



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

August 12, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

8/12/23 23:59* PST

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SUMMARY – DAY 534

It has been 3,454 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 169 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- Ukrainian forces have stabilized defensive lines from Lyman Pershito Pershotravneve as the intensity of Russian attacks starts to drop
- Ukrainian forces have retaken the battlefield initiative in the Svatove area of operation (AO)
- Russian forces have concentrated their combat potential on Bilohorivka [Luhansk]
- The Russian Ministry of Defense reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near the tactically important settlement of Yakovlivka
- The Ukrainian Air Force is either taking more calculated risks or has established air parity in the Bakhmut AO and Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction (DO)
- Fighting continued in Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka, with Russian forces making marginal gains in Andriivka
- The operational tempo remains low in the Avdiivka and Marinka AOs

- Ukrainian forces control most of Urozhaine, with Russian sources reporting that Russian troops withdrew under fire
- Chechen Kadyrovites got into a gun battle with Russian troops in occupied Urzuf, resulting in Chechen OMON and civilians killed
- Multiple Russian sources reported that Ukrainian armored vehicles had entered the fight at Robotyne and breached the Russian minefields into the second echelon
- Fighting was reported in Robotyne and in the direction of Verbove
- A Russian convoy got into a motor vehicle accident near Pryazovske, struck a gas station, and caused a fire that closed the critical M-14 Highway ground line of communication
- Insurgents reported that dozens of wounded Russian troops were brought to the civilian hospital in Melitopol as other military hospitals were filled to capacity
- The Kerch (Crimean) Bridge was attacked twice by S-200 air defense missiles converted for ground attack without damaging the structure
- Ukrainian sources claim the Russian bases at Yevpatoria were struck by drones resulting in dozens of Russian casualties

- The Chongar Bridge is more severely damaged than first reported by Russian authorities and will take another four to eight weeks to repair
- Civilian petrol shortages have spread from occupied Donetsk to occupied Crimea
- Ukrainian border guards replaced the international border market on Zmiiny (Snake) Island
- A Russian convoy in Radensk was destroyed with dead, wounded, and ammunition cooking off
- A large Russian ammunition depot was destroyed in Oleshky
- The last well-prepared Russian reserve units of Russian airborne (VDV) troops in occupied Kherson have been transferred to Zaporizhzhia
- More pictures and videos from the Robotyne area suggest Ukrainian forces have advanced deeper than reported
- A Russian ballistic missile struck Kryvyi Rih
- A Russian reconnaissance unit tried to cross the international border near Znob-Novgorod
- A Russian Su-30 crashed, killing both crew members in Kaliningrad
- Gunfire and explosions reported near Krasnaya Yaruga in Belgorod were potentially a fratricide incident between Russian and Chechen troops
- Russia launched five Shahed-136 kamikaze drones with three shot down

- Inspections of Ukrainian military commissars at the regional level will continue through September, with 1,395 people facing conduct reviews
- German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall will provide Ukraine with LUNA NG drones
- There is an increase in the number of Russian deserters, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
- In Crimea, a Russian soldier shot and killed his sergeant when he did not respond to an identification challenge

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Our earlier assessment of Ukrainian military capabilities may have been overly pessimistic, with the introduction of DPICM (cluster munitions), tactics to identify Russian landmines established and a change of battlefield tactics resulting in new tactical gains and renewed daily progress in multiple AOs.
2. We remain concerned about Ukraine's capacity to turn operational success and tactical gains into strategic victories.

3. We maintain that signals from Kyiv indicating the next phase of the summer offensive are being prepared, and we now believe there are five operational areas where the next phase could start.
4. We maintain the reduced format Stavka on August 9 indicated Ukraine is preparing significant activity in the next 24 hours. However, the meeting may have been about firing and expanding the investigation of the commissariats and all managers.
5. It is highly unlikely that Ukraine will execute a wet crossing of the Dnipro River with a battalion-sized or larger force.
6. Our assessment that the loss of the road bridges at Henichesk and Chongar, and the previous damage to the railroad bridge at Syvash, would degrade Russian logistics appears to be accurate, with the number of Russian fire missions continuing to decline and expanding fuel shortages.
7. Due to a lack of troop rotation, growing ammunition shortages, and weak commanders, Russia is pushing combat ineffective and combat destroyed units to the forwardmost line of friendly troops (FLOT), engaging in attritional warfare against Ukrainian units.
8. Despite Ukraine's plans to move to the next phase, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and


- ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
9. We assess that Russian and Belarusian aggression and threats on the borders of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Black Sea coast will continue to expand and lead to an international incident if Ukraine's allies do not take a stronger posture.
 10. Russian President Vladimir Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection, and there continues to be a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt.
 11. Our assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces, was accurate with increasing fratricide incidents and desertions.
 12. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
 13. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political

infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

14. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

UKRAINE WEATHER



The ECMWF ensemble forecast model predicts a normal summer pattern with clear skies and a chance of seasonal afternoon pop-up showers and thunderstorms through August 18. High temperatures will be between 24° and 32° Celcius, and lows of 13° to 21°. There is a slightly elevated chance of thunders on August 17.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



The GFS model for August 20, 2023, predicts soil saturation will be between 5% and 40% across the theater of war. Tractability should not be impacted.

The soil saturation model does not consider the lakebed of the Kakhovka Reservoir. In the theater of war, soil saturation is between 15% to 40% in most areas and up to 70% in the Kreminna, Svatove, and Kupyansk AOs. A drying trend is forecasted through August 20.


KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

Free Kharkiv/Luhansk: Spokesperson for Operational Command East (OKE), Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, reported Russian forces fired 328 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs from Dvorichna [Kharkiv] to Bilohorivka [Luhansk] and carried out ten airstrikes. There were eight combat clashes reported.¹ The Russian offensive appears to be slowing with almost no verifiable gains.



¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109723>


Dvorichna Operational Area

We made more map adjustments based on new intelligence. We moved the line of conflict east, away from the Oskil River at [Hryanykivka](#) and [Masyutivka](#). We moved the line of conflict to the southern edge of [Lyman Pershyi](#) and 200 meters further south of [Vilshana](#). Despite repeated Russian claims, they have not entered or reached the northern edge of [Synkivka](#). Ukrainian troops were able to plug the gaps between their defense lines and bring the situation, which is still difficult, under control. Mutual fighting continued north of [Synkivka](#).^{2 3 4}

² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11027>

³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17350>

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Kupyansk Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported a Russian offensive north of [Kyslivka](#) failed, while the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Pershotravneve](#).⁵

⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




Svatove Operational Area

Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces had retaken the battlefield initiative in the Svatove AO.⁶ Based on today's combat reports, the statement by Seymon Pegov has weight.

⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14329>

RMOD and WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive again at [Novoselivske](#), [Nadiya](#), and on the edge of [Serhiivka](#).^{7 8 9}



Kreminna Operational Area


RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the [Serebryansky Woods](#).¹⁰

⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14329>

⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/29188 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁰ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Lysychansk Operational Area

Russian forces appear to have shifted their remaining combat potential on point attacks directed at [Bilohorivka](#) [Luhansk], where Ukrainian forces are straining to hold gains made in early July. We moved the line of conflict closer to the village and removed the gray area from the edge of Shpylyivka.¹¹


¹¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17350>

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




Soledar Operational Area

On August 11, RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces had launched an offensive in the area of Vesele but did not specify which one.^{12 13} On August 12, RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of [Yakovlivka](#). No other source claimed there was fighting in this area.¹⁴

¹² https://t.me/mod_russia/29151 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


¹³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14310>

¹⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Bakhmut Operational Area

The Ukrainian air force dropped at least two JDAM-ER glide bombs on apartment towers in the Litak region of Bakhmut, northeast of where the Mig-17 statue was located. It was one of several Ukrainian air strikes using glide bombs.



Klishchiivka Operational Area

Russian counterattacks in [Klishchiivka](#) and the western edge of [Kurdyumivka](#) failed again.^{15 16 17} Ukrainian forces have destroyed six Russian tanks and two infantry fighting vehicles near the railroad tracks on the northern tip of Klishchiivka in the last 48 hours. DeepState, Ukrainian milbloggers, aligned with our August 11 assessment, writing, "Russia [is] trying to hold at all costs." A geolocated video showed a  [Russian T-90M tank firing from the western edge of Andriivka](#).¹⁸ Based on this

¹⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11027>


¹⁶ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17350>

¹⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁸ <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1690420889177796609>

intelligence, we moved the line of conflict west but kept the settlement in the gray area.


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics


RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of Krasnohorivka but didn't specify if it was the settlement north or south of Avdiivka. No other source reported fighting near or in either town.¹⁹



¹⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Avdiivka Operational Area

The operational tempo remains very low, with mostly artillery duels, positional fighting, and harassment attacks east of [Avdiivka](#), in the [Sjeverne/Vodyane](#) gray area, and near the Ukrainian firebase at [Nevelske](#).^{20 21}




Marinka Operational Area

Positional fighting continued in [Marinka](#), with no change to the situation.²²


²⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11027>

²¹ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11027>



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction


Fighting continues in [Urozhaine](#), with Russian forces attacked from all sides.^{23 24 25} Ukrainian forces advanced to the center of the settlement, with multiple Russian sources reporting that the remaining troops withdrew under fire. We could not verify the claim, but we adjusted the map due to a geolocated video showing  [ongoing fighting in the southern part of the settlement](#).²⁶ Near Zavitne Bazhannya,

²³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14329>

²⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11027>

²⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²⁶ <https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1690441283507015681>

Russian troops attempting to leave Urozhaine on the one remaining ground line of communication (GLOC – supply line) under Ukrainian fire control were  [hit by DPICM \(cluster munitions\), wiping out a platoon.](#)²⁷

Russia cycled four brigades and regiments in defense of Urozhaine over the last two months, with the 247th Parachute (VDV) Regiment combat destroyed and three other units now combat ineffective. The shift in Ukrainian tactics and superior artillery fire caused heavy casualties. There were additional Ukrainian air strikes with JDAM-ER glide bombs in the rear areas, which also helped tip the balance of power.


Occupied Donetsk

In Urzuf, Chechen OMON Kadyrovites fought with Russian troops, which devolved into a shootout. An unknown number of Chechen troops were killed, but the fratricide happened near the center of the town during the day, with civilians caught in the crossfire. The gunfire killed two teenage girls, four boys, and a woman.²⁸

²⁷ <https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1690638106301440001>

²⁸ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/12542>

ZAPORIZHIA




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhzhia

Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavskiy, Commander of the Tavriia Operational and Strategic Group of Forces, reported that Ukrainian forces carried out 1,303 fire missions in eastern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.




Orikhiv Operational Area

Errors and Omissions: The August 11 SITREP declared, "Ukrainian forces have not breached the first echelon of the Surovikin Line." This was in error, and the sentence should have read, "Ukrainian forces **have not breached** the first echelon of the Surovikin Line." We thank our sharp-

eyed readers for defending the truth because the truth matters.

Fighting is ongoing in the northern and northeastern parts of [Robotyne](#), with Russian sources reporting the situation has become very difficult.^{29 30 31} Multiple Russian sources reported that Ukrainian tanks are supporting the light infantry attacks because the minefields have been beached, verifying that the first echelon of the Surovikin Line has been pierced. Ukrainian forces were also reportedly advancing toward [Verbove](#) again, in the second location where the minefields appear to have been breached.³² WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian light infantry was moving through natural terrain, bypassing Robotyne and advancing toward [Novoprokopivka](#). WarGonzo also said that Ukrainian forces renewed attacks on [Zherbyanky](#) but could not move the line of conflict.³³

Occupied Zaporizhzhia

A motor vehicle accident involving a Russian convoy caused a truck to  [slam into a gas station, causing an](#)

²⁹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17350>

³⁰ https://t.me/mod_russia/29187 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³¹ <https://t.me/rybar/50636>

³² <https://t.me/rybar/50636>

³³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14329>

[explosion and fire](#).³⁴ The M-14 Highway Russian GLOC at Pryazovske was closed for hours due to the crash and fire response. The accident was on the critical Crimean land bridge between Melitopol and Berdyansk.³⁵

In occupied Melitopol, insurgents reported that ambulances brought dozens of wounded Russian soldiers to the civilian hospital because all other military field hospitals were beyond capacity.³⁶

In Berdyansk, there was a significant  [explosion and fire in the port area](#), but no other information was released.³⁷

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There was no update on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

³⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109778>

³⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109783>

³⁶ https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2853

³⁷ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/12525>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) did not update the number of Black Sea Fleet vessels on patrol, and there were no insurgent reports of naval activity at Sevastopol.


Occupied Crimea

Ukraine twice attacked the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge, disrupting Russian logistics for hours. Two S-200 anti-aircraft missiles modified for ground attack were launched around 12:30 hours local time. Russian air defense appeared to shoot down both missiles, with bridge traffic closed, and a smoke screen used. The bridge reopened 90 minutes later but was attacked again at 14:40 hours by a single S-200, which was also intercepted. The bridge was reopened at the time of publication, and our network does not believe there was any significant damage.³⁸

The illegitimate occupation government of Crimea announced that there would be stiffer criminal penalties

³⁸ https://t.me/grey_zone/19990

for anyone who posts videos and pictures of the location or operation of Russian air defense systems, military facilities, or strategically important locations. A Russian tourist was forced to make an apology video in his bathing suit after posting a video showing the location and operation of Russian air defenses.³⁹

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) claimed that the August 11 – 12 drone attack involved 17 UAVs targeting the Russian logistics based at Yevpatoria. The attack was reportedly successful, with Ukrainian claiming there were dozens of Russian casualties and destroyed equipment. We cannot verify the claim. A video showing Russian air defenses operating appeared to show  [at least one drone did strike the area or a S-300 anti-aircraft missile failed immediately after launch.](#)⁴⁰

Russian gauleiter and illegitimate leader of occupied Kherson, Vladimir Saldo, announced that repairs to the Chongar Bridges would take another four to eight weeks due to "difficulties."⁴¹ We had previously reported that Ukraine intentionally targeted the embankment/abutments to the bridge to cause maximum damage and complicate

³⁹ <https://t.me/rsotmdivision/10038>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109791>

⁴¹ <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/9939>

repairs. This is why the bridges were struck at the ends instead of the center.

In occupied Crimea, gasoline prices continued to climb, and shortages of E-92 and E-95 gasoline (petrol) were expanding.⁴² Occupation leaders tried to assure tourists and residents there were no widespread shortages or problems with the supply chain.

Odesa

Ukrainian border guards  [replaced the international border marker on Zmiiny \(Snake\) Island.](#)⁴³

ASSESSMENT: While there is a moral and psychological victory for the Ukrainian people, this is a trap in our assessment. We expect the Russian air force (VKS) to bomb the island for no good reason beyond the pettiness of Russian commanders, and we believe that Ukrainian air defenses are already anticipating this.


⁴² <https://t.me/investigatorkua/6663>

⁴³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109789>

KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, prepare the region for illegitimate elections in September 2023, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



It has been requested by the Ukrainian government to curtail coverage in the Kherson region. Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense, Hanna Maliar, released a statement on the overall situation. "There is no cause for excitement. I just came back from those places. In order to land there [*the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River – Ed.*], not to be destroyed, and also to gain a foothold, you need to clear the territory and repel the enemy. We protect people. That's why we work on counterbattery. Yes, certain units performed a certain task there. This is predictable because our goal is to return all temporarily occupied territories, so we are working on this possibility everywhere."⁴⁴

We can verify that Deputy Minister Maliar was in Kherson on August 11. Ukrainian forces maintain their presence from [Dachi](#) to [Kozachi Laheri](#), where an unusual level of activity to support counterbattery missions continues.

Russian forces conducted 61 fire missions, firing 365 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad rockets, and drone-delivered IEDs on free Ukraine, striking the city of Kherson 13 times. Three people were wounded in the attacks, with two pensioners requiring hospitalization.

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/1119>


Occupied Kherson

The Crimean Tartar insurgent organization ATESH reported that Russian morale is low on the Dnipro River's left (east) bank, with the situation "getting out of control" due to desertions.⁴⁵

ASSESSMENT: Many of the units now defending the left bank were third-echelon defense who had been in country for ten or more months. These Russian units were heavily involved in constructing the Surovikin Line, and we praised the decision to give them busy work to keep them from getting into trouble and giving them a sense of mission. However, the units never received significant combat training and were moved to the forwardmost line of friendly Russian troops (FLOT). While these units will suffer casualties under targeted artillery attacks and drone strikes, additional losses are due to acute high-velocity steel and tungsten poisoning of the 5.56x45 mm and 7.62x39mm variety supporting counterbattery work.

⁴⁵ https://t.me/atesh_ua/1492

In occupied Oleshky, a large  [Russian ammunition depot was destroyed](#) by a Ukrainian artillery strike.⁴⁶


In Radensk, 18 kilometers south of the Konka River, a Russian convoy on the E-97 Highway GLOC has attacked, resulting in  [multiple casualties and the loss of at least two trucks](#) carrying ammunition.⁴⁷

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Dnipropetrovsk

A Russian ballistic missile struck Kryvyi Rih, terrifying a group of children  [waiting in line to receive back-to-school supplies](#).⁴⁸ Alexander Vilkul, Chairman of the

⁴⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109804>

⁴⁷ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/9625?single

⁴⁸ <https://twitter.com/i/status/1690368791983919104>

Defence Council of Kryvyi Rih, said there would be no report on the strike, but there were no casualties.⁴⁹

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Sumy

A Russian reconnaissance squad of ten soldiers attempted to cross the international border near Znob-Novhorodske. The Russian unit was engaged by mechanized infantry and drone-directed fire, suffered losses, and returned to Russia.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/12/7415283/>


⁵⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109787>

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Kaliningrad

In Kaliningrad, a Su-30 Flanker-C multirole fighter making a demonstration flight for Russian Air Force Day  [crashed with the loss of both crew members](#), who were flying too low to eject. This is the eighth Russian airplane lost due to training or demonstration flight accidents in 2023.⁵¹

Belgorod

Residents of Krasnaya Yaruga and Prilesie, Belgorod Region, report sounds of explosions and automatic bursts

⁵¹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5863

of gunfire.⁵² Russian officials claim that this was associated with the “work” of the Russian military, but there were reports from partisans that there was a fratricide incident between Chechen Akhmat and Russian troops. We could not confirm the report at the time of publication.

BELARUSIAN FRONT

There was no new development, but border tension remains high.

THEATERWIDE

On the night of August 11 – 12, Russia launched five Shahed-136 kamikaze drones at Ukraine, with three shot down. Kyiv did not report the status of the other two drones, and no social intelligence was available.⁵³

Ukrainian officials are conducting a wider corruption sweep within the military commissariat, with all 1,395 commissars in managerial roles being assessed for misconduct and

⁵² <https://t.me/bazabazon/20411>

⁵³ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/23293>

corruption. Kyiv said the investigations would go through the end of September.⁵⁴

German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall reported to Reuters that they intend to supply Ukraine with LUNA NG strike drones. The LUNA NG is a reconnaissance drone that can carry up to eight quadcopters, each armed with weapons and able to attack individual targets.⁵⁵

The table for equipment losses was **updated on August 6, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

⁵⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109785>

⁵⁵ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/39406>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to August 6, 2023. 11,570 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,100 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2059	256	8.04:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	144	346	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	939	305	3.08:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2622	682	3.84:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	341	316	1.08:1	—
MRAPs	46	134	0.34:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	199	348	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	246	16	15.38:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	329	74	4.45:1	↓
Towed Artillery	269	144	1.87:1	—
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	475	193	2.46:1	↓
MLRS	253	50	5.06:1	↑
SAMs	142	119	1.19:1	—
Mobile Radars	40	70	0.57:1	—
EW/ECW	49	4	12.25:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	85	69	1.23:1	—
Helicopters	107	32	3.34:1	↓
Naval Vessels	13	26	0.50:1	↑

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR

GSAFU reported that in Kherson, Russian blocking troops are searching houses for deserters and mobiks who are going AWOL to abuse drugs or alcohol. Units that moved into combat roles suffer from low morale due to losses, poor leadership, and a lack of understanding of their mission.⁵⁶ Deserters are moved to Storm-Z penal units or are strongly encouraged to return to their existing units.

A Russian soldier shot his sergeant under unusual circumstances, which is under investigation. The sergeant was reportedly in a restricted area when the soldier, who was on guard duty, challenged the person. The sergeant did not respond with the password, and the soldier reportedly fired two warning shots in the air. The sergeant continued to approach, with the soldier firing a third, fatal shot.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109807>

⁵⁷ <https://t.me/bazabazon/20416>

Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War


Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.