



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

August 13, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

8/13/23 23:59* PST

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SUMMARY – DAY 535

It has been 3,455 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 170 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Today's report is combat only.

- Russian forces have not been able to make further gains at Synkivka despite using human wave attacks
- Another 111 civilians evacuated from the Kupyansk raion
- Fighting continued at Novoselivkse, Novojehorivka, and near Dzherelne
- Russian forces launched a furious counteroffensive on Klishchiivka without success
- Insurgents caused an explosion at the airport in Mariupol
- Russian troops were fighting among themselves at the Santa Barbara Café in Mariupol
- Fighting expanded south of Orikhiv, with Ukrainian forces consolidating gains near Verbove and advancing in Robotyne
- Ukrainian troops went on the offensive at Kopani and Nesterianka, possibly breaching the first echelon of the Surovikin Line in a third location
- Fuel shortages have spread to occupied Zaporizhzhia

- The cargo ship Sukru Okan, which was bound for Izmail, Ukraine, was intercepted by a Russian warship and boarded near the territorial waters of Türkiye
- Satellite images showed there was no new damage to the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge but revealed other problems
- Odesa was attacked by 15 kamikaze drones and eight cruise missiles, with debris destroying a hypermarket
- Seven civilians were killed, including a family of five, and at least ten were wounded by Russian artillery and bombing of free Kherson
- The Ukrainian 39th Amphibious Assault Brigade has been transferred to Kherson
- Drone or air defense missile debris damaged an apartment building in Belgorod, Russia
- The commissariat office in Polevskoy, Sverdlovsk, Russia, was firebombed
- Ukrainian forces have had to navigate minefields with up to five mines per square meter
- Mine injuries are now the number two cause of Ukrainian casualties, behind artillery
- Ukraine revealed its Furia uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV), which is being used in combat and has entered serial production

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Our earlier assessment of Ukrainian military capabilities may have been overly pessimistic, with the introduction of DPICM (cluster munitions), tactics to identify Russian landmines established and a change of battlefield tactics resulting in new tactical gains and renewed daily progress in multiple AOs.
2. We remain concerned about Ukraine's capacity to turn operational success and tactical gains into strategic victories.
3. We maintain that signals from Kyiv indicating the next phase of the summer offensive are being prepared, and we now believe there are five operational areas where the next phase could start.
4. In our assessment, the reduced format Stavka on August 9 was related to the firing of the Ukrainian military commissars and the announced investigation of all 1,395 managers.
5. It is unlikely that Ukraine will execute a wet crossing of the Dnipro River with a battalion-sized or larger force.
6. Our assessment that the loss of the road bridges at Henichesk and Chongar, and the previous damage to the railroad bridge at Syvash, would degrade Russian

- logistics appears to be accurate, with fuel shortages spreading to occupied Zaporizhzhia.
7. Due to a lack of troop rotation, growing ammunition shortages, and weak commanders, Russia is pushing combat ineffective and combat destroyed units to the forwardmost line of friendly troops (FLOT), engaging in attritional warfare against Ukrainian units.
 8. Despite Ukraine's plans to move to the next phase, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
 9. We assess that Russian and Belarusian aggression and threats on the borders of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Black Sea coast will continue to expand and lead to an international incident if Ukraine's allies do not take a stronger posture.
 10. Russian President Vladimir Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection, and there continues to be a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt.
 11. Our assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces, was


accurate, with more reports of fighting between units, fratricide, and desertions.

12. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
13. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
14. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



Dvorichna Operational Area

Ukrainian milblogger Mannerheim's Son provided an update on the situation in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk areas of operation (AOs) which aligns with our assessment on August 11.¹ "The enemy is conducting its main operations in the direction of Vilshana [and] Synkivka...Synkivka, despite the fact that it is located in a lowland, is important in the structure of defense in this area. Therefore the intensity of hostilities is quite high. The lack of artillery on both sides often leads to shooting battles. The enemy still does not use tactics, only infantry

¹ https://t.me/ukr_sisu/68

assaults [*human wave attacks using the military definition – Ed.*]." Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces have superior defensive positions, the forests are heavily mined, and the marshlands negate the ability to use armor.² Fighting continued north of [Synkivka](#), with no change in the situation.³


ASSESSMENT: The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) and Russian milbloggers have oversold the amount of success in the AO. While there have been incremental gains, Ukrainian forces have stabilized their defensive lines.

In the evacuation zone established by the Kharkiv Oblast OVA, 111 people, including 36 children, departed from the Kupyansk raion.⁴

² <https://t.me/wargonzo/14346>

³ https://t.me/mod_russia/29216 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109839>




Kupyansk Operational Area

There were no reports of significant fighting from reliable or semi-reliable sources in the Kupyansk AO.


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




Svatove Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in [Novoselivske](#) and southeast of [Novojehorivka](#), near [Karmazynivka](#).⁵ The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU)

⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/29216 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

reported a Russian attack from [Dzherelne in the direction of Andriivka](#) was repulsed.⁶




Kreminna Operational Area

Veteran Ukrainian soldier Shatun, with the National Guard of Ukraine, described the fighting in the [Serebryansky Woods](#).⁷ "The enemy outnumbers us in terms of artillery. The road is under their fire control. When you go to a firing position, you can't make a mistake because, let's say, 200

⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11056>

⁷ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/13/7415384/>

meters, and the enemy is right there. They attack you before you manage to reach your position."




Lysychansk Operational Area

RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive at [Bilohorivka](#) [Luhansk].⁸

⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/29216 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections


Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties

RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of Vesele and Krasnohorivka but didn't specify the location of the settlements. There were no other reports of fighting in the three possible Veseles and two Krasnohorivkas by any other source.



Bakhmut Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces attacked from [Yahidne](#) in a western direction suffered losses and returned to their defensive positions.⁹



Klishchiivka Operational Area

Russian forces, including the 83rd Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade and the 2nd Army Corps 72nd Motor Rifle Brigade, launched a furious counteroffensive on [Klishchiivka](#) supported by armor, artillery, Russian air force, and army aviation (VKS), and drones. They were unable to reestablish positions in the settlement or advance on the high ground


⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11056>

held by Ukraine.¹⁰ GSAFU reported that the Russian offensive at [Andriivka](#) ended in failure.¹¹ We did not adjust the map.

¹⁰ https://t.me/mod_russia/29216 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11056>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




Avdiivka Operational Area

The operational tempo remains very low, with artillery duels and positional fighting east of [Avdiivka](#).¹² A Russian soldier with the 1st Army Corps, 5th Brigade, reported that there had been no change in Russian strategy or tactics in the Avdiivka AO in almost 18 months. He reported that morale was low, attacks were ordered without the support of armor or artillery, and how veteran fighters who have

¹² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11056>

become permanently disabled are receiving no government support.¹³




Marinka Operational Area

Positional fighting continued in [Marinka](#), with no change to the situation.¹⁴

¹³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109887>

¹⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11056>



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Multiple Russian sources reported that Russian troops retreated from [Urozhaine](#) after trying to cling to the southern edge. Ukrainian sources said that mop-up operations were ongoing, with pockets of Russian troops remaining in the encirclement.¹⁵

ASSESSMENT: Ukrainian commanders adapted and addressed shortcomings in tactics. Artillery and drone strikes were much better coordinated with light infantry


¹⁵ <https://t.me/odshbr46/1270>

advances. Light infantry moved in small groups to identify the location of Russian strong points and coordinated with artillery units and drone operators to neutralize those positions. Armor was held in reserve until mines were cleared. The loss ratio is 5:1 to 7:1 in favor of Ukraine despite being on offense because they held Russian troops in a technical encirclement for 11 days. Hopefully, the lessons learned and applied here can be implemented theaterwide where it is tactically appropriate.

Russian milbloggers were lamenting that Ukrainian troops are now 3 kilometers from Staromlynivka and 8 kilometers from the second echelon of the Surovkin Line. GSAFU has not announced the liberation of the settlement. We moved the line of conflict south based on open-source intelligence but left the southern half of the settlement as gray zone.

Russian forces attempted to counterattack at [Staromaiorske](#), found that the approaches had been remotely mined, suffered significant losses, and retreated.


Occupied Donetsk

A large explosion and fire at the airport in Mariupol was reportedly caused by insurgent activity.¹⁶ Also, Russian soldiers at the Santa Barbara Café in Mariupol  [got into a brawl](#). It is unclear what the fight was about.¹⁷

¹⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109939>

¹⁷ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/12578>

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks


Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhzhia

Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavskiy, Commander of the Tavriia Operational and Strategic Group of Forces, reported that Ukrainian forces carried out 1,630 fire missions in eastern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.¹⁸

The Russian Ministry of Defense has reported fighting southwest of Uspenivka two days in a row, which makes no sense. There are two settlements with the same name in Ukraine. One is 16 kilometers northeast of Hulyaipole and 16 kilometers from the line of conflict. The other one is 32 kilometers north of Berdyansk, 64 kilometers from the line of conflict.

¹⁸ <https://t.me/otarnavskiy/196>




Orikhiv Operational Area

Russian sources report a significant increase in fighting with Ukrainian forces expanding offensive operations after breaching the Russian minefields at Robotyne and possibly Verbove.

The Ukrainian 46th Brigade reported that a Russian attack from [Novokarlivka](#) in the direction of Bahate was repulsed.¹⁹ Northwest of [Verbove](#), Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian troops were consolidating their gains. We reviewed several graphic videos that

¹⁹ <https://t.me/odshbr46/1270>

showed numerous dead Russian soldiers in abandoned positions. A Russian counterattack at [Robotyne](#) failed, with semi-reliable Russian sources reporting that Ukrainian forces continued to make gains in the settlement and to the east and southwest.^{20 21} A Ukrainian video  [confirmed that demining efforts are culminating](#), and Ukrainian armored vehicles are reentering the fight.²² Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian light infantry continued to advance in the direction of [Novoprokopivka](#), but there were no other reports of fighting in the area.

The Russian 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Brigade has been deployed from their base in Chornomorivka in Kherson to Orikhiv to shore up the defense. This leaves the 10th Spetsnaz Brigade as an elite reserve force on the Dnipro River's left (east) bank.

The Ukrainian 46th Brigade reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive at [Kopani](#), attacking from the northeast.²³ Ukrainian forces reportedly had breached or reached the southern edge of the minefields, creating a

²⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11056>

²¹ <https://t.me/odshbr46/1270>

²² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109852>

²³ <https://t.me/odshbr46/1270>

third penetration in the Russian first echelon. Fighting was also reported at [Nesterianka](#).²⁴

ASSESSMENT: Russian forces were able to close the cracks that formed south of Orikhiv two weeks ago, but the cracks have turned into gaps in the Russian defensive lines. The unanswered question is how dense the minefields are to the second echelon of the Surovikin Line. The ongoing success should be considered cautiously, as many single-source reports exist. Russian commanders have committed a significant portion of their reserve forces already. Even if the second echelon is formidable, it will only be as good as the number of combat-effective Russian troops who can man positions. We maintain our assessment that a breakthrough at Verbove would be the most problematic for Russian defenses.

Occupied Zaporizhzhia

Fuel shortages continue to spread in the occupied territories, with gasoline shortages reported in Melitopol, some service stations on the M-14 Highway ground line of communication (GLOC) between Crimea and Russia, and in Tokmak.²⁵

²⁴ <https://t.me/odshbr46/1270>

²⁵ https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2856



Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant


There was no update on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

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BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) did not update the number of Black Sea Fleet vessels on patrol, and the Russian frigate Admiral Makarov launched eight Kalibr cruise missiles, leaving no other missile carriers available.²⁶

The Russian corvette Vasyl Bykov intercepted the civilian Turkish-owned, Turkish-crewed, Palauan-flagged bulk carrier Sukru Okan.^{27 28} The Russian corvette fired warning shots at the Izmail, Ukraine-bound Sukru Okan, 12 kilometers from the territorial waters of Türkiye, and sent a  [contingent of Naval Infantry onto the vessel using a Ka-29 attack helicopter](#).²⁹ Russian soldiers did not search the vessel, and the ship changed its destination to Sulina, Romania. The Turkish government said they knew about the incident and ~~didn't want to make Russian President~~

²⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109928>


²⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109854>

²⁸ <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/9959>



²⁹ <https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1690843053748277248>

~~Vladimir Putin mad because World War III that an investigation was underway.~~³⁰

Occupied Crimea

Satellite images of the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge from July 30 to August 13  [showed no new damage to the structure](#) from the August 12 missile attacks.³¹ The same images also showed no significant progress from ongoing repairs after the successful uncrewed surface vessel attack (USV) in July. The Kremlin predicted the lesser damaged highway section would be repaired by September 15 and the severely damage section by November 1.

Odesa

Russian launched 15 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones and eight Kalibr cruise missiles at Odesa, with air defense successfully intercepting all targets.³² One air defense missile appeared to have partially disabled a Kalibr cruise missile but was not destroyed. It resulted in either  [the remains of the S-300 rocket booster or the Kalibr missile](#) crashing into the  [Fozzy Hypermarket](#), wounding three

³⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109907>

³¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109913>

³² <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/39503>

and  [causing a large fire.](#)^{33 34 35 36} Burning  
[fragments of rocket debris](#) fell across Odesa, also
damaging a hostel.³⁷

³³ https://t.me/tokmak_ukraine/4674?single

³⁴ https://t.me/our_odessa/52273

³⁵ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/23343>


³⁶ <https://twitter.com/leonidragozin/status/1690970816509292544>

³⁷ https://t.me/our_odessa/52241

KHERSON



Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, prepare the region for illegitimate elections in September 2023, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



Ukrainian forces maintain their presence from [Dachi](#) to [Kozachi Laheri](#). Operational Armed Forces of Ukraine

reported that the recently formed 39th Amphibious Assault Brigade, which has bridging and amphibious equipment, had been deployed to Kherson.³⁸

Russian forces heavily shelled free Kherson, killing seven and wounding at least ten. In Shyroka Balka, an entire family of five was killed, including a 23-day-old infant named Sofiyka. Her 12-year-old brother, Artem, was hospitalized in critical condition but died from his injuries. In Stanislav, the pastor of the Tachishvili Christian Church, Mykola Mykolayovych, and a congregant were killed during an artillery attack.³⁹ Some people may find these pictures disturbing despite being blurred. You can view them by  [clicking here](#).⁴⁰ The Russian VKS dropped FAB-500-SE  [UPMK glide bombs on Bilozerka and Odradokamyanka](#), destroying over a dozen homes and wounding one person.⁴¹

³⁸ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109932>

³⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109871>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109853>

⁴¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109914>

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity reported.

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives


There wasn't any significant activity reported.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Belgorod

Debris from Russian air defense missiles  [damaged the tenth and eleventh floors of an apartment building](#) in central Belgorod. Fifteen cars were also damaged, with no injuries reported.^{42 43 44}

Sverdlovsk

In Polevskoy, the commissariat office was firebombed, burning the front door. Over the last week, more than three

⁴² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109892?single>

⁴³ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/13/7415410/>

⁴⁴ https://t.me/shot_shot/55547

dozen military enlistment offices have been attacked in Russia.⁴⁵

BELARUSIAN FRONT

There was no new development, but border tension remains high.

THEATERWIDE

During the ongoing counteroffensive, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that Ukrainian forces had found up to five Russian landmines per square meter.⁴⁶ "Russian minefields are a serious obstacle for our troops, but not insurmountable. We have skilled sappers and modern equipment, but they are extremely insufficient for the front that stretches hundreds of kilometers in the east and south of Ukraine."


Serhii Ryzhenko, the chief doctor at Mechnikov Hospital in Dnipro, where many of the most seriously wounded are being treated, said he sees 50 to 100 soldiers daily, with

⁴⁵ <https://t.me/bazabazon/20439>

⁴⁶ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/13/7415416/>

mines the second most common cause of injury after artillery.⁴⁷

In another sign that Ukrainian forces are advancing again, there has been a sharp increase in the number of Russian troops captured or surrendering, confirmed through video and pictures. As an editorial policy, we generally do not share pictures and videos of POWs.

Ukrainian revealed their  [Furia \(Fury\) uncrewed aerial vehicle \(UAV\)](#), successfully fielded in combat to provide aerial command and control to direct artillery and drone attacks.⁴⁸

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz confirmed that Germany is studying the technical limitations of the Taurus cruise missiles before they are delivered to Ukraine. It is reported that Germany wants to geofence the Taurus, due to its 500-kilometer range, to assure it is not used on Russian soil.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/13/7415416/>

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2853>

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109869>



The table for equipment losses was **updated on August 6, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

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RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to August 6, 2023. 11,570 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,100 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2059	256	8.04:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	144	346	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	939	305	3.08:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2622	682	3.84:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	341	316	1.08:1	—
MRAPs	46	134	0.34:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	199	348	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	246	16	15.38:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	329	74	4.45:1	↓
Towed Artillery	269	144	1.87:1	—
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	475	193	2.46:1	↓
MLRS	253	50	5.06:1	↑
SAMs	142	119	1.19:1	—
Mobile Radars	40	70	0.57:1	—
EW/ECW	49	4	12.25:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	85	69	1.23:1	—
Helicopters	107	32	3.34:1	↓
Naval Vessels	13	26	0.50:1	↑

Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War


Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.