



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR SITUATION REPORT



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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 125

It has been 3,043 days since Russia occupied Crimea on February 27, 2014.

The situation in the Severodonetsk salient is deteriorating as Russian forces increase pressure on the Ukrainian Ground Lines of Communications (GLOC – aka supply line), including the Bakhmut-Lysychansk T-1302 Highway and the Siversk-Lysychansk route. The pattern of massive social media-driven disinformation campaigns from Pro-Russian accounts that occurred in Chernihiv, Mariupol, Sumy, and Severodonetsk is occurring again with the battle to control Lysychansk.

The situation around Lysychansk is very fluid, and cloudy weather has obscured satellite and NASA FIRMS data making confirmation challenging.

Russian forces have pushed north from Bila Hora and have likely reached School Number 12 in the southeastern Lysychansk lowlands. Fighting continues at the rubber factory and the gelatin plant. Ukrainian forces have held the gelatin plant for five days.

Russian forces have secured Vovchyoyanka and reached the quarry at the northern tip of the settlement. Russian forces have advanced west from Vovchoyanka and are fighting at the southeast corner of the Verkhokamyanka oil refinery but have not reached the T-1302 Highway GLOC.

There were reports, likely started by Igor Girkin, that Ukrainian forces had withdrawn entirely from Pryvillya and Russian forces had made a wet crossing at Kreminna. There is no information, videos, or pictures to support these claims. Given the continued Ukrainian resistance southwest, south, and southeast of Lysychansk, it is unlikely that a full-scale withdrawal has begun.

Russian forces crossed the T-1302 Highway west of Mykolaivka in an attempt to capture Spirne but were unsuccessful and pushed back to the original line of conflict.

Heavy shelling of the T-1302 Highway continued in Berestove and Bilohorivka [Donetsk].

Russian forces attempted to advance on Klynove, east of Bakhmut but were unsuccessful. Russian forces shelled Bakhmut as well as Travneve.

In the Svitlodarsk bulge, Russian forces shelled Ukrainian positions in Novoluhansk and Travneve on June 28. Both settlements were previously coded as under Russian control. There is fighting for control of the power plant on the northern edge of the Vuhlehirske Reservoir.

In the south Donbas, Russian forces tried to recapture Pavilvka but were unsuccessful. Otherwise, there were only artillery exchanges and skirmishes.

Russian forces attempted to capture Dementiivka north of Kharkiv city again but were unsuccessful.

On the Izyum axis, Russian forces attacked Dovhalivka and Zalyman again. This does not represent a new offensive and is an attempt to distract and redirect Ukrainian military assets, which are interdicting the Russian M-03 GLOC through Vesele [Kharkiv 49°23'16.6"N 37°11'52.8"E]. Russian forces made piecemeal attacks on Mazanivka and Dolyna in an attempt to advance on Slovyansk. The understaffed units suffered heavy losses and were unsuccessful.

Ukrainian forces “shelled” Snake Island, reporting that several Russian military assets, including a radar station and a Pansir anti-aircraft system, were destroyed.

Russia continued to launch Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) and cruise missiles into Ukraine. Missile strikes hit Dnipro, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kremenchuk, and Kharkiv.

In all other regions in Ukraine, there was no change in territorial control and only positional battles.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. It is possible the cyberattacks on Lithuania were the culmination point for Russian hostilities directed at Lithuania and its enforcement of trade sanctions – Russia has no other non-kinetic solutions available.
2. The situation for Ukrainian forces in Lysychansk has stabilized but is very fluid. We cannot confirm that Ukraine has started or is preparing a mass withdrawal.

3. It is highly unlikely that Russian forces will be able to quickly reengage new defensive lines at Siversk, Soledar, Bakhmut, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk if Ukraine withdraws from the Severodonetsk salient.
4. The condition of the Russian positions on the Izyum axis is increasingly fragile.
5. Russia continues to focus on securing the Luhansk Oblast at all costs.

On the surface, Russia made only minor gains measured in meters around Lysychansk in the last 24 hours. That would appear to be good news, but the areas of advance are applying significant pressure on Ukrainian military leaders. We maintain it is vital for Ukraine to hold Lyschansk for another 15 to 25 days. Although it is unlikely Russia will be able to reposition its forces to reinforce Izyum, broaden their offensives north of Kharkiv, or reinforce the south Donbas, Ukraine needs more time for more heavy weapons from NATO and Western allies to arrive.

Even if Ukraine withdraws from Lysychansk, there are preprepared defenses at Soledar, Bakhmut, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk. Defenses at Slovyansk and Karamtorsk are so built up that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) made a deliberate decision at the beginning of May to stop offensive operations toward Slovyansk and move all

available combat power to the Luhansk Oblast. Almost 60 days later, the goal of capturing the Luhansk Oblast is still not complete.

As the siege of Severodonetsk entered its third month on May 25, the Russian MOD started transferring units from Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia to fight in Luhansk. This has impacted Russian offensive operations on every other axis.

We had predicted that Russia's most likely and only possible response to Lithuania was a cyberattack. After the Killnet Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack on June 27, rhetoric from the Kremlin has quieted down.


We assess that Russia is straining to maintain the 2,450-kilometer-long line of conflict. The forests west and northwest of Izyum are a force multiplier for Ukrainian forces, resources, and tactics, and they are using that to their advantage.

We continue to have concerns about Ukraine's ability to take the initiative in late July or August. Western allies need to accelerate arms shipments to make this possible. We continue to believe that NATO and Western allies

should supply Main Battle Tanks (MBT) to Ukraine, which would be a significant force multiplier in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.

We are concerned we are in the Mutual Assured Destruction Instability Paradox, given Russia's unyielding view on Ukraine, its hypocritical stance on European Union sanctions, and its diminishing capabilities through conventional warfare. The decisions emanating from the Kremlin are not geopolitically or militarily sound.


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK

Severodonetsk Salient



Russian forces only made incremental gains south of Lysychansk, but the gains made were critical.

Northwest of Bila Hora, Russian forces remain contained on the southeastern edge of Lysychansk in the lowlands on the west bank of the Siverskyi Donets River.

Russian forces have likely pushed into the city but have only reached School Number 12 and Zavodu Park.

Ukrainian forces are holding the Russian advance north of Pidlisne at the rubber plant and the gelatin factory. Ukrainian forces have held the gelatin factor despite intense fighting and artillery fire for five days.



Russian forces continued to advance north, taking control of Vovchoyarivka and reaching the rock quarry. Russian forces have not been able to advance further into the Verkhokamyanka oil refinery. An attempt to advance on the complex from the south along the T-1302 Highway GLOC failed. The GLOCs that support Ukrainian forces in Lysychansk are getting squeezed from the south and southwest.



There were reports that Ukrainian forces had withdrawn from Pryvillya, likely started by Igor Girkin.¹ Later on June 28, Girkin claimed that Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) and Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) forces occupy 30% to 50% of Lysychansk and are in a mass withdrawal.² It is noteworthy that Girkin claims that Russian forces have

¹ <https://twitter.com/mdmitri91/status/1541705183071199232>

² [War Translated – Igor Girkin June 28, 2022](#)

entered the city from the north, which would indicate that the GLOCs out of the city are severed.


ASSESSMENT: Even if Ukraine was withdrawing, it is questionable that Russia and Russia-backed separatists had this much force strength. Additionally, there is nothing to indicate that fighting has stopped south of Lysychansk as of this writing. Even if Russia established a wet crossing at Kreminna, it takes time to move materiel safely over the bridgehead, secure the south bank, and start an advance in force. Additionally, an advance into Lysychansk from the northwest would effectively surround the troops in the city. Girkin not only did not indicate that Ukrainian forces were surrounded, he clearly stated they were continuing to retreat to reinforced positions in Siversk.

Editor's Note: Just before publication, Serhiy Haidai, Luhansk Regional State Administrative and Military head, reported that Ukrainian forces were holding existing territory and that Russian forces had made no additional gains.^{3 4} He made no indication that a withdrawal was occurring or that the GLOCs into Lysychansk had been severed.

³ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3880>

⁴ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3890>

Russian forces crossed the T-1302 Highway west of Mykolaivka in an attempt to capture Spirne but were unsuccessful and pushed back to the original line of conflict. This is another indication that Russian forces are unlikely to control 50% of the northern part of Lysychansk.




Russian forces continued heavy shelling of the T-1302 Highway in Berestove and Bilohorivka [Donetsk]. Drone video just north of Bilohorivka [Donetsk] quarry, where the T-1302 Highway crosses the railroad line from Popasna, showed terrain reminiscent of a World War I battlefield.

(NSFW, not for children, viewer discretion is strongly advised – [you can watch the video here](#))




East of Bakhmut, Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group, supported by LDR and DNR separatists, attempted to advance on Klynove and were unsuccessful.



In the Svitlodarsk bulge, Russian forces shelled Ukrainian positions in Novoluhansk and Travneve on June 28. On June 26, Russian forces attempted an advance on Kodema and failed. Travneve was coded as contested and Novoluhanske as under Russian control. The settlement of Dolomitne is sandwiched between the two.

The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that positions in Novoluhanske and Travneve were attacked, indicating that the line of conflict may have been pushed back further than initially thought after the failed Russian offensive on Kodema.




On June 27, we shared satellite images indicating there was fighting near the power plant on the northern edge of the Vuhlehirsk Reservoir.

ASSESSMENT: We do not believe this represents a Ukrainian counteroffensive, and it is likely Novoluhanske, Dolomitne, and Travneve are contested. This new information implies that Russian forces were pushed 4 kilometers south in the last 48 hours.


Lyman Axis

There weren't any major combat operations around Lyman on June 28.




SOUTH DONBAS AND WESTERN ZAPORIZHIZHIA

There were scattered artillery exchanges from Horlivka to Donetsk city to Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk Oblast and Hulyaipole to Orikhiv in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.



Russian forces attempted to break through to Pavlivka and suffered heavy losses. Due to the continued offensives on Pavlivka, we have recoded Yehorivka as contested.




We continue to consider Rivnopil, Pyatkhatky, and Stepove [Zaporizhia] as contested until additional verification exists. We are not prepared to list Luhivske, Novokarlivka, Bahate, Ukrainske, and Inzhenerne as contested without additional information.

Another explosion was reported at the Russian-controlled port in Berdyansk, which recently restarted operations after a March 24 missile strike sunk a large landing ship, damaged two others, and badly damaged a cargo ship.⁵



⁵ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/06/28/7355240/>



Volodymyr Rogov, the so-called "member of the main board of the military-civic administration" of the Russian occupying forces, claims the explosion was a "demining" exercise.


KHARKIV REGION

NORTHERN KHARKIV COUNTEROFFENSIVE

North of Kharkiv, Russian forces attempted to recapture Dementiivka again and were unsuccessful.⁶ Positional battles continued in Vesele [Kharkiv 50°10'26.3"N 36°31'59.5"E] and Rubizhne [Kharkiv]. Members of the

⁶ [General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces - Facebook](#)

Ukrainian 92nd, 40th, and 27th Brigades attacked Russian positions in the contested settlement of Vesele. [Artillery destroyed a Multiple Launch Rocket System \(MLRS\) vehicle and a loader.](#) The video was geolocated. The attack likely happened earlier in the week based on weather conditions in the video.




Russia launched at least six Iskander-M SRBMs from Belgorod toward Kharkiv city on the evening of June 28. [There were at least two massive explosions in the city.](#)⁷

⁷ <https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1541981647951859715>

Southeast of Chuhuiv, Russian forces shelled Malynivka and Pechenihy.

We consider the settlements of Hrakove, Nova Hnlytysa, Chkalovske, Doslidne, Rtyschchivka, and Zaliznychne contested.


IZYUM AXIS



Russian forces are attempting to respond to widespread interdiction of the Shevchenkove-Volohkiv Yar-Vesele-Horokovatka GLOC.

Russian forces have attacked Ukrainian troop concentrations at Mospanove and shelled Yavirske today. Russian forces also launched spoiling attacks against the settlements of Dovhalivka and Zalyman. None of these actions indicate a renewed Russian offensive has started. The artillery and MLRS strikes have been limited, and understaffed and underequipped units with low morale have made the attempted advances against Dovhalivka and Zalyman. On June 27, they suffered heavy losses.

Ukrainian forces established a wet crossing over the Siverskyi Donets south of Chepil on May 15 and have maintained the bridgehead while moving troops and limited materiel behind the current line of conflict.



The forested areas west and northwest of Izyum favor Ukrainian equipment, tactics, and training. Small units and SOF supported by Ukrainian artillery, benefiting from the introduction of NATO M777 155mm artillery at the end of April, have staged increasingly successful and widespread hit and run attacks on Russian positions, troop movements, and supply convoys.

The United States Department of Defense reported on April 29 that 60% of the first 90 M777 155mm towed artillery pieces allocated to Ukraine, along with ammunition, were in theater.⁸ On May 1, one of the first uses of M777 artillery by Ukraine was on Russian military equipment in Bairak. On May 2, M777 artillery was used to attack an occupied former Ukrainian military base in Balakliya, where additional Russian military hardware was destroyed. On May 3, Ukrainian forces [destroyed over 30 Russian vehicles](#) hiding in the forest in Vesele at the intersection of the P-78 and E-40 Highways. Drone video of the artillery barrage showed pinpoint accuracy.


Continued Ukrainian artillery strikes forced Russian troops to pull back to Kunie, Pidyvsoke [Kharkiv 49°26'26.3"N

⁸ [United States Department of Defense](#)

37°16'09.1"E], and Sukhyi Yar. The withdrawal created the opportunity to establish the wet crossing south of Chepil.

Ukrainian forces, supported by M777 artillery, started to move southeast into the forested area west of Izyum. Ukrainian SOF and small military units used guerilla tactics while artillery decimated elements of the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army, including the 38th and 64th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigades (SGMRB).


By the end of May, between artillery and guerilla warfare attacks on Russian patrols, positions, and supply convoys, Russian forces withdrew from Kunie, Pidvysoke [Kharkiv 49°26'26.3"N 37°16'09.1"E], and Sukhyi Yar and consolidated in Horokhovatka on the west bank of the Oskil River, and a different Pidvysoke [Kharkiv 49°23'08.6"N 37°26'29.5"E], further west from the line of conflict.



Additionally, after three months of combat, including being directly involved with the war crimes in Bucha, the 38th and 64th SGMRB were destroyed entirely. When Russia withdrew them from poorly prepared defensive positions west of Izyum at the end of May, less than 200 soldiers of the estimated 1,600 that first invaded Ukraine were left alive. The 64th reportedly had less than 20 surviving members.

Shortly after, Ukrainian forces liberated Velkya Komyshuvakha, Zavody, and Spivakivka. A few days later, Ukrainian forces reached the hamlet of Prydonetske, and M777 artillery was targeting Russian positions and armored vehicles 500 meters from the edge of Izyum itself. The

situation for Russian troops west of Izyum became so bad that they gave the region a nickname – Sherwood Forest.



As Russia continued its offensive to capture Severodonetsk and Luhansk Oblast at all costs, they further degraded force strength by moving assets from Izyum to the Luhansk Oblast. Additionally, when Ukraine launched the Northern Kharkiv Counteroffensive and started to threaten the Belgorod-Vovchansk-Kupyansk GLOC, an additional two under-strength Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) was sent north from Izyum. In the span of a week, Russia went from having 22 under-strength BTGs on the Izyum axis to 16.

The remaining BTGs were in poor condition. The Borivska City Council reported that contract soldiers and conscripts receive final training in the forests outside Pidlyman. Contractors who completed their obligation and left the region reported receiving poor training lasting only seven to 30 days. Conscripts and contract volunteers were used for piecemeal attacks with little strategic thought—fifty to 250 soldiers advancing on well-prepared Ukrainian positions. Desertion became common.

Regular Russian military forces shared rumors of Ukrainian forces attacking trenches at night, executing prisoners, and torturing wounded Russian soldiers. Stories spread of dead Russian soldiers tied to trees and bushes like scarecrows could be found on the forest trails and backroads. Whether the stories were true or not, they had a negative effect. The reports struck fear into the inexperienced replacement forces, some of whom were forced conscripts from Donetsk and Luhansk. The stories lowered their morale before they even experienced their first battle. For Russian units at forward operating bases in the forests west and northwest of Izyum, Ukraine rules the night.

Russian positions are described as poorly built trenches that lack bunkers. M777 artillery with proximity fuses

explodes in the trees sending metal and wood shrapnel flying into the trenches below. Russian troops complained they didn't receive equipment to build bunkers for better protection. Heavy equipment wasn't available to assist with digging trenches in deeply rooted soil. Desperate Russian soldiers scoured Izyum for shovels, picks, axes, and saws.

Ukrainian forces hide in the forests in small groups during the day to avoid drones and help direct artillery. They seek targets of opportunity and often wait to attack at nightfall and in the early morning.


Supply convoys and troop movements are increasingly challenging in the settlements surrounded by forests. The armor-heavy Russian military, deficient in light infantry, is disadvantaged.

In many ways, the situation west and northwest of Izyum is similar to the conditions Russian forces faced when they were stalled out northwest of Kyiv. Small units, territorial guard experienced with the terrain, and SOF making small attacks that minimize Ukrainian losses while grinding down Russian troop strength and morale. Even if Russian forces eliminate or capture a squad, the overall combat capacity for Ukraine is not adversely diminished due to the

distributed nature of the “counteroffensive.” Russian forces on the western flank of the Izyum axis are suffering from a death of a thousand cuts.

On June 25, the headquarters of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army was destroyed by a HIMARS rocket strike on Izyum. The attack also destroyed over 20 fuel trucks parked in the area. Izyum is 80 kilometers from Bakhmut. If a HIMARS system is located there, Izyum and the entire region south of the city is in range of the HIMARS medium-range precision rockets.


Since early May, we have assessed the western flank of the Izyum axis is underdefended. Two months later, the flank has become very fragile.



Additionally, on June 28, Russian forces attempted to advance on Mazanivka and Dolyna. They suffered heavy losses and withdrew back to the line of conflict.

DNIPRO, KHERSON & MYKOLAIV, ZAPORIZHIA REGION

In Kherson, the Ukrainian counteroffensive continued, but there were no territorial changes. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has maintained Operational Security (OPSEC) on specific details of ongoing Ukrainian advances.



Russia fired up to 12 cruise missiles at Mykolaiv city, with at least one hit. There wasn't any other information available.⁹

Russian cruise missiles hit civilian and military targets in Mykolaiv on June 28. Damage included the football [soccer] stadium where a 5-meter deep crater was left where the stands meet the pitch.¹⁰ Overnight on June 28, a missile hit an apartment building. There is more information in the **War Crimes and Human Rights** section.

⁹ <https://twitter.com/Russiaconflict/status/1541631736324448256>

¹⁰ https://twitter.com/ukraine_world/status/1541874984548798464/photo/1

At least two missiles hit the powerplant in Kryvyi Rih on June 28. Information about damage or the impact on operations was not shared.¹¹

Two Russian cruise missiles hit the city of Dnipro. Ukrainian air defenses shot down at least one missile additional missile.¹² At least one missile hit an automobile repair shop. Searchers found two dead civilians in the rubble.¹³

CHERNIHIV & SUMY REGION

Russia launched 20 missiles from helicopters into Krasnopillya in the Sumy Oblast.¹⁴ The attack killed two people. Krasnopillya has been subject to near-daily cross-border attacks since May. The settlements of Khmelivka and Popivka were also shelled.

¹¹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/06/28/7355257/>

¹² <https://twitter.com/TpyxaNews/status/1541829084027797509>

¹³ <https://twitter.com/Russiaconflict/status/1542013647534362624>

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1541950278483820545>

Russian forces fired 15 artillery shells cross-border into the settlement of Hirsk in the Chernihiv Oblast. There was damage to homes, but no casualties were reported.¹⁵

KYIV REGION

There wasn't any significant military action in this region.

BLACK SEA & ODESA REGION

Ukrainian forces appear to be attacking Snake Island on a daily basis. Command South reported that the most recent strike on June 27 destroyed a Pantsir SA-22 anti-aircraft battery and an electronic warfare radar station. A reliable source verified the reports.¹⁶ [A video was also released](#) showing the strike on the island.¹⁷

ASSESSMENT: It is unclear what system Ukraine is using to attack the island. Recently provided self-propelled artillery systems from Germany, Slovakia, Poland, Norway, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States have the

¹⁵ <https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1541723581637427201>

¹⁶ <https://twitter.com/OSINT88/status/1541796701903720451>

¹⁷ <https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1541401235236032516>

capability to strike the island with precision munitions. Additionally, Harpoon missiles from Denmark were upgraded to be used as land-to-sea and land-to-land missiles.

WEST REGION

There wasn't any significant military action in this region.

ASSESSMENT: We believe the chances that Belarus will launch a ground invasion of Ukraine remain extremely remote.

THEATERWIDE & EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

After face-to-face meetings in Madrid, Turkey no longer opposes Finland and Sweden joining NATO.¹⁸

"We now have an agreement that paves the way for Finland and Sweden to join NATO," Secretary-General Jens

¹⁸ [USA Today](#)

Stoltenberg said Tuesday at the Madrid summit, hailing the "historic decision."

Less than 24 hours after two Russian cruise missiles struck a mall in Kremenchuk, Germany and the Netherlands pledged to provide additional 155mm howitzers to Ukraine. Each nation announced it would provide three self-propelled artillery pieces – combined that is enough to arm a battery (company). Additionally, Germany revealed its initial shipment of Pzh 2000 155mm self-propelled howitzers included seven pieces of equipment, not five as reported earlier.¹⁹

Ukrainian Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov has reported that thousands of Ukrainian defenders have mastered the use of weapons provided by Western partners, and their training is still ongoing. He said Ukrainian fighters learn quickly, and any weapon becomes even more effective in the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In addition, a basic general military training course for Ukrainian Armed Forces service members was launched this week with the support of the United Kingdom. The

¹⁹ <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-netherlands-promise-additional-howitzers-to-ukraine/a-62294789>

program is capable of training 20,000 soldiers every 120 days.²⁰

The website Politico reported that Ukrainian forces have already started training on the Norwegian NASAMS integrated anti-aircraft system.²¹ There are reports that the United States is purchasing the NASAMS system for Ukraine to help supplement their current air defenses. There are reports that Ukraine is running low on missiles for the S300 anti-aircraft system, and the supply outside the Russian Federation is becoming limited. The Norwegian NASAMS system can strike air targets up to 160 kilometers away.

The European Union will supply Ukraine with 90 off-road trucks to support medical, engineering, and logistical efforts.²²

²⁰ <https://news.yahoo.com/reznikov-reports-thousands-ukrainian-armed-195300542.html>

²¹ <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2022/06/28/7142180/>

²² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - Facebook](#)



WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The search for victims from the Russian cruise missile strike on Kremenchuk continues, with authorities reporting that 36 are still missing.²³ [A surveillance camera that pointed at the rear of the Amstor Mall](#) caught the moment of impact. It also shows that a Kh-22 air-to-sea missile was used in the attack.²⁴

²³ [Reuters](#)

²⁴ <https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1541914750463918080>



The Russian Ministry of Defense has changed its story multiple times in the hours after the attack. They initially reported that the mall was never hit, and the missiles struck a factory and railroad station as planned. Then the Kremlin said the missiles did hit the mall, but it was also used for ammunition storage. Then they changed their story a third time after multiple videos released before the Kremlin claim showed no secondary explosions. In the final version, the Russian MOD admits to striking the mall but claims Ukraine staged the victims after the missile strike, and the mall had been closed for months.

Two civilians were killed in Tsyркuny as Russian forces continued to attack civilians and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv city and the areas north.²⁵ Additionally, five civilians were wounded, and required hospitalization after Kharkiv's Industrialnyi district was attacked.

A cruise missile hit a residential building in Mykolaiv, killing two civilians and wounding three.²⁶

GEOPOLITICAL

The United Nations Security Council held an emergency meeting after the Russian missile attack on Kremenchuk.²⁷ Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of being a "terrorist state" during a video conference address to the council.

"Russia does not have the right to take part in discussing and voting in regard to the war in Ukraine, which is unprovoked and simply colonialist of the part of Russia,"

²⁵ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/06/28/7355254/>

²⁶ <https://twitter.com/StratcomCentre/status/1542015562401857536>

²⁷ [Reuters](#)

Zelenskyy said. "I urge you to deprive the delegation of the terrorist state of its powers."

ECONOMIC

The rouble improved on Tuesday, trading at 52 for 1 US dollar.

Oil prices were mixed, with WTI crude steady at \$111 a barrel while Brent rose to \$118. RBOB United States wholesale gasoline was also steady, trading at \$3.88 a gallon. (\$1.02 a liter)

SRW Chicago wheat futures climbed a penny, rising to 94 cents a bushel for September 2022 delivery.