



**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
SITUATION REPORT**



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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 222

It has been 3,128 days since Russia occupied Crimea on February 27, 2014.

Our chief content officer was traveling on Monday for a personal matter. Today's report will be brief, not include some of our usual features, and will have less detailed maps. We thank you for your understanding.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Our assessment that Russian defensive lines in Kherson were collapsing over a large area was accurate, with Russian forces now withdrawing from previously critical defensive positions and unable to respond to the Ukrainian advance.
2. Our assessment in late July that once the Russian Vysokopillya salient in northern Kherson collapsed, the withdrawal of Russian troops would accelerate was accurate.

3. We maintain our assessment that Russia is incapable of responding simultaneously to three counteroffensives in Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Kherson.
4. We maintain that if a Russian force of company size or larger surrenders in northern Kherson, it will create a cascade of surrendering Russian troops. The defensive lines in northern Kherson are at high risk of complete collapse.
5. We assess that mass surrenders could become a logistical problem for Ukraine, which could overwhelm the ongoing counteroffensive.
6. We maintain that using tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield is highly unlikely as it would require striking what the Kremlin believes is Russian soil and Russian forces are incapable of fighting in a conventional environment, let alone a CBRN setting.
7. We assess that the Kremlin is facing its worst crisis in the information space since Vladimir Putin became President. Moscow not only has not set conditions for the collapse of its military mission in Ukraine, but less than a week ago portrayed the "special military operation" had achieved a great victory in annexing Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson. The state Duma appears to be looking for an off-ramp for Zaporizhia and Kherson and did not ratify the new borders for the two oblasts. State media journalists, propagandists, members of the Duma, and other


influencers are now openly critical of the Kremlin, the Ministry of Defense, and Putin's inner circle.

8. We maintain Russia's mobilization efforts are ineffective due to corruption, a lack of preparation, violation of the social contract with the Russian people, and conscripts being sent en masse to Ukraine without vital equipment or training.
9. We maintain that the next five days are critical as the Kremlin reveals its border intentions.
10. In our assessment, there is a heightened risk of terror attacks on cities in central and western Ukraine over the next few days with the ratification of the sham referendum borders. To be explicitly clear, we have no belief or concern that would include weapons of mass destruction.
11. We maintain we are in the Mutually Assured Destruction Instability Paradox due to irresponsible language from the Kremlin, looming decisions from Moscow leadership, and the deteriorating kinetic warfare situation for Russian troops in Ukraine.
12. Several news publications in Western journalism are attempting to take advantage of heightened concerns over nuclear war with poorly researched stories and sensationalist headlines. In our assessment, the western audience is ill-served amplifying these reports, which are overblowing the current situation.

13. We maintain our assessment that the Russian military in Ukraine is combat destroyed is accurate, and the Russian military has no meaningful way to respond to the ongoing and accelerating collapse on multiple fronts. It was reported the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army is combat destroyed.

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
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



Information about changes made to the map: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgency, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at Saky Naval Airbase. Based on your feedback, we changed the archived offensive flags to “gray circles.” The layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted, like [Kherson](#), the link will take you to the exact location explained in the Situation Report.

You can visit our war map at <http://www.rusvukrmap.com>

KHERSON COUNTEROFFENSIVE & MYKOLAIV



Russian Objective: Integrate oblast into Russian Federation, hold existing defensive lines, protect remaining Lines of Communication (LOC – supply lines), defend Kherson, prevent envelopment on the western side of the Dnipro River, restrict insurgent activity


Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the Kherson oblast west of the Dnipro River, push Russian forces back far enough to

end multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) attacks on Mykolaiv and Kryvvi Rih

BREAKING NEWS: At the time of publication, there was an unconfirmed report that the Russian Ministry of Defense had ordered a general retreat of Russian troops in the northern part of the Kherson oblast. We cannot verify the veracity of this claim, but it does appear that Russian forces have started a large-scale retreat north of a line from Davydiv Brid to Mylove.


Officially, Ukraine maintained tight operational security in Kherson. There was a high volume of information in the social intelligence space, which is unusual for Kherson, and the Russian information space remained panicked.

Ukraine's counteroffensive in Kherson moved approximately 32 kilometers in less than three days. There is dense fog of war, and Russian defensive lines are unstable. A large salient is forming in northern Kherson, with thousands of Russian troops running out of options.




Along the west bank of the Dnipro River, Russian defenses collapsed completely. Ukrainian forces have advanced to Dudchany and control about 75% of the town. Russian troops blew up the causeway in the southern part of the town to delay the advance and retreated. There are multiple but unconfirmed reports that Russian troops then left the southern part of Dudchany and retreated to Mylove, leaving it a no man's land.

On October 2, the only settlement we didn't have information about along the bank of the Dnipro was Mykhailivka, which was confirmed as liberated by Ukrainian forces on October 3.




Local residents reported that Russian forces had left Chervone, which would be a significant development indicating that Russian troops further north on the Inhulets River could be fighting a rear guard action to support a retreat. The alternative is worse. The line of defense to their rear has or is collapsing, and they're at risk of


encirclement. The third possibility is the report from local residents is incorrect.



The bigger problem for Russian troops is the liberation of Novopetrivka. The village was the last point of the original Vysokopyllyia defensive line. It isn't surprising that Russian forces withdrew after Ukraine liberated Arkhanhelske on October 1.




Russian forces from Starosillya to Davydiv Brid are at low but notable risk of encirclement. The Russian VDV troops in Davydiv Brid have been formidable defenders, inflicting heavy casualties on Ukrainian forces for weeks despite numerous attempts to push them out of the town. Ukraine has switched tactics and is using light infantry to dig into the forested area west of the village after using artillery, drone strikes, and close air support to push Russian troops out of the area.



There are unconfirmed reports on the Inhulets River bridgehead that Ukrainian forces were able to push south, retaking Stepove, which they briefly held in September. If Ukrainian troops can push to Charivne, a secondary Ground Line of Communication (GLOC, aka supply line) will be threatened.


The challenge for Russian forces is the T-2207 Highway GLOC to Davydiv Brid is challenged at the Inhulets River bridgehead. Russia knows it, which is likely the main reason the town has been ferociously defended. The T-403 Highway GLOC is severed at Dudchanby. On paper, because Russia still holds Mylove and reportedly is reinforcing its

positions there, it appears that the last effective supply line remains. The problem is that Mylove is now well within the range of Ukrainian artillery. Russia could set up firebases on the east side of the Dnipro, but they can't remain static. Points on the east bank under Russian control are now well within the range of Ukrainian multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). They no longer have to rely on HIMARS and aviation to strike these areas.



Northwest of Kherson, Myrolyubivka was liberated. The status of Pravdyne, where Ukraine has suffered heavy losses during multiple liberation attempts, is unknown. The town has become a no man's land, and Russian troops would be in a technical encirclement if it is still occupied. Russian and Ukrainian military leaders clearly believe that

Pravdyne is a critical defense point, given the number of resources both have dedicated.



The General Staff of the Armed forces of Ukraine reported that an attack on Ternovi Pody was repelled. We're not prepared to update the map and consider the village a no man's land.

Operation Command South (OCS) reported that multiple ammunition depots within Kherson and the immediate suburbs were targeted by rockets fired by HIMARS. Russian

troop convoys in Darivka came under fire at the pontoon bridge, and Russian supply points were attacked in Beryslav and Nova Kakhovka.

The Ukrainian air force performed nine air strikes, and ground forces carried out 290 fire missions. In maintaining operational security, there wasn't information on what was targeted.

ASSESSMENT: Russian defensive lines are in complete collapse. The situation is very dynamic, and our maps are likely conservative. Due to low morale, lack of command and control, supply issues, losing their artillery advantage, the inability of the Russian air force to provide theaterwide close air support in northern Kherson, and other factors, we believe that Russian troops will withdraw from this northern Kherson. In Lyman, Russian forces suffered catastrophic personnel and equipment losses during a chaotic retreat. In Kherson oblast, if Russian troops wait too long to withdraw, a similar retreat could create an unspeakable number of casualties. We've read other analyses that the areas are heavily mined, but Russian troops reported themselves the area wasn't mined even after the counteroffensive started because they continued to believe they would relaunch a northern offensive themselves. Antitank and antipersonnel mines will be a


challenge for Ukrainian forces, but we believe the risk is overstated. Retreating Russian forces will need to use those same roads, and based on Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk, they have not effectively used mines to support a retreat.

Russian forces are in trouble. A further indication of the dire situation for Russian troops and their collaborators in Kherson, the Kremlin might be looking for an off-ramp. While the Duma ratified annexation, the issues of borders for Kherson and Zaporizhia have been paused so officials can do "consultations." Don't get too excited that Moscow will give up on everything west of the Dnipro. The administrative capital for Kherson oblast is Kherson and remains the only major city Russia capture intact since February 24. For this reason, it seems implausible that the Kremlin will be willing to give up the west bank of the Dnipro.

DNIPROPETROVSK & NORTHERN ZAPORIZHIA

Russian Objective: Integrate the oblast into Russian Federation, capture the rest of the oblast, break civilian will with continued terror attacks, and turn popular opinion against Ukraine by terrorizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Ukrainian Objective: Prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and prepare the area's civilian population for a nuclear accident



The situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant is stable, and occupation authorities released Ihor Murashov, Director General of ZNPP, after a vigorous protest by the International Atomic Energy Agency. No reason was given for his detention.

Four people were killed, and four more were wounded in what appears to have been a targeted attack on Nikopol to terrorize civilians. In a salvo of 30 Grad rockets fired by MLRS, more than 30 large apartment blocks and homes were damaged, with four apartments totally destroyed in one building when it suffered a direct hit.


The attack targeted the public water pumping station, disabling water service to Nikopol, and knocked out power to 7,000 homes. From Nikopol to Marhanets, grain storage was destroyed along with stores, and a school was badly damaged.

Russian missiles struck Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro. Ukrainian officials did not release additional information due to operational security.



DONBAS REGION

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHIA



Russian Objective: Integrate the oblast into Russian Federation, capture the rest of the oblast, defend the existing line of conflict, and end the insurrection that is throughout the Russian-controlled territory

Ukrainian Objective: Fix Russian assets in place to prevent redeployment, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies and disrupt logistics, support and expand the insurrection in occupied territories


The only fighting we can report is sporadic artillery fire from the Donetsk-Zaporizhia administrative border to Hulyaipole to Orikhiv.^{1 2} There are additional activities in one location, but it has been requested to maintain operational security.

Like Kherson, the Russian Duma did not establish official borders as part of the sham annexation of Zaporizhia and stated they would need to do "consultations."

¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM PDT Report via Facebook](#)

² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM PDT Report via Facebook](#)

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Integrate the oblast into Russian Federation, capture the rest of the oblast, maintain existing defensive lines, and bring the insurrection across southwestern Donetsk under control


Ukrainian Objective: Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and

exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies and disrupt logistics


The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) militia made one claim of battlefield success north of Horlivka and claimed to have destroyed two Ukrainian tanks and eight various armored vehicles across the oblast. Ukrainian forces launched 180 fire missions on the occupied territories.



The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported fighting east of Niu York, with no change in territorial control.



There was also fighting reported east of Kamyanka, with elements of the 1st Army Corps unable to improve their positions.




Russian proxy forces continued their attempts to capture Nevelske and suffered heavy losses.

ASSESSMENT: The renewed attacks on Nevelske after several failed advances on Pervomaiske from Pisky indicate that Ukrainian forces can still maintain defensive positions and use Nevelske as a forward operating base. It is unlikely the DNR will find success here due to the terrain advantages Ukraine holds.

The DNR renewed attempts to improve positions on the southern flank of Marinka, with a repeat of its greatest hits, failed offensives toward the settlement of Pobjeda.

NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Integrate oblast into Russian Federation, defend against Ukrainian advances toward Luhansk, capture Bakhmut/Soledar


Ukrainian Objective: Defend Bakhmut-Soledar while managing equipment and personnel losses, minimize civilian casualties, and defend GLOCs

We maintain that the remainder of northeast Donetsk still under Russian occupation is a lost cause. The Russian Duma ratified the borders of annexation after the sham referendum, even though Russian forces only control 40% to 42% of Donetsk Oblast. Most of that territory was established in 2015 as part of the Minsk II agreement. Continued pointless counteroffensives continue.


It is worth noting that some of the most extreme Russian agent provocateurs and propagandists are calling the offensive on Bakhmut and Soledar a waste of resources. They are openly questioning the Kremlin's decision to continue the operation and asking why Private Military Corporation (PMC) Wagner Group, viewed in Russian circles as more effective than the Russian army, hasn't been redeployed to Luhansk. The offensive around Bakhmut doesn't just involve PMC Wagner. The Russian VKS (air force), Russian artillery units, and elements of the 1st Army Corps of the DNR are involved in the operation. Chechen units of the 141st Akhmat were previously engaged, suffered heavy losses in Mayorsk, and were withdrawn. Russia also sacrificed one of its last remaining combat effective companies in September.




Russian forces attempt to advance on [Spirne](#) and [Vyimka](#) again without success. The advances make no sense tactically or strategically.



Fighting continued on the southern edge of [Bakhmut'ske](#) led by Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group, with no change in the situation. It was reportedly intense at times. There was an unconfirmed report that residents in Bakhmut were being told to stay in their homes for the next few days due to a looming Ukrainian counteroffensive. We don't believe this report has much weight, but it just crossed the line of worth mentioning in the situation report.




PMC Wagner attempted to advance on Ozarianivka but could not gain new ground, with Ukrainian forces stiffly defending the edges of Zaitseve (the one south of Bakhmut).



The 1st Army Corps of the DNR, 3rd Brigade, likely did a brief operational pause on Sunday. They renewed attacks on Zaitseve and Mayorsk, finding success on the southern edge of Zaitseve, destroying a Ukrainian defensive point.

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Integrate oblast into Russian Federation, hold current defensive lines, and control insurgency

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, prevent the retreat of Russian soldiers from Lyman, make opportunistic territorial gains, support insurgents, interdict supplies

Defensive lines for Russian forces have temporarily stabilized, but in our assessment, this is more likely due to Ukrainian troops consolidating territorial gains and fortifying new GLOCs.

Ukrainian forces didn't make any verifiable gains in Luhansk on October 3. However, in Kharkiv, Ukrainian forces made significant advances to the Luhansk administrative border, impacting the Russian hub of Svatove.

There were reports that Russian officials ordered the evacuation of civilians from Svatove less than a month after Russian collaborators fled Kharkiv to the city in the Luhansk oblast. Svatove could be described as being in a very loose encirclement. Ukrainian forces now control three GLOCs to the city from the northwest, west, and south. They remain about 30 kilometers away in all directions, which puts the city within the range of MLRS. Some readers may be quick to point out that M777 artillery and other NATO-provided 155mm artillery units can now reach the Svatove too. However, that requires Excalibur shells which are better used for precision strikes.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has thrown some recently conscripted troops at Ukrainian advances, which has had the predicted impact. There are numerous videos and pictures of Russian casualties with Ukrainian forces reporting that newly formed Russian units are incapable of fighting due to a lack of training, retreat, or surrender. It is critical to note there have been no large-scale surrenders. Most groups are smaller than a squad and were separated, became lost, or surrendered after other members of their unit were killed.

On the subject of POWs, a video has emerged showing what appeared to be Ukrainian troops interrogating a Russian soldier while one repeatedly kicked the kneeling soldier in the ribs. One person off-camera told them to stop the abuse, but others refused. When the Russian soldier tries to lift his body up to avoid the blows, another person puts his boot on his back.

ASSESSMENT: The truth matters, and reporting and identifying Ukrainian war crimes is a sensitive matter, especially after the Amnesty International report, which attempted to provide false moral equivalency to Ukrainian troops providing a desperate defense in the early months of the war to Russian troops use of executions, torture, castration of POWs, and targeting of civilians and civilian

infrastructure. The truth matters, and we uphold the truth. The truth is there is strong video evidence that a group of Ukrainian soldiers tortured a Russian POW. There is no evidence to suggest this is systemic or condoned by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. All war crimes should be investigated by either belligerent.

Pro-Russian milblogger WarGonzo, which has provided a high degree of accuracy on the situation since Lyman, wrote a pessimistic assessment on the defense of Kreminna. Russian forces did not build deep defenses while Lyman was under siege, and currently lack combat-capable reserves and are facing encirclement. The main GLOC to the town has been severed, complicating its defense. Seymon Pegov admitted that the loss of Kreminna could create a ripple effect to Lysychansk and north to Svatove.


Reports that Ukrainian forces had advanced to the edge of Lysychansk were likely a psychological operation. There are multiple reports that Russians who brought their families to Lysychansk for work on restoring the town are being evacuated. Collaborators, on the other hand, are being told they will not be removed from the city – which has been a pattern repeated through all of the Russian withdrawals.

The Russian state Duma ratified the sham annexation of Luhansk, even though its borders are on the brink of collapse.

ASSESSMENT: In our assessment, the defensive lines Russian forces are attempting to build from Svatove to Kreminna will not hold. Both towns will likely fall under Ukrainian control in October.




KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Retreat and minimize casualties, prevent Ukrainian forces from advancing from their bridgeheads on the east bank of the Oskil River, and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale


Ukrainian Objective: Liberate all of Kharkiv oblast, sever GLOCs into Luhansk, protect civilian lives, and defend the Ukrainian border




The Borova City Council reported that almost the entire hromada fell under Ukrainian control on October 3 after Russian forces retreated. A flood of videos appeared on social media showing Ukrainian troops in multiple towns and people celebrating in the center square of Borova. Our assessment that the video made by Russian forces in the same square on October 1 was a “last man out” video and not proof of continued occupation was accurate. Videos

coming out of Borova show that the town did not suffer from the heavy fighting that ravaged other liberated communities.


Ukrainian officials have found a Russian torture chamber in Pisky-Radkivski and evidence of other war crimes. This should be expected throughout all liberated territories.



The retreat of Russian troops from the Borova hromada has moved the line of conflict to the Kharkiv-Luhansk administrative border. Ukrainian forces are between 24 to 30 kilometers away from Svatove in Luhansk and can establish fire bases using artillery and put the city under fire control.



North of Borova, Bohuslavka has been liberated by Ukrainian forces. Russian forces are believed to hold Kruhlyakivka on the east bank of the Oskil, which is a bridgehead to Ukrainian-controlled Senkove on the west bank. Kruhlyakivka is a critical defensive point if Russian troops are there, as it represents the last settlement between the advancing Ukrainian forces moving south from Kupyansk. The capture of the town would secure the entire east bank of the Oskil less than three weeks after Russian forces attempted to create a defensive line on it.



Ukrainian forces hold administrative, military, or fire control over almost all of the Kharkiv oblast. Only a small area in the northeast corner remains occupied by Russian troops. There remains no information on [Lyman-Pershyi](#), but reliable sources are reporting the town has become a no man's land.

It is very likely in October, Kharkiv will be relegated to the same state as Chernihiv and Sumy in the situation reports, with reports only of border activity.

CHERNIHIV & SUMY REGION

Dmytro Zhyvytsky, Sumy Oblast Administrative and Military Governor reported an "agricultural enterprise," which usually means a barn or food processing building, in the Velykopysarivska hromada was damaged when Russian troops fired across the international border.

KYIV REGION

There wasn't any significant military action in this region.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA & ODESA REGION

Ukrainian air defense shot down at least one Iranian-sourced Shahed-136 drone. There wasn't any additional information.

WESTERN & CENTRAL UKRAINE

There wasn't any significant military action in this region.

RUSSIAN FRONT

There have been a lot of headlines that could be described as clickbait about Russian nuclear drills, secretive nuclear military trains on the Ukrainian border, and tidal wave-creating torpedoes in the last 24 hours.

The Russian federation regularly performs nuclear readiness drills, and the current activity was preannounced well before the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The "nuclear train" is part of the ongoing drills and is located in Central Russia. It is heading west if random reports from somewhat unreliable publications are to be believed, but that is a long way from the "Ukrainian border."

Breathe. Western Intelligence has publicly stated they do not see any changes in activity that would be a prelude to a nuclear strike. It is critical to understand that Western nations have built a surveillance system beginning in the early 1960s, which has only been refined and improved. Consider the quality of satellite images available from public companies such as Maxar, which can provide enough detail to identify vehicles and types of aircraft. Now think about what you "can't" see without a security clearance. Don't you feel better now?

If you watched clips or part of the concert in Moscow that was done to celebrate the sham annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts, you heard cheering crowds as terrifying militant speeches were given. It turns out that people in those crowds were recording and streaming the event too, and that content is widely available. The cheers and applause you saw from the RIA-approved news broadcasts and streams? They were added by Russian state media. During some of the speeches, the crowd was not only silent but not even paying attention.

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