workers with Road to Relief were killed and two more critically wounded when a Russian drone struck their vehicle near Bakhmut
- North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un is in Vladivostok to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin
- Russia's rupee problem is much bigger than initially reported
- International sanctions may have contributed to a narrowly missed civilian air disaster near Novosibirsk, Russia

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Our concern about Ukraine's ability to turn tactical gains into operational success and strategic victories has been tempered by expanding success in the Orikhiv area of operation (AO), the breaking of the stalemate in the Klishchiivka AO, and the declining quality of Russian troops.
2. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, and proxy forces.

3. At the direction of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian government is in the largest purge of dissident voices and perceived internal enemies since the Soviet era, including the leaders, mercenaries, and employees of PMC Wagner, objective state media journalists and war bloggers, far-right nationalists who want the Kremlin to take more aggressive action in Ukraine, and human rights activists.
4. There remains a possibility of partisan violence within Russia after the killings of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin. President Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains in a weakened state.
5. Our assessment that the continued soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's international border further emboldened Moscow to take calculated risks was accurate. After joint training exercises in the Black Sea between Ukraine, Romania, and the United States were announced, the United Kingdom announced they were flying combat air patrols over the western Black Sea to protect grain shipments, and Romania took steps to protect their border and citizens, Russian drone strikes are targeting other regions.
6. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political

- infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
7. The perceived slow progress of the Ukrainian summer-fall offensive, questions about the capabilities of Ukrainian military commanders at the battalion and brigade level, and ongoing anticorruption measures highlighting the problems within the Ukrainian government are unfairly straining Western support.
 8. We maintain Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition delivery dates, and these continued delays are negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
 9. We maintain that the growing number of combat ineffective and combat destroyed Russian units has forced commanders to commit strategic reserves meant for a fall counteroffensive into defensive operations. Additionally, due to declining combat potential, Russian commanders are activating the reserves from the second and third echelons of the Prigozhin and Surovikin Lines.
 10. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.


11. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

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
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



Dvorichna Operational Area


After making marginal gains on September 9 – 10, Russian forces were pushed back from the treeline northeast of [Synkivka](#).^{1 2}

¹ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1064>

² https://t.me/couch_IU/42225


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective New: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and set conditions to capture the rest of the region

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




Svatove Operational Area

Russian forces have been slowly pushed back from [Novoselivkse](#).³ Fighting continues in the area with no change in the situation. The intensity of Russian attacks east of [Novojehorivka](#) has decreased due to heavy losses.⁴ Some Russian units are combat destroyed, with surviving members being consolidated into new companies mixed with mobiks.⁵

³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11900>

⁴ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1064>

⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114087>




Kreminna Operational Area

Artillery duels continued in the [Serebryansky Woods](#) and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops were on the offensive west of [Dibrova](#).⁶


⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/30351 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective New: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region

Ukrainian Objective New: Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north and south of Bakhmut, cut off the ground lines of communication into Bakhmut and Soledar and liberate both operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




Soledar and Bakhmut Operational Areas

Deputy Minister of Defense for Ukraine Hanna Maliar reported that Russian attempts to restore its lost positions west of [Zaliznyanske](#) were unsuccessful.⁷ Russian attempts to advance on [Orikhovo-Vasylivka](#) and in the direction of [Bohdanivka](#) failed.⁸

⁷ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1064>

⁸ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1064>



Klishchiivka Operational Area

Russian forces have been pushed out of [Klishchiivka](#) and hold a small area northeast of the settlement along the railroad grade.^{9 10} We expect a formal announcement from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) within the next week. While Russian troops have left the northeastern corner of the settlement, Ukrainian forces haven't secured the area. A prominent Russian milblogger aligned with our assessment of September 9 that Ukrainian forces now occupy [Andriivka](#) and the railroad grade.¹¹ We also expect an announcement within the week.

⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11900>

¹⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17583>


¹¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14965>



Reports that Ukrainian forces have reached the outskirts of the Bakhmut suburb of [Opytne](#) are false.


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SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective New: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and capture the remainder of the oblast


Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, set conditions for an offensive in the Volnovakha and Mariupol directions, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




Avdiivka Operational Area

Russian forces are trying to push Ukrainian forces back from the approaches of the Krasnohorivka Plateau so they can use the area more freely for artillery. Russian forces attempted to advance toward [Keramik](#) and, despite support from the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), suffered heavy casualties and retreated to previously established defensive positions.¹²

¹² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11900>




While Russian milbloggers deny Ukrainian forces are occupying the northeastern part of [Opytne](#), Ukrainian troops shared videos of  [Russian soldiers captured in Opytne](#).¹³ Take all the time you need. Last week, Russian sources reported that retreating Russian soldiers requested a danger close fire mission to cover their withdrawal, but it turned into a rout. It was claimed the artillery strikes were requested within 200 meters of Russian positions and, as Russian troops tried to withdraw, came under fire from their own artillery. Over 30 were killed and almost 40 wounded in the 90-minute barrage. Reportedly, Russian drone operators mistook Russian troops for a Ukrainian

¹³ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6304

advance. It was the confusion and heavy losses that enabled the advance.¹⁴

Marinka and Vuhledar Operational Areas

Positional fighting and harassment attacks continued in [Marinka](#) with no change in the situation.^{15 16}



¹⁴ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14965>



¹⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11900>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14965>

Staromlynivka Operational Area

Fighting continued on a broad front south of Velyka Novosilka, including at [Shevchenko](#), in [Novomaiorske](#) and [Novodonetske](#), and near [Pryyutne](#) on the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk administrative border. There is significant fog of war and uncertainty about the size of the forces involved.

Occupied Donetsk

In Makiivka, the 4500 square meter Master Torg warehouse was hit by artillery, and  [completely engulfed in flames](#).¹⁷ It is unclear what was stored in the warehouse, with the sound of small arms ammunition cooking off, but the  [fire did not behave like burning munitions](#).¹⁸


Diesel and RON A-92 regular gasoline shortages have intensified in Mariupol as the supply chain for motor fuels crumbles from Crimea to the Russian border along the land bridge.¹⁹ The shortages have spread from impacting civilians and farmers to city utility vehicles. So far, there is no evidence that the shortages have spread to Russian military units.

¹⁷ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/100690>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/100690>

¹⁹ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/13369>

ZAPORIZHIA




Russian Objective New: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective New: Break through the Surovikin Line and sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhzhia

Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavskiy reported that Ukrainian forces executed 1,255 fire missions in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Kherson.²⁰



Orikhiv Operational Area

Fighting continued west of [Verbove](#), with Ukrainian sources reporting the challenge is that Russian commanders are pushing in reinforcements as fast as they can be

²⁰ <https://t.me/otarnavskiy/238>

neutralized. Ukrainian forces continued consolidating earlier gains and advanced south and southeast of [Robotyne](#), reaching the northern edge of [Novoprokopivka](#) and advancing through the high ground to the east.²¹ The push to the east of Novoprokopivka has enabled Ukrainian armor to advance further south. Russian attempts to advance north from [Nesterianka](#) were unsuccessful.²²

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There were no updates on the situation at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.


²¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11900>

²² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11900>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea


There was no report on the composition of the Black Sea Fleet.

During a series of offensive operations over the summer, Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) secured the Boiko Towers – four natural gas platforms across the Black Sea,  [including off the coast of Crimea](#).²³ Russia has been using the platforms to launch helicopter attacks and to extend radar and electronic warfare coverage further west of occupied Crimea.

Ukrainian forces captured air-to-ground missiles for attack helicopters, a Neva-B radar station being used as a repeater to extend the coverage of land-based radar systems, and an R-330 M1P Diabazol radio and electronic warfare complex.²⁴

²³ https://t.me/couch_IU/42228

²⁴ <https://t.me/informnapalm/18792>

The Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR)  [released a video of the operation](#).²⁵ Over the past months, pieces of information have been shared, including MANPADs fired from boats to suppress Russian combat air patrols and the search for a missing soldier who fell off a boat.

ASSESSMENT: While it is unclear if Ukrainian forces can maintain a presence on the towers, taking away Russia's ability to use them to resupply and support attack helicopters and reducing their radar coverage and electronic warfare capability is strategically important. Ukraine could use the towers to launch their own attacks using crewed watercraft and uncrewed surface vessels, track the activity of the Black Sea Fleet, and launch SSO operations in occupied Crimea.

Romania

NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Joan Vin said that the Alliance did not see any evidence that Russia "intended" to attack Romania after the wreckage of at least two Shahed-136 kamikaze drones was found last week. Despite the assurances, Romania joined the Sea Breeze 23.3 training exercises with the United States and Ukraine in the

²⁵ <https://t.me/informnapalm/18792>

western Black Sea and the Danube River delta and is building bomb shelters in some communities adjacent to Ukraine.²⁶

Occupied Crimea

Diesel fuel shortages are getting worse in occupied Crimea. In Chervonnoe, two truckloads of diesel were delivered, and the price was set at 85 roubles per liter, a 20% jump from the last shipment.²⁷ The fuel shipment quickly sold out. RON A-92 regular is also in very short supply.

Odesa

After declassifying information, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Rishi Sunak, reporting that on August 24, the Russian Federation attempted to sink a Liberian-flagged civilian cargo ship in Odesa. Ukrainian air defense intercepted two Kalibr cruise missiles, and two guided Kh-59 missiles launched at the vessel.^{28 29}

²⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114076>

²⁷ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/41960>


²⁸ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114097>

²⁹ <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/10366>

KHERSON

Russian Objective New: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



There weren't any significant updates in this region.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives


There weren't any significant updates in this region.

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Chernihiv

Two Shahed-136 kamikaze drones  [struck a two-story apartment building in Chaykine](#), starting a fire and causing

significant damage. At the time of publication, there was no information available about casualties.³⁰

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective New: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Kursk

A Ukrainian drone struck the city administration building in Rylsk, damaging the roof and blowing out the windows. There were no reports of casualties.³¹

³⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114015>

³¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114114>

BELARUSIAN FRONT

The remaining Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group mercenaries were offered to join PMC GradServis, which the illegitimate president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, owns.³² The PMC is headquartered in Maryina Gorka near Minsk. The remaining Wagnerites are running out of employment options, and the Council of Commanders of the Wagner Group has still not issued a formal statement on what is next for the mercenary terrorist organization.


THEATERWIDE

Head of the GUR, Kyrylo Budanov, said the Ukrainian counteroffensive will not culminate in the fall and will continue "in all directions."³³ He added that due to Russian mines, antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), and drones, most of the offensive is "going on our feet."

³² <https://t.me/uniannet/111027>

³³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114034>

On the night of September 11, Russia launched at least 12 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones in the direction of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk. All 12 were intercepted.³⁴

The U.K. has provided the territorial defense of Ukraine with 15  [FV432 armored personnel carriers](#), which have similar capabilities to the American M113.³⁵ While introduced in the 1960s, 500 were updated and modernized to remain in service through the end of the 2020s.³⁶

On September 10, United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken was asked by CNN about Elon Musk's reported interference with Starlink Internet service in Ukraine and if he or SpaceX will face any "consequences." Blinken said, "I can't talk about a specific episode. Here's what I can tell you. Starlink is a vital tool for Ukrainians to communicate with each other, and especially for the military to communicate in their efforts to protect the entire territory of Ukraine. It remains so and will continue to be critical to their efforts. Therefore, we hope and expect that this technology will remain fully available to Ukrainians. It is vital to what they do."³⁷

³⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114001>

³⁵ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/3117>

³⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114042>

³⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114113>

Germany will provide Ukraine with 40 more Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), increasing the total number to 80.³⁸ The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, and his German counterpart, Annalena Baerbock, held negotiations on the development of bilateral relations, the increase of the coalition in support of the Ukrainian Ten Point Peace Formula, new ways of grain export, bolstering air defense, and the transfer of long-range Taurus cruise missiles. After the meeting, Kuleba said, "Today, we better understand the specifics of the process of making a final decision by the German government. For its part, Ukraine is ready to do everything necessary to speed it up."

The table for equipment losses was **updated on September 1, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

³⁸ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114020>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to September 1, 2023. 11,936 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,326 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2132	271	7.87:1	—
Medium Duty Tanks	147	360	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	958	317	3.02:1	↓
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2715	728	3.73:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	346	330	1.05:1	—
MRAPs	47	153	0.31:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	204	365	0.56:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	249	16	15.56:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	340	79	4.30:1	↓
Towed Artillery	292	157	1.86:1	↓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	509	212	2.40:1	↓
MLRS	257	50	5.14:1	↑
SAMs	165	129	1.28:1	—
Mobile Radars	45	75	0.60:1	—
EW/ECW	53	4	13.25:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	89	71	1.25:1	—
Helicopters	111	34	3.26:1	↓
Naval Vessels	13	27	0.48:1	—

RUSSIAN MOBIKS, MOBILIZATION, AND MIR

Russian propagandist, former “little green man” of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), and mercenary milblogger Gennady Dubovoy was instantly killed when he was struck by a car in the occupied city of Donetsk.³⁹ In a plot twist that is raising questions, Dubovoy was struck by Vyacheslav Snitkin, the commander of the Commandant Regiment of the DNR, who reportedly was driving a car with no license plates and fled the scene.⁴⁰

There are conflicting reports about the status of Chechen Colonel General Ramzan don don Kadyrov and the Minister of Health of Chechnya, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic Elkhan Suleymanov, also Kadyrov’s personal physician. Reports have swirled since April 2022 of Kadyrov suffering from declining health. In October 2022, Kadyrov was advised that a medication prescribed by Suleymanov was the cause of his illness. It is reported that the former personal physician has been put into custody. There were also multiple reports claiming he was executed months ago.^{41 42}

³⁹ <https://t.me/uniannet/111065>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/uniannet/111041>

⁴¹ <https://t.me/vchkogpu/41701>

⁴² <https://t.me/vchkogpu/41705>

Russian milblogger Andrei Morozov, better known as Murz, announced on his Telegram channel that he would no longer provide aid to Russian units seeking camouflage netting and, more critically, radio equipment after a falling out with his commanders. Murz, who has agreed with Igor Strelkov Girkin in the past and was investigated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in late 2022 due to his social media posts skewering the Russian Ministry of Defense, announced that he was returning to the frontlines for the first time since 2020.⁴³

"The fact is that the transfer of this batch of radio communications to the brigade ended with the fact that the officers of my battalion, the Prizrak battalion, which is now part of the 4th brigade, including the battalion commander, made a complaint to me – that I forgot about [the] interests of the battalion and I want to gain favor with the brigade command."

"No one approached me and asked, 'Why did KCPS spend all this money this way?' And I would answer that a person came to me and suggested, 'Let's give you money so that you can connect with some large division as it's necessary.'

⁴³ <https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2659>

One in the DNR and one in the [so-called Luhansk People's Republic – Ed.] LNR. Here in the LNR, you make a good connection for the whole brigade. We believe in you that the money will go to work."

"And I went to the head of communications of our brigade, coordinated the application with him, we took into account the interests of all brigade divisions, including 'Ghost,' brought equipment, [and] it went to work. And 'Ghost' was also given some of its equipment."

"Nobody asked me. It's just that people, apparently focusing on the structure of their own inner world, consider me by default to be an asshole who wants to 'sit on humanitarian aid' until the end of the war [Murz is suggesting he is being accused of fraud – Ed.] and 'get under the skin of the big bosses.' When some pen pal boxers on the Internet think so, I don't give a damn. When the battalion I serve, including my commanders, think so, I consider it unacceptable."

"In connection with all this, as I already said, I am finishing my 'humanitarian studies' completely and forever. I hope that soon, I will finally find myself at the front, on the front line."

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

In Ivanivske, a Russian kamikaze drone struck a vehicle with four foreign humanitarian aid workers, killing two. Emma Igual, a citizen of Spain and the director of the international organization "Road to Relief," and Canadian volunteer Anthony Ignat were killed. German volunteer medic Ruben Mavik and Swedish volunteer Johan Matias were severely injured by shrapnel and suffered significant burns. The Ukrainian 3rd Brigade 2nd Battalion evacuated the pair.⁴⁴ According to the Road to Relief website, the organization works with several Ukrainian battalions to provide stabilization care, including medical transport.

GEOPOLITICS

Brazilian President Zalupa Lula da Silva walked back his assurances that Russian President Vladimir Putin would not be arrested if he came to the country. Silva told reporters he "doesn't know if Putin would suspend Brazilian justice" because it is up to the judiciary to decide. Brazil ratified the Rome Statute in 2002, which would legally

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/The3rdForceUA/19711>

obligate the South American nation to arrest Putin if he visited.⁴⁵

ASSESSMENT: President Putin is notoriously paranoid about flying, and it seems incredibly unlikely he would travel to South America under any circumstances.

On the subject of President Putin, the former KGB agent with Tzarist aspirations is hosting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Vladivostok after the equally paranoid dictator arrives by armor train.⁴⁶ It is widely believed that the meeting is to request ammunition and other weapons, as Russia's defense industry cannot support its current consumption without external help. While many are dismissive of the reclusive and poverty-stricken nation, North Korea likely has deep reserves of 122 mm and 152 mm artillery rounds, 125 mm tank rounds, Grad rockets, and mortars of various calibers. China and Iran appeared more concerned about international sanctions, and Moscow has already raided its reserve stocks in Belarus.

Recent analysis supported our assessment from the fall of 2022 that Russia can produce up to two million artillery

⁴⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114003>

⁴⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114040>


rounds a year, outstripping their consumption by up to 500%. Russian industry is further restricted on the number of charges they can produce, reducing the range of their artillery systems.

ECONOMY

We had previously reported that Russia had a rupee problem. After accepting payment for oil and gas shipments to India in rupees, Moscow found that due to a major trade imbalance and the inability to convert the currency into something Russia could use, the treasury was stuck with a growing mountain of unusable money. A report in the U.S. publication Newsweek outlined how bad it is, with an estimated \$40 billion stuck in unconvertible rupees.⁴⁷

A Ural Airlines A320 narrowly avoided disaster after experiencing a midflight total hydraulics failure. The airline, originally owned by an Irish leasing company and stolen by Russia in March 2022, was flying from Sochi to Omsk with 170 passengers and crew when it experienced the in-flight emergency. Unable to land in Omsk, the

⁴⁷ <https://t.me/uniannet/111015>

airplane attempted to continue to Novosibirsk but ended up  [making an emergency landing in a fallow field](#) in the village of Kamenki.⁴⁸ One side of the aircraft was smeared black from what appeared to be a possible fire. Incredibly, no one was injured. We have previously reported how multiple Russian airlines still operate so-called “red tag” aircraft with critical maintenance issues. Airlines can’t get parts due to sanctions and the status of over 640 airlines as stolen. Russian civilian aviation leaders have warned that most of their fleets will be grounded by the end of 2024 without a resolution.


Analysts in Russia are warning that the prices for private homes could jump another 20% to 25% before the end of the year due to the exchange rate for the rouble increasing the cost of building materials.⁴⁹ The Central Bank of Russia is struggling to prop up the value of the rouble while preventing hyperinflation.


⁴⁸ <https://twitter.com/TreasChest/status/1701445250248531994>


⁴⁹ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/100478>


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.