Hello and welcome history friends patrons all to PINYL section A creating a Commonwealth part 2. Last time we set the scene within the realms of Poland and Lithuania, and we asked how these two very different and distinct polities in north eastern Europe managed to unify their monarchies and their nobilities together to form one supercharged block of a state, known simply as PL. It was a union brought about by marriage, but fortified and solidified by treaty, further intermarriage and not a small amount of mutual self-interest. Like Britain holding England and Scotland, here we get to the point in the story where the union becomes the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, so I hope you’re ready. I will now take you to the early 15th century…

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The first recorded letter sent from an English King to a Polish King comes from Henry V’s plea to King Jagiello to help England against the French in 1415. We should see it as no coincidence that only a few years after such a shattering victory against the Teutonic Knights, an English King was appealing to the good graces of his Polish regal brother. Poland, thanks to its association with the sprawling Lithuania, which both inflated its size and secured its flank, had become a major power, and its King now led the largest state in Europe, not to mention the most powerful. With other powers ravaged by wars, in fear of larger neighbours or too small to register on the radar, PL was supreme and for a long time, could boast few equals or rivals to its mantle.

If this was true in terms of raw power and potential, it was not quite true in terms of its dynasty. While the Jagiellonian dynasty ruled over P and L, it was a young royal family, only emerging from the pagan mists of Lithuania within the last generation. It could not lay the same claim to fame as other European royal houses: Capetian, Habsburg, or Luxemburg, for example. Yet, in this respect too, the nobility of PL had its sights set on some mighty ambitious prizes. Now that their home situation was looking up, it was time to broaden their horizons and make with some advantageous marriages.

In the immediate vision of the union, the best opportunities for expansion lay in Hungary, Bohemia and into the Balkans. The Holy Roman Empire was an uncertain entity, and far too full of competing petty princes to warrant much serious consideration of prepared marriages. In Scandinavia too, the possibility that a Polish King might somehow break into that morass of states and gain some advantage over Denmark’s ruling House of Estriden and the Kalmar Union which Queen Margaret I of Denmark, Norway and Sweden established. Margaret would in fact die in 1413, and Poland wasn’t uninvolved in the goings on of Scandinavia, since one of Denmark’s deposed kings would die in a Polish castle, signifying that both power had some awareness of the other, but still, it was to the south west that the best opportunities for dynastic advancement lay.

In fact, Jagiello would continue to search for potential advantages for some time without result. This was largely because the field to the south east was tied down between the fierce rivals in the Houses of Luxemburg and Habsburg, and there was little room for an outsider. Only when one of these entrenched families departed the scene would there be room for a player like the Jagiellonian dynasty to sneak in, but until then, neither German House was likely to look particularly favourably upon the only recently Pagan Lithuanian king. In a sense this suited Jagiello as it gave him the opportunity to solidify his position and further surround the Teutonic Knights. Another reason why the German Houses would be unlikely to unite with Jagiello was because they supported the mission of the Knights, as much as they supported any venture which would undercut the suddenly very large and insurmountable union to the wild east. The Teutonic Knights were like a thorn in the side of PL which came blessed by the Pope, so this was further reason for Habsburg and Luxemburg princes to ignore any Jagiellonian overtures.

The playing field suddenly tilted towards Krakow in 1437 when the Luxemburg house went extinct. With no direct competitor to the Habsburgs, the playing field suddenly widened, and nobles unwilling to place themselves under the protection of a House they had rallied against in the past, chose the lesser of two evils, the unfamiliar but very powerful Jagiellonian dynasty. Thus the silence in terms of offers of marriage etc. was transformed into a deafening orchestra of demands from the late 1430s; in 1440 Jagiello’s eldest son Vladislav was crowned King of Hungary, Poland and Bohemia, but this supremacy would only last four years. In the Battle of Varna along the Black Sea, King Vladislav III was cut down by the Turks, anticipating a national animosity which at times appeared so far off, but which would in time contribute to the Commonwealth’s downfall.

After Vladislav’s death, the thrones of Poland and Hungary passed to different potentates; Poland went to Vladislav’s younger brother Casimir IV, and Hungary to a non-Jagiellonian, but still a fascinating man of Romanian descent by the name of Mattius Corvinus Corvinus was the son of the astoundingly popular and successful Hungarian regent John Hunyadi, who held back the Turks in Hungary, and who fought determinedly against them in the Balkans, in the same war where King Vladislav III died in Varna.[[1]](#footnote-1) It was all against the Ottomans at this point in time, but Mattius Corvinus was elected King in 1458 and went on to achieve great successes in administration and the expansion of Hungarian power. It proved to be Hungary’s last furtive gasp of independence, for by the time of Corvinus’ death in 1490, the crown went to another Jagiellonian, and another Vladislav, who was the grandson of Jagiello.

This Vladislav would hold the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary while Poland fell to the bounty of sons had by Casimir IV of Poland, who ruled from 1444-1492, and his wife Elizabeth of Habsburg, yes that’s right I said Habsburg. Turned out that the Habsburgs decided the best to beat them was to join them. Casimir and Elizabeth’s fruitful marriage provided three sons to sit on Poland’s throne between 1492-1548, and it was this last son Sigismund, who would provide the last Jagiellonian King for Poland, as his Sigismund’s son Sigismund’s Augustus sat from 1548-72. The Jagiellonian dynasty thus ended in 1572 with Jagiello’s great grandson, and the union then became the Commonwealth, once the childless Sigismund Augustus died. The Union of Lublin which established this plan three years before in 1569 demonstrated that both Poland and Lithuania weren’t messing around, and that both planned to keep this good thing that they had going, going.

PL was thus bolstered by some well-placed kings blessed with the powers of longevity, and this helped to stabilise the dynasty and thus the union to the future, even while grave and terrible events were occurring around PL that would be enough to make any strategist worry. To begin with, the Teutonic Knights just could not be gotten rid of, even with successive defeats suffered at Poland’s hands, and with her order being reduced to a vassal of the Polish Crown by 1466. As we saw in the last episode, it was also in 1466 that Prussia was divided between East and West, with the former falling to the Teutonic order, with the moniker Ducal, and the latter acquiring the designation of Royal, totally under the Polish flag. The welcoming of Royal Prussia into PL brought with its critically important ports like Gdansk and lucrative waterways which could be taxed.

As the monetary and trade systems developed, it seemed impossible that the Teutonic Order could remain in place, especially since its conversion mission to Lithuania had vanished a century before. Yet the Knights did not go, and they made great credit from their history of proselytising to the pagan masses in the Baltic region, and of their loudly parroted suspicions about the truly pagan nature of the Lithuanians which had never really been erased. Only with a crusade the likes of which the Teutonic Knights could arrange could Lithuania be purged of that scourge of humanity. This idea attracted some measure of sympathy, especially when it was twinned with the idea of Poland being led hopelessly along by its larger neighbour. The Poles, it was inferred, needed to be saved from their bad deal before they were corrupted by the pagan influence.

This notion was only exacerbated by the very incorrect versions of the 1410 battle of Grunwald that the Teutonic Knights spread after the event. Engaging in some healthy damage control, the knights spread several myths which remained with Europe right up until the Nazis were invoking the memory of that battle five hundred years later. Grunwald was not, the Teutonic order claimed, a victory of PL over the meddlesome knights, oh no; instead, barely any Poles had taken part, and it had instead been a massive contingent of Lithuanians, bolstered by their basically feral pagan allies from the far east, which overwhelmed and slaughtered without quarter the brave Christian defence. Rumours of this kind were spread around, in addition to the claim that the Lithuanians had called on pagan gods during the Battle, that the pagans in the region still had not been cleansed and had infiltrated the Teutonic order, betraying them at the critical moment and all sorts of other rubbish. The efforts were not designed to cast the battle as German versus Slav, so much as Christian versus pagan. According to the knights, PL had warped the truth of what really happened at Grunwald; that stinking union had lied about the fact that it was a defeat for Christendom, not just the Teutonic Order.

The major reason this cacophony of lies gained such widespread acceptance was mostly because it gelled with what the potentates of the HRE wanted to hear. Any potential device to discredit the Poles and Lithuanians would be used; since the Teutonic order had lost the battle, it was necessary to win the war by other means. No mention of course was made of the facts, such as, for example, the fact that when the forces of PL did capture the Teutonic baggage train, they found several miles of heavy chains and shackles, indicating that the Teutonic order intended to sell them as slaves to the highest bidder, be they Christian or not.[[2]](#footnote-2) The whispers became notably less effective and believable once Jagiello died in 1435, and the throne was passed onto his sons. With the death of the last Grand Duke of Lithuania to be born a pagan died an era in European history unimaginable today, but critically important for the purpose of filling the blanks of Poland’s story. Just as it was inconceivable that Lithuania would return to paganism after Jagiello’s death, so too was it impossible that Poland and Lithuania would now separate. There was little discussion at all of any reduction in the terms of the union, and if anything the closeness intensified between the two unlikely partners.

As it transpired, the heaviest defeat to the Teutonic order came not with another battle in the early 1500s, but with a campaign of another kind, launched, it was said, by one man. The Reformation did more to upend the apple cart of northern Europe than any military campaign ever had. The order disbanded, its castle and banners vanished, and its lands fell to the Dukes of Pomerania, whose duty it was to pay homage to the King of Poland for the possession of East Prussia. It was this same East Prussia which fell, through marriage, to the Elector of Brandenburg at the beginning of the century, and it was after a few more decades of the Elector giving homage to the King of Poland for this territory that an incredible deal was reached in 1657.

At this virtually unknown 1657 treaty of Wehlau, a Polish King desperate for the aid and solid commitment of the Elector of Brandenburg against the Swedes absolved him from his duties of homage, and effectively granted the territory of East Prussia over to the Elector in perpetuity, to shape in any way he pleased his rule over it. It is in these curious, contrived ways that the House of Hohenzollern, ruling as Electors of Brandenburg, came to be rulers and then Kings in Prussia, before they dropped the less glamorous title of Elector and cast themselves in the late 18th century simply as Kings. By that point, the trade granted by the Polish King had created a monster in Brandenburg-Prussia, a monster which would in time devour the largest pieces of the PLC for her own gain.

As you can see, several things, including the complicated and bizarre status of Prussia, were being laid down and defined in these eventful decades of PL union. But Europe was changing in other ways as well. Hungary, that medieval kingdom of yore, was itself devoured, along with a great deal of its historically connected territories in the Balkans, by an Ottoman wave of unstoppable force in the first two decades of the 16th century, that also broke onto the walls of Vienna in 1529, as the rest of Europe fought amongst itself.[[3]](#footnote-3) In the shocking battle of Mohacs in 1526, Hungary was effectively destroyed in the space of a day, its childless King Louis drowning in a river as he fled the field.[[4]](#footnote-4) With the extinguishing of Hungary, Croatia and much of the Balkans from the European list of schemes, the horizon of PL became narrower, but no less involved.[[5]](#footnote-5) The rule over the north-eastern wilds was consolidated, as was control over the Ukraine, Belarus and the two Prussian states. Harnessing the waterways in the Dnieper, and siring the grain from that vulnerable, but fruitful region, and making use then of Gdansk to ship said grain across the continent, was to make some nobles in PL very rich indeed.

The Reformation redefined what it meant to be a believer, and the creeping threat of the Turk into Europe granted these Lutherans an opportunity to advance their creed while the attentions of the Habsburgs were so desperately occupied.[[6]](#footnote-6) To the extent that Lutheran’s teachings reached Poland or Lithuania, they generally did not provoke the violent outbursts in the union as were seen elsewhere. What exactly did the Reformation facilitate in Poland then Zack? Well, in the words of one historian:

In Poland, the Reformation inspired the most advanced legislature in Europe of its time to allow freedom of conscience and equality of religious denominations, a legislature composed of a powerful and enlightened nobility who were anxious to defend their individual rights against a centralized authority. [[7]](#footnote-7)

In short then, ideas about freedom of religion were necessarily crystallised when so many different interpretations of what Luther had said began popping up across Europe, as countless individuals took up his example to march about proselytising on their own bat, as Jan Hus had done a century before. Preventing religious civil war was only one reason for making such sweeping concessions to the concept of freedom of conscience though; the idea of freedom of religion also gelled with what the nobility had learned and been taught about their rights and privileges up to this point. If they were free to exert a level of political control within the union; if they were free to hold the King to account, then who among these nobles would permit the King to rule over them when questions of religion emerged? For freedom of religion to be absent, a portion of the nobility would have to have had an iron, dogmatic faith in the Catholic Church. Many may well have had this, but what they didn’t have was the desire or the resources to use this faith against their peers, or to grant their king the opportunity to batter down any of these same peers in the name of that faith. In PL, or so it seemed, the most important god of all was that of freedom.

Of course this wasn’t completely accurate. Within PL people felt and believed deeply about their faith, and this fact was borne out with the same transformative results as it was in other states where the Reformation made itself felt – in literature. Because a key tenant of Luther’s creed had it that a Bible should be available in the vernacular, it followed that in Poland, as in Germany, Bibles appearing in the native language would appear, along with guides and other instruments to help with their reading. As the historian Konrad Gorski noted:

People who wanted to join the new movement stood in need of instruction in their native tongue. To answer these needs a multitude of writers, of different talent, were producing new translations of the Bible, catechisms, hymn-books, commentaries on the Scriptures, polemical treatises criticising the Catholic dogmas and ritual, and, along with these, other compositions, more literary in character: rhymed dialogues, tales and poems with a moral in them, satires seeking to strengthen the principles of the new faith and to reduce the Papal creed to a hopeless position.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The reactions of the counter-Reformation a few decades later only solidified this entrenchment of Polish language in the union, and made it essential that all Lithuanian nobles would have to learn that language, if they hadn't already, if they wished to progress. It was hardly possible for the campaigning Catholic Church to take back members of its flock that had been led astray if they continued to argue in Latin. Thus the Catholic Church increasingly turned to the vernacular in its arguments and debate in the relevant countries. We should mention as well Poland’s history of religious difference, seen in sympathy with Jan Hus for example, not to mention a ‘spirit of opposition to the Roman ritual kept up in some churches and monasteries’.[[9]](#footnote-9) This all helped to creat in Poland a cabal of different interpretations of Luther’s teachings, this only made the divided sects of Protestants much easier to reclaim.

The campaign of counter-reformation was in full swing in PL in the second half of the 16th century, and its longest reigning king – Sigismund III – was to be a product of that counter-reformation and the organisation which is spawned: the Jesuits. We’ll see in our next section the extent to which Sigismund III’s Jesuit upbringing affected his rule. For his militaristic, dogmatic and uncompromising faith, he would be expelled from Protestant Sweden and Orthodox Russia, places where his House of Vasa might well have triumphed, had he been a little bit less bull-headed. It is thus important for us to look at epochs like the Reformation in PL, even in this minimal amount of detail which we’re engaging in now, to build a picture of how the union was shaped and moulded by its related events and characters.

As much as she was shaped by spiritual awakenings happening in Europe, PL was naturally shaped by her geography, and the opening up of her waterways which resulted from the removal of the Teutonic Knights from the scene and the increased safety in travel and trade.[[10]](#footnote-10) Trade out of Gdansk to England quadrupled between 1466 and the removal of the Knights, as their power began to decline before their dissolution at the arrival of Luther. For the first time, and thanks in large part to that critical port in Royal Prussia, the union were being granted reliable, steady access to goods which had never been know before on such a level or with such an organised spread. Salt came from Western France, herrings from Scandinavia, cloth in abundance from Flanders, England and Holland. In response to the increase in available goods, Polish entrepreneurs determined the time was ripe to venture out on the seas, and hundreds of boats left Gdansk every year as the merchant service for the union increased, albeit haphazardly.

The building of boats made timber more expensive, but it also led to an increase in demand for grain, which flowed out of the Ukrainian basin like an invaluable flood. 4,000% is the insane figure given to estimate the increase in price for shipbuilding materials during this period, and to provide the quality grain which Poland was becoming known for, the nobles were never more active or thrifty. They engaged with an intense deforestation program – which provided more timber for boats – and they also modernised and drained their sodden marshlands to plant more grain and sell more grain and make more money loving grain. Before long, the problem wasn’t so much these actions or the transformative impact it had on the land, but the want of manpower required to fill these manual jobs. It was at this point in history where a certain practice became very popular among those magnates far to the east, in lands too wild to ever contemplate moving to voluntarily. In return for a man moving his family to the wild east to work on the magnate’s farm, that magnate would grant his new charge a tax-free income for a set number of years.

This set amount of years would vary depending on the desirability of the location, with several factors including the isolation, weather and threats from Tartar raiders all being factored in. It couldn’t even be imagined just yet, but already these magnates were creating a policy which would become essential in later years, and then subject to immense abuses. Under the promise of tax free living, scores of peasants did make the journey to the east. When some discovered that they had been lied to, they took to banditry rather than accept the indentured service on such bad faith. Some peasants, indeed, turned to banditry when their tax free terms had expired. What became of these former peasants turned bandits? They converged and joined with likeminded fellows, as well as other individuals deeper into the Ukraine, injecting a great deal of human stock into the Cossacks, a fierce and warlike body of people, whom anyone could join.

The Cossacks were to become a real problem from later in the 16th century. Orthodox, nomadic and comprised of little in the way of loyalties to a given state, Cossacks made their home along the Ukrainian borderlands to the south east of PL. It was along this border that the presence of a fierce people like the Cossacks was necessary, for they guarded the peasants and magnates’ lands from an equally terrible threat – the Crimean Tartars. In 1569, with the Union of Lublin, the Cossacks would be inherited by the Poles from the Lithuanians, a problem they had never really grasped or attempted to familiarise themselves with, but one which would soon consume Polish notions of defence, especially when the blasted Cossacks teamed up with those fearsome Tartars, as they did time and again in the latter 17th century.

The recipe for several of the Commonwealth’s most desperate problems were thus set in motion from an early stage. As far as its crowning constitutional achievements are concerned, this trend is true also. For without the significant history of political activism and awareness, there was no possible means by which the nobility of PL could have presented such incredible demands to the would-be King, Henry of Valois, the younger brother of the King of France, in 1572. Yet, these Henrican Articles, so-called because they were presented to King Henry before any other would-be monarch, had been mostly decided upon three years before at the Union of Lublin, that seminal event in the history of Polish-Lithuanian relations.

Since the first few decades of the 15th century, the nobles had bided their time and used crises in succession, in foreign relations or in economics to demand and receive more privileges from their Kings. We will be examining these developments and their legacy in more detail in section C, but for now, it suffices to run down a few examples of what the nobility or *szlachta* managed to wrest from their Kings. In 1430, the Polish answer to Habeus Corpus was confirmed by King Jagiello in return for their approval of his son to the Polish throne. This law meant that no King could detain a member of the nobility without trial, which placed the nobles beyond the reach of the Crown and wealthier magnates. The magnates – those large landowners, governors of provinces, advisors to the king, massively wealthy families, and even some distant relatives of royal houses – were in fact in constant competition with the nobles or *szlachta* for privileges.

In 1454, King Casimir was so constrained by these magnates that he promised the minor nobles something incredible. The privilege of Nieszawa stipulated that if the King wished to raise soldiers or taxes, he would have to acquire approval from all 18 palatinates within Poland. This of course involved acquiring approval from each of the palatinates’ regional assemblies, which would be a long, laborious, difficult process fraught with intrigue and buckets of kissing up to nobles. Difficult to pronounce name of the act aside, what this act represented in 1454 was an ancestor of no taxation without representation, Polish style. Only by sitting in their regional assemblies, the *sejmiks*, and voting on what the King wanted, could the King get what he wanted. It was an astonishingly progressive development in a country the size and age of PL, to say nothing for the era of absolutism and feudal vassalage which these nobles lived in. But the nobles weren’t finished.

In 1468, the nobles from two of the largest palatinates met together and formed the national Sejm, bringing together deputies from across the Kingdom and inviting other palatinates to send their nobles too. In 1493 this process was cleaned up a bit, and this Sejm was given an upper and lower house; the Senate and Sejm proper respectively. The Senate could be the place where magnates, bishops, palatines and other VIPs would gather, while the Sejm itself was the home of the *szlachta*. Only the year before in 1492, Casimir IV, the king since 1444, had died, and in their eagerness to put a son of Casimir on the throne, the nobles were given more powers and privileges. The nobles used it as an opportunity, in Adam Zamoyski’s words, to flex their muscles, and prove that they were willing to use this platform to deliberate the succession even while hereditary monarchy was in place. The Sejm made a show of considering several other candidates from minor Jagiellonian branches, largely for the purpose of spooking Casimir’s sons, who must have believed that their father had created something of a monster.

Either way, this settled a precedent, since any time a new king needed to be elected, the Sejm gathered to deliberate the candidates, even while the laws of succession made it clear who should be selected. For the sake of the support of the Sejm, it was said, the King should grant new rights and privileges to the nobles. In 1505 this policy reached its incredible apex; it was there at a sitting of the Sejm at Radom, that the King’s prerogative to legislate by himself was removed. Henceforth, the King of Poland would need to gain the permission of the two houses of the Sejm before he passed any laws. Even in the case of the Supreme Court, the Sejm managed to wrest control over it and the legal jurisdictions of the Crown more generally, over the 15th century.[[11]](#footnote-11)

There is thus good reason to suppose that the nobles were eager to work the system still further; imagine if they did have *genuine* control over who sat on the throne, and imagine if the system of monarchy ceased to be a hereditary institution. This desire of the nobles became a possibility with the increasing concessions of Sigismund Augustus, Poland’s last Jagiellonian King. Playing hardball and supporting partners at various intervals, the extinction of his dynasty meant disaster for PL unless the union could be solidified by something other than the family ties of his relatives. With this in mind, Sigismund Augustus was willing to do anything to get the approval from the Sejm for an interesting idea he had: the Union of Lublin. Next time, we will investigate this profoundly significant document, which meant great and significant things for PL, as well as the rest of the continent. I hope you’ll join me then history friends, but for now, my name is Zack, and you have been listening to PINYL section A creating a commonwealth part 2. Thanks for listening and I’ll be seeing you all soon.

1. Historians estimate that the Ottoman campaigns in Hungary delayed their conquering of that Kingdom for about 60 years. See Mark Whelan, ‘Pasquale de Sorgo and the Second Battle of Kosovo (1448): A Translation’, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (January 2016), pp. 126-145. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Norman Davies, *God’s Playground*, p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Kelly De Vries, ‘The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern

Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526)’, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Jul., 1999), pp. 539-559. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. This death would prove a great boon for Habsburg interests in Hungary, as Mary, the late King Louis’ sister, had been married to a Habsburg, which now granted that dynasty the right to claim a sliver of Hungary for themselves. Hungary was divided up and partitioned, in anticipation of the treatment metered out to Poland hundreds of years later. See Daniel R. Doyle, ‘The Sinews of Habsburg Governance in the Sixteenth Century: Mary of Hungary and Political Patronage’, *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Summer, 2000), pp. 349-360; John F. Guilmartin, Jr., ‘Ideology and Conflict: The Wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1606’, *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring, 1988), pp. 721-747. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See Gunther E. Rothenberg, ‘The Origins of the Austrian Military Frontier in Croatia and the Alleged Treaty of 22 December 1522’, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 38, No. 91 (Jun., 1960), pp. 493-498. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Sydney H. Moore, ‘The Turkish Menace in the Sixteenth Century’, *The Modern Language Review*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan., 1945), pp. 30-36. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Marian Hillar, ‘Poland's Contribution To The Reformation: Socinians And Their Ideas On Religious Freedom’, *The Polish Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1993), pp. 447-468; p. 447. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Konrad Gorski, ‘Some Aspects of the Polish Reformation: Unitarian Thought in 16th and 17th Century

Poland’, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 9, No. 27 (Mar., 1931), pp. 598-611; pp. 598-599. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Gaston Bonet-Maury, ‘John à Lasko and the Reformation in Poland. 1499-1560’, *The American Journal of Theology*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1900), pp. 314-327; p. 314. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Adam Zamoyski, *Poland*, p. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See *Ibid*, pp. 45-46. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)