

**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SITUATION REPORT**

July 11, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

7/11/23 23:59* PST

Malcontent News is an independent group of journalists and researchers in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, Israel, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We are part of Badon Hill Group, LLC, and operate independently from all entities.

We are funded through Patreon, grants, and donations and aided by volunteers. For media inquiries, you can contact social@malcontentnews.com. For news tips, you can contact our newsroom at tips@malcontentment.com.

[Patrons at the Bronze level or higher](#) can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patrons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

This update is copyright © 2023 by Badon Hill Group LLC, all rights reserved. No parts of the original content can be reused without express written permission. Authors and Analysts: David H. Obelcz, Adam Irving, Jeff Davis, Katie Livingstone, Oskar Hallgrimsson, Ryan Evans, Michael Hering, and Ana Ras, Spanish Editor in Chief

The reader accepts that the information contained in the Malcontent News Situation Report will not be used for travel, navigation, or personal security assessment. The reader agrees to get real-time information from official channels provided by national, oblast, raion, hromada, city, or local officials and follow their security recommendations.



SUMMARY – DAY 502 3

DAILY ASSESSMENT 4

TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP 6

UKRAINE WEATHER 7

SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY 8

KHARKIV 9

DONBAS REGION 10

LUHANSK 10

NORTHEAST DONETSK 14

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK 21

ZAPORIZHIA 27

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION 32

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE 33

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE 35

RUSSIAN FRONT 36

THEATERWIDE 36

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES 41

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR 42

SUMMARY – DAY 502

It has been 3,422 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 137 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- The report that Russian forces had advanced to Torske was incorrect
- Ukrainian forces made more advances in the Soledar and Klishchiivka areas of operation
- In the Avdiivka and Marinka operational areas, Russian attacks continue
- Ukrainian forces expand their bridgehead at Dachi
- After the public expression of frustration with NATO's memo and the state of Ukraine's membership path, Kyiv takes a softer tone
- Germany announces another military aid package
- A memorandum to start F-16 fighter pilot training has been signed involving 11 nations

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. The release of the commanders of Azovstal from Türkiye and the Kremlin claiming they were aware of the exchange on July 5, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirming that Yevgeny Prigozhin and 34 other PMC Wagner commanders met with President Vladimir Putin for three hours on June 29 feeds into the continued risk of another attempted insurrection/coup.
2. The current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
3. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
4. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community will impact Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
5. Russian forces on the forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) suffer from critical shortages of heavy weapons, effective radio communications, food, and


potable water, increasing casualties and lowering morale.

6. Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
7. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)



TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)




UKRAINE WEATHER



Severe weather has left Ukraine with a continued chance of pop-up thunderstorms and showers throughout the week. High temperatures will be from 20° to 32° Celcius, with July 14 forecasted as the hottest day. Low temperatures will be from 10° to 23°. Windows up to 60 kph are possible in central Ukraine on July 14 and 15. The new moon is on July 17.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



July 18, 2023, GFS forecast predicts soil saturation will range from 10% to 45% to 40 centimeters deep across the theater of war within Ukraine.

The soil saturation model does not consider the lakebed of the Kakhovka Reservoir. Soil saturation is between 15% to 45% in southern and eastern Ukraine. Thunderstorms could impact tractability in localized areas in eastern Ukraine on July 13 and 14, followed by a drying trend through July 19.

KHARKIV




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

There wasn't any significant activity.

DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

Free Luhansk


The spokesperson for Operational Command East (OKE), Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, reported that Russian forces fired 470 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets, indirect tank fire, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs from Dvorichna in Kharkiv to Bilohorivka in Luhansk.¹



¹ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/11980>

Svatove Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations west of [Karmazynivka](#).²



Kreminna Operational Area

² https://t.me/mod_russia/28265 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Mutual fighting was reported near [Dibrova](#), with no change in the situation.^{3 4 5} Positional fighting continued in the [Serebryansky Woods](#).⁶


³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17067>

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/28265 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁵ <https://t.me/rybar/49593>


⁶ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17067>

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




Kreminna Operational Area

There wasn't a Russian advance into northeast [Torske](#) on July 10, and the 23rd Battalion deleted the video. According to the Ukrainian source DeepState, the original post from the Ukrainian military unit used clumsy language, which confused the analyst community. Shortly after the video was deleted, Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Hanna Maliar made another strong request to only trust materials released from the Ministry of Defense and not the unit level.⁷ We noticed a significant reduction in information shared by Ukrainian sources today. It is unclear if this is

⁷ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17066>


because it appears both combatants have entered an operational pause, recent poor weather hampered logistics, or if there is an intentional further reduction in information sharing. We have regressed the map to July 9 based on this new intelligence.



Siversk Operational Area


The Russian Ministry of Defense reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Spirne](#).⁸

⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/28265 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Soledar Operational Area

Russian forces tried to counterattack in the direction of [Vesele](#) without success. The Ukrainian units that advanced [west of Yakovlivka and east of Mykolaivka](#) were able to capture the remainder of the Russian defense lines between the two wedges.



Bakhmut Operational Area


GSAFU reported that Russian forces attempted to attack east of [Orikhovo Vasylivka](#) along the ridgeline adjacent to the M-03/E-40 Highway.⁹ The attack was unsuccessful. Russian forces also made another attempt to advance toward Hryhorivka, which failed.¹⁰ Mutual fighting continued in the southwestern corner of [Berkhivka](#).^{11 12}

⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10302>

¹⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10302>

¹¹ <https://t.me/rybar/49593>

¹² <https://t.me/wargonzo/13747>



Klishchiivka Operational Area

Fighting continued west and northwest of [Klishchiivka](#), with Ukrainian forces clearing the forested block on the southern edge of the stronghold and trench network on the western edge of the settlement.^{13 14} The map was adjusted to show the territorial control change. Ukrainian forces are now less than 500 meters from the first group of houses, and the line of conflict has reached the administrative border of the town. A Russian video showed Klishchiivka is


¹³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17067>

¹⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/28265 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

under Ukrainian fire control, making daytime movement almost impossible. There were reports of continued fighting east of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal in the direction of [Andriivka](#).

Ukrainian military leaders suggest that Chechen Akhmat forces are in the Bakhmut area of operation but as blocking units to prevent further retreats and are not operating near the friendly line of Russian troops (FLOT - zero line).


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




Avdiivka Operational Area

The Russian 1st Army Corps is using the cut-and-paste option for their war planning. A Russian attack from the area of Vesele, supported by Russian army aviation, attempted to advance in the direction of [Avdiivka](#) without success.^{15 16} Mutual fighting was reported in the gray area

¹⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10302>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13747>

between [Sjeverne and Vodyane](#), on the eastern edge of [Pervomaiske](#), and near [Nevelske](#).^{17 18 19}



Marinka Operational Area

In the Marinka operational area, Russian forces launched attacks east of [Krasnohorivka](#), on the northern flank of [Marinka](#), and east of [Pobjeda](#). None of the attacks were successful.^{20 21 22}

¹⁷ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10323>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10302>


¹⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/28265 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10323>

²¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10302>

²² <https://t.me/wargonzo/13747>

Russian attacks in and near [Marinka](#) were also unsuccessful.^{23 24 25}



Vuledar Operational Area

It was a similar situation east of [Novomykhailivka](#), with continued Russian attacks failing to move the line of conflict.^{26 27 28}

²³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10289>


²⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10299>

²⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13729>

²⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10289>

²⁷ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10299>

²⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13729>



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

GSAFU reported that Russian forces, supported by the Russian Airforce (VKS), attempted to advance in the direction of [Blahodatne](#) without success.²⁹ Positional fighting continued near [Staromaiorske](#) and [Pryyutne](#). In today's press briefing, Ukrainian officials said that Ukrainian troops were consolidating their recent territorial gains in preparation for their next advance.

Free Donetsk

²⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10302>

Serhii Kovalenko, the CEO of DTEK Group, reported that the July 7 roof collapse at the Kurakhove Thermal Power Plant was caused by previous damage by Russian shelling. Two employees were killed and three wounded. One of the power units was operating again despite the collapse.³⁰


Occupied Donetsk

Insurgents in Mariupol documented Russian forces setting up ammunition warehouses next to occupied civilian housing in the Shevchenko and Primorsky Districts.³¹

³⁰ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/11/7410893/>

³¹ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/11449>


ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhia: Ukrainian forces carried out 1,418 fire missions and 15 airstrikes on Russian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia.³²



Orikhiv Operational Area

Fighting on the northern edge and northeast of [Robotyne](#) and the eastern edge of [Zherebyansky](#) continued with no change in the situation.^{33 34}

³² <https://t.me/vilkul/3729>

³³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17067>

³⁴ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13747>

The spokesperson for the Press Center of the Tavrian Defense Forces, Valerii Shershen, reported that 19 Russian soldiers had been taken prisoner on July 11 and ten on July 10.³⁵ "This is the first time such a large number of prisoners has been recorded, specifically in the summer and specifically during the Tavria group's offensive operations. This is indicative of low morale and demotivation among enemy personnel. And, of course, that is a success on our side."

ASSESSMENT: We rarely report casualty, missing in action, and prisoner of war numbers as they are hard to verify. We continue to see three to six new POW videos a day released by Ukrainian forces, and in our assessment, these are at least close to accurate numbers.

Occupied Zaporizhia

Russian troop concentrations were hit by rockets fired by HIMARS, with Russian propaganda claiming the attack used cluster munitions. The NATO-provided 155 mm artillery rounds are not rockets and would require firing within 3 kilometers of the line of conflict to strike Tokmak.³⁶

³⁵ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/11/7410808/>

³⁶ <https://t.me/zaborzp/48732>

Insurgents in Tokmak dismissed the claim, stating that “regular rockets” were used, suggesting Russian positions were hit by M30A1 HIMARS rockets.³⁷

Berdyansk was hit by Storm Shadow missiles twice in less than 24 hours. The Russian Southern Military District headquarters at the Dunes Resort was destroyed.³⁸ A Russian Lieutenant General was killed in the strike. There is more information in the **Russian Mobilization, Mobiks, and Mir** section. Two more missile strikes were reported in the morning.³⁹

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

United States Department of State spokesperson Matthew Miller called for Russia to stop interfering with the International Atomic Energy Agency.⁴⁰ “We believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency should have full access to all parts of the plant. Russia should facilitate this access locally. We've said it several times. The Russian leadership should think long and hard about whether they want to risk causing a nuclear catastrophe. Because if this

³⁷ https://t.me/tokmak_ukraine/4233

³⁸ https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2498

³⁹ <https://t.me/zaborzp/48714>

⁴⁰ https://t.me/energoatom_ua/13915



happens, the international community will definitely hold Russia accountable."

COPYRIGHT 2023, MALCONTENT NEWS

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Insurgents in Sevastopol reported a Kilo-class submarine capable of carrying up to four Kalibr cruise missiles left the port.⁴¹

Occupied Crimea

To alleviate traffic backups to Crimea, the Russian large landing ship (LLS) Olenegorsky Gornyak transported 14 trucks across the Kerch Strait.⁴² Russia said it would use the vessel if needed to help reduce the traffic using the Crimean Bridge and as added support to the Kerch Strait Ferry, which was suspended for almost two days due to severe weather.

Odessa

The Shahed-136 kamikaze drone attack on the night of July 10 – 11 concentrated on Odesa, with 24 UAVs targeting the grain terminal at the port in violation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Twenty-two drones were shot down, with

⁴¹ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/36136>


⁴² <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/36124>

two striking an administrative building and a grain terminal.⁴³ There wasn't any critical damage, and the fires were quickly controlled.^{44 45}

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Russian forces targeted the humanitarian aid center in Kherson for the third time in the last four weeks, wounding five people and damaging five residential buildings.⁴⁶ In a break from the usual Kherson target, Russian artillery  [attacked the Kherson Regional Military District](#) and the prosecutor's office.⁴⁷ The settlement of Sofiivka was shelled by Grad rockets fired by multiple launch rocket systems, killing one civilian.⁴⁸

⁴³ https://t.me/our_odessa/49867


⁴⁴ https://t.me/our_odessa/49866

⁴⁵ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/11/7410761/>

⁴⁶ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8938

⁴⁷ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/8940

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/949>



Ukrainian forces reportedly expanded the bridgehead at Dachi, taking control of the approach to the remains of the Antonovskyy Bridge north of the Konka River and keeping Russian units under fire control.⁴⁹

Occupied Kherson

A Storm Shadow cruise missile reportedly hit Russian positions in Skadovsk. There was no other information at the time of publication.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/rybar/49593>

⁵⁰ <https://t.me/zaborzp/48732>

Cherkasy

Local officials reported that a Shahed-136 kamikaze drone struck a non-civilian infrastructure facility causing a fire and wounding two people.⁵¹

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

⁵¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/105072>

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest


There wasn't any significant activity reported.

THEATERWIDE

Russia launched 15 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones at Ukraine, with the air defenses intercepting 11 UAVs.⁵² At least one drone struck Cherkasy.

We provided our analysis of the Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North

⁵² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/105071>

Atlantic Council in Vilnius in a  [Flash Report](#), which provides a downloadable copy of the memo.

After publicly expressing frustration, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Kyiv officials struck a more conciliatory tone. In a TV interview, the head of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleskiy Danilov, said, "We now have to do a lot of homework on the full transition to Alliance standards...NATO is not only a military alliance; it is also a word about democracy, human rights, and freedom. First of all, it will be necessary to "do a lot" in this area. Our army already meets NATO standards, and the actions of our army meet the standards. No one has any questions here...we have already moved this process from a dead point. And if on February 24 we had units of weapons of their standard, then today there are more units. What we heard today and will hear tomorrow will be important days in our history. Of course, I would like to [join] from the first time and right away. But we keep in mind that the Alliance includes 31 countries, and each country must give its consent. This is not an easy process. But I am sure that we will pass this way."⁵³

⁵³ <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/9450>

Sergeant Major of the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Markus, sent a letter requesting he be demoted because of an ongoing disagreement with the brigade's commanders.⁵⁴ Markus became Internet famous on June 28, when he described a successful advance in Zaporizhia and spending the night in a trench with the corpses of dead Russian soldiers.

"I'm totally opposed to the decisions that have been made regarding the deployment and development of the 47th Brigade. We haven't been allowed to develop the military unit in line with the values we have stated at the time it was being created. I no longer have opportunities to influence or rectify the situation. I no longer think it is appropriate for me to remain the brigade's sergeant major. I can't abandon my people, so I'm **voluntarily** taking the lowest rank to be closer to them on the battlefield. The commander has received my resignation notice."

Days after Markus posted his video on Facebook, he met with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and discussed further developing the non-commissioned officer corps in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Since the meeting, Markus stated he believes the command has failed to understand the

⁵⁴ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/11/7410890/>

importance of the soldiers' morale and to champion the brigade's interests before the higher command and the incompetence of senior officers goes unpunished.

Minister of Defense of Ukraine Oleksii Reznikov signed a memorandum on creating a coalition to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16. The coalition includes Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and training will begin in August.⁵⁵

Germany announced another arms package for Ukraine.⁵⁶ The latest tranche includes,

- 2 Patriot system missile launchers
- 40 Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles
- 25 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks
- 5 Bergepanzer 2 armored recovery vehicles
- 20,000 155 mm artillery rounds
- 5,000 155 mm smoke rounds
- Drone detection and protection equipment
- LUNA drone system

⁵⁵ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/86952>

⁵⁶ https://t.me/zinkevich_igor/6960

- Medical equipment

France has confirmed that it would provide SCALP cruise missiles nearly identical to the British Storm Shadow cruise missile. Neither missile system is in production anymore, with the package reportedly including 50 missiles.⁵⁷ The missile is considered a “short-range” weapon, with a range of up to 300 kilometers.

The table for equipment losses was last updated on July 10, 2023, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

⁵⁷ https://t.me/zinkevich_igor/6957

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to July 10, 2023. 11,041 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 3,483 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1964	235	8.35:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	139	330	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	907	293	3.10:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2492	614	4.06:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	324	292	1.11:1	↓
MRAPs	45	113	0.40:1	↓
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	194	336	0.58:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	245	15	16.33:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	318	69	4.61:1	↑
Towed Artillery	253	134	1.89:1	↓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	442	175	2.53:1	—
MLRS	233	47	4.96:1	↑
SAMs	122	115	1.06:1	↓
Mobile Radars	36	68	0.53:1	—
EW/ECW	41	4	10.25:1	—
Winged Aircraft	84	68	1.25:1	—
Helicopters	106	31	3.42:1	—
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR

Russian Lieutenant General Oleg Yurievich Tsokov, Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District, was killed by a Storm Shadow cruise missile strike on July 11. His death has been confirmed by multiple Russian sources and the Russian Officers Killed In Ukraine research project.^{58 59}

In occupied Simferopol, the entire 7th floor of the civilian Republican Hospital has been converted into a ward for military patients, and the sixth floor is being prepared to receive more wounded.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ <https://twitter.com/KilledInUkraine/status/1678893643929640960>

⁵⁹ <https://t.me/brdprotiv/1022>

⁶⁰ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/36128>


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.