



# MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

July 10, 2023



# Malcontent News

## Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

### 7/10/23 23:59\* PST

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## **SUMMARY – DAY 501**

It has been 3,421 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 136 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- While there were significant tactical events in the theater of war, it was an unusually quiet day theaterwide
- Russian forces appear to have broken through Ukrainian defense west of Kreminna
- Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian defenses north of Soledar and south of Orikhiv
- The Kremlin publicly admitted that excess traffic to Crimea and continued poor weather in the Black Sea are affecting Russian logistics
- Ukrainian officials have announced a voluntary civilian evacuation along the Sumy Oblast border with Russia
- Türkiye will no longer stand in the way of Sweden's accession into NATO
- NATO members have agreed to waive the Membership Action Plan requirement for Ukraine's accession into the defensive alliance
- Ukraine and Türkiye have broken ground on a factory to build Bayraktar drones in Ukraine

- Germany and Ukraine have broken ground on a factory in western Ukraine to build and repair tanks and other armored vehicles

## **DAILY ASSESSMENT**


We assess the following:

1. The release of the commanders of Azovstal from Türkiye and the Kremlin claiming they were aware of the exchange on July 5, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirming that Yevgeny Prigozhin and 34 other PMC Wagner commanders met with President Vladimir Putin for three hours on June 29 feeds into the continued risk of another attempted insurrection/coup.
2. Ukrainian military leaders' changes to battlefield tactics have created a slower but more effective offensive that reduces the attrition of personnel and equipment. This is the last day of this entry.
3. The current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
4. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between

- penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
5. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community will impact Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
  6. Russian forces on the forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) suffer from critical shortages of heavy weapons, effective radio communications, food, and potable water, increasing casualties and lowering morale.
  7. Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
  8. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)


## TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



**About the maps:** Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the *Moskva* and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

### [Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)


# UKRAINE WEATHER



Stormy weather and high winds continue to impact the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, impacting Russian naval operations and military logistics. There remains a chance of pop-up thunderstorms and showers throughout the week, with a significant chance on July 14. High temperatures will be from 19° to 30° Celcius, with July 13 forecasted as the hottest day. Low temperatures will be from 10° to 22°. The new moon is on July 17.




## SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



*July 18, 2023, GFS forecast predicts soil saturation will range from 10% to 45% to 40 centimeters deep across the theater of war within Ukraine.*

***The soil saturation model does not consider the lakebed of the Kakhovka Reservoir.*** Soil saturation is between 15% to 60% in southern and eastern Ukraine. Thunderstorms could impact tractability in localized areas in Zaporizhia on July 13 and 14, followed by a drying trend through July 18.

# KHARKIV




**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

There wasn't any significant activity.


# DONBAS REGION

## LUHANSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

**Ukrainian Objective:** Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




## Svatove Operational Area

Russian forces continued sustained attacks on [Novoselivske](#). Some sources reported a small Russian advance, but analyzing the available intelligence confirmed our existing line of conflict. There was no change to the map.<sup>1</sup> Multiple sources reported that Russian troops advanced to the P-07 Highway west of Kryvoshyivka, but we


<sup>1</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17061>

had previously assessed this was where the current line of conflict is located using terrain analysis. We had likely overestimated the area controlled by Russian forces, with the new intelligence aligning with our existing map.



The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive west of [Karmazynivka](#).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28239](https://t.me/mod_russia/28239) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




## Kreminna Operational Area

RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Dibrova](#), with a video showing Russian troops being attacked by a TOS-1 thermobaric multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) Ukraine captured just west of the village.<sup>3</sup> Ukrainian source DeepState reported that fighting remained intense in the [Serebryansky Woods](#).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28239](https://t.me/mod_russia/28239) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


<sup>4</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17061>

# NORTHEAST DONETSK




**Russian Objective:** Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

**Ukrainian Objective:** Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




## Kreminna Operational Area

A geoconfirmed video released by the Armed Forces of Ukraine showed  [Russian troops shelled](#) by the 23rd Separate Motor Infantry Battalion in the northeastern part of [Torske](#).<sup>5</sup> Based on this new intelligence, we moved the line of conflict east to the settlement and coded it as contested. Russian troops were able to come within 200 meters of the Voznesenskyi Monastery.

<sup>5</sup> <https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1678515632747208713>






## Siversk Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces, supported by the Russian Airforce and army aviation (VKS), made a second attempt to advance on Spirne, suffered losses, and retreated to their defensive positions.<sup>6</sup>

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
<sup>6</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10289>



## Soledar Operational Area

Ukrainian forces were able to advance 1,500 meters south of [Rozdolivka](#) in the direction of Soledar, putting Russian troops in [Mykolaivka and Sakko i Vantsetti](#) into a salient.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17061>



## Bakhmut Operational Area


GSAFU reported another Russian attack “in the area of” the tactically significant village of [Dubovo-Vasylivka](#), which was repulsed.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, Russian forces supported by the VKS attempted to advance southwest from Dubovo-Vasylivka in the direction of Hryhorivka.<sup>9</sup> The attack was unsuccessful despite heavy fighting and significant close air support (CAS). Fighting in the southwestern part of [Berkhivka](#) continued but at a reduced tempo.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10289>

<sup>9</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10299>

<sup>10</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17061>

Deputy Minister of Defense for Ukraine, Hanna Maliar, reported that "In Bakhmut, our defenders have been keeping the entrances, exits, and movement of the enemy through the city under fire control for several days. This became possible [because], in the process of advancing, our troops took control of the main commanding heights around Bakhmut."<sup>11</sup>



<sup>11</sup> <https://t.me/annamaliar/924>

## Klishchiivka Operational Area

Fighting continued west of [Klishchiivka](#), with Ukrainian forces working to take full military control of the stronghold and trench network west of the settlement.<sup>12 13</sup> Petro Kuzyk, Commander of the Svoboda battalion of the 4th Operational Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, said, "Ukrainian troops have not yet seen any of the special forces of the Akhmat group, who were allegedly sent by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov to the Bakhmut front to fight in Klishchiivka."<sup>14</sup>


***Editor's Note: Please allow me this one moment of snark. Shocked, I tell you!***

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<sup>12</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17061>

<sup>13</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28239](https://t.me/mod_russia/28239) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/10/7410646/>




## Toretzsk-Niu York Operational Area

GSAFU reported a Russian attack in the direction of [Pivnichne](#) was repulsed.<sup>15</sup> Russian and Ukrainian sources have reported fighting near Mayorsk, Druzhba, and Ozarianivka. Videos have shown the fighting is between these settlements, [bracketed by the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and the T-513 Highway](#). This creates a situation where the direction of attack is subjective depending on the source.

<sup>15</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10299>


# SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

**Ukrainian Objective:** Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



## Avdiivka Operational Area

A Russian attack from the area of Vesele towards [Avdiivka](#), utilizing a significant armored force, ended in failure.<sup>16 17 18</sup>

Mutual fighting was reported in the gray area between [Sjeverne and Vodyane](#) and near [Nevelske](#).<sup>19 20 21</sup> Fighting was described as positional.

<sup>16</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10289>

<sup>17</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10299>


<sup>18</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17061>

<sup>19</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17061>

<sup>20</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28239](https://t.me/mod_russia/28239) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>21</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/13729>






## Marinka Operational Area

Russian attacks in and near [Marinka](#) were also unsuccessful.<sup>22 23 24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10289>

<sup>23</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10299>

<sup>24</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/13729>




## Vuledar Operational Area

It was a similar situation east of [Novomykhalivka](#), with Russian attacks failing to move the line of conflict.<sup>25</sup> <sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10289>

<sup>26</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10299>



## Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Both combatants have likely entered an operational pause, with only squad or platoon sized fighting reported near [Pryyutne](#) [Zaporizhia-Donetsk administrative border].<sup>27</sup>


## Occupied Donetsk

Insurgents in Mariupol documented Russian forces setting up ammunition warehouses next to occupied civilian housing in the Shevchenko and Primorsky Districts.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28239](https://t.me/mod_russia/28239) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


<sup>28</sup> <https://t.me/andriyshTime/11449>

# ZAPORIZHIA



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

**Ukrainian Objective:** Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



## Orikhiv Operational Area

Russian and Ukrainian sources, plus a geolocated video, confirmed that Ukrainian troops had advanced northeast of [Robotyne](#) up to 1,000 meters, pushing Russian forces back off the ridge and breaching their first primary line of defense south of Orikhiv.<sup>29 30 31 32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17061>

<sup>30</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28239](https://t.me/mod_russia/28239) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>31</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/49553>

<sup>32</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/13729>

Three more bodies were found at the humanitarian aid distribution point bombed by the Russian VKS on July 9, bringing the death toll to seven. Twelve people remain hospitalized, and the recovery effort has ended.<sup>33</sup>

## **Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant**

No information was shared about the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

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<sup>33</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104897>

## **BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION**

### **Black Sea**

The communications director for Operational Command South (OKS), Captain Natalya Humenyuk, reported that due to severe thunderstorms and high winds, there are no ships of the Black Sea Fleet on patrol within 100 nautical miles of the Ukrainian coast and no missile carriers.<sup>34</sup> This was likely the situation yesterday.

### **Occupied Crimea**

The Kerch Strait Ferry ran for half an hour after service was suspended due to high winds and severe thunderstorms yesterday before sailings were suspended again.<sup>35</sup>

The loss of the ferry has created significant traffic backups on the Crimean Bridge and has snarled Russian logistics to the point that the Kremlin has publicly declared the situation a problem. Over 1,300 cars were waiting in a 9-kilometer-long line to enter occupied Crimea from Russia

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<sup>34</sup> [https://t.me/our\\_odessa/49810](https://t.me/our_odessa/49810)

<sup>35</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/36044>

due to strict security measures and no alternative routes.<sup>36</sup> The Kremlin has asked civilian traffic not to take the bridge but to divert through Mariupol using the land bridge to Crimea. Further complicating Russian logistics, loaded trucks are still forbidden from using the Crimean Bridge due to security measures.

## WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity—two housekeeping notes. Ukrainian officials have stopped providing detailed information on post-flood recovery after the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam. Ukrainian forces continue to occupy the bridgehead at Dachi.

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<sup>36</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/36004>




## NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

### Kyiv

Russia launched an air raid on the Kyiv region using Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. All of the UAVs were intercepted, with the debris of one landing in the city's suburb. One  [house had broken windows a small grass fire](#) started.<sup>37</sup>

### Sumy

Sumy Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA), Volodymyr Artiukh, walked back an announcement made earlier in the day that a 5-kilometer wide security zone had been created along the Russian border, and residents still

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<sup>37</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104928>

living in these areas were subject to a mandatory evacuation. The evacuation order is voluntary.

"I want to stress that there will be no emergency mandatory evacuation. Evacuation will proceed as planned after [Sumy Oblast] residents make their own decisions. If someone refuses to evacuate, they can write a statement of refusal. Everyone else who wants to be evacuated will be taken to safe locations. I'd like to stress this: the evacuation will proceed as planned and will be voluntary. People have to know that if they remain in the 'death zone' – there is no other way to describe this area – they have to accept responsibility for their lives. Though, of course, we won't leave them alone. Every life is precious. But will they have access to emergency medical services? Will electrical engineers be able to repair power lines within 100 metres of the line of contact which enemy forces are destroying? I don't think so. We can't provide comfort for some of the residents while putting the lives of others at risk."<sup>38</sup>

Russian forces carried out 26 fire missions on eight border hromadas of Sumy, firing 180 artillery rounds, mortars, air-to-surface rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and rocket-

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<sup>38</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/10/7410734/>

propelled grenades. There were no casualties or significant damage reported.<sup>39</sup>

## RUSSIAN FRONT

**Russian Objective:** Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

**Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective:** Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

There wasn't any significant activity reported.

## THEATERWIDE

Russian launched 28 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones at Ukraine, with the air defenses intercepting 26 UAVs. To

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<sup>39</sup> [https://t.me/Sumy\\_news\\_ODA/17680](https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/17680)

support ongoing operational security, we did not investigate the impact of the two unaccounted-for drones.<sup>40</sup>

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the Ukrainian Armed Forces would receive a multi-year aid package that would “allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to move from Soviet weapons to NATO standards and meet the level of allies.”<sup>41</sup> Additionally, Stoltenberg announced that the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) would be waived for Ukraine, supporting a request from Kyiv.<sup>42 43</sup> MAP is a NATO program to which candidate countries are admitted. But last year, the Alliance invited Finland and Sweden to join NATO without a MAP. It was confirmed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will attend the NATO Summit in Vilnius.

In a joint statement made by Secretary General Stoltenberg, Türkiye's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the Prime Minister of Sweden, Ulf Kristersson, President Erdoğan has agreed to forward Sweden's accession protocol to the Grand National Assembly as soon as possible and secure ratification.<sup>44</sup> We had previously

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<sup>40</sup> <https://t.me/zaborzp/48678>

<sup>41</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/5324](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5324)

<sup>42</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/5315](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5315)

<sup>43</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17048>

<sup>44</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17056>

assessed this breakthrough would happen by September, after Türkiye's national elections.

"This is a historic step that makes all NATO members stronger and safer," Stoltenberg wrote on Twitter. Sweden has agreed to support Türkiye's accession to the European Union. The last barrier to Sweden's accession to NATO is Hungary. President Viktor Orbán had previously stated that if Türkiye ratified Sweden's membership, his nation would do the same.

Construction of a Bayraktar drone factory in Ukraine has started as part of an agreement forged in 2022. The facility is expected to be online by early 2025. Alexander Kamyshin, Minister of Strategic Industries of Ukraine, announced that ground had been broken on the production facility.<sup>45</sup>

United States news agency CNN reported that German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall was opening a joint factory to produce and repair tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and

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<sup>45</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17047>

armored personnel carriers in western Ukraine that will start operations within 12 weeks.<sup>46</sup>

The table for equipment losses **was updated** on July 10, 2023, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

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<sup>46</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/5313](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5313)

## RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to July 10, 2023. 11,041 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 3,483 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>	1964	235	8.35:1	↓
<b>Medium Duty Tanks</b>	139	330	0.42:1	—
<b>Armored fighting Vehicles</b>	907	293	3.10:1	—
<b>Infantry Fighting Vehicles</b>	2492	614	4.06:1	↓
<b>Armored Personnel Carriers</b>	324	292	1.11:1	↓
<b>MRAPs</b>	45	113	0.40:1	↓
<b>Infantry Mobility Vehicles</b>	194	336	0.58:1	—
<b>Command and Communications Vehicles</b>	245	15	16.33:1	—
<b>Engineering Vehicles</b>	318	69	4.61:1	↑
<b>Towed Artillery</b>	253	134	1.89:1	↓
<b>Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars</b>	442	175	2.53:1	—
<b>MLRS</b>	233	47	4.96:1	↑
<b>SAMs</b>	122	115	1.06:1	↓
<b>Mobile Radars</b>	36	68	0.53:1	—
<b>EW/ECW</b>	41	4	10.25:1	—
<b>Winged Aircraft</b>	84	68	1.25:1	—
<b>Helicopters</b>	106	31	3.42:1	—
<b>Naval Vessels</b>	12	26	0.46:1	—

## **RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR**

In a stunning revelation just minutes before Russian state media released a smear piece highlighting Yevgeny Prigozhin's criminal past, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed a French news story that Russian President Vladimir Putin met with PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and 34 other leaders on July 29, five days after the failed insurrection.

"The president had such a meeting. He invited 35 people to attend – all the commanders of the detachments and the company's management, including Prigozhin himself. This meeting took place in the Kremlin on 29 June. It lasted for almost three hours."




Peskov said that Putin discussed the actions of PMC Wagner in Ukraine as well as the failed insurrection, adding that Wagner Group commanders offered their version of what happened on June 23 and 24 and why. Peskov said the representatives from Wagner stressed they "are staunch supporters and soldiers of the head of state."<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/10/7410652/>



In Krasnodar, Navy Captain Stanislav Rzytsky, the former commander of the Kilo-class submarine Krasnodar, was shot four times in the back while out for a jog.<sup>48</sup> Russian investigators report that the attack was not random, with Rzytsky killed in a location without security cameras. Rzytsky was the deputy head of the Krasnodar department for mobilization work and shared his jogging route publicly on the app Strava.<sup>49</sup>

Rumors that Valery Gerasimov had been dismissed from commanding the Joint Group of Russian Forces in Ukraine were untrue. We addressed the rumors  [in a July 9, 2023, Flash Report](#). The Kremlin  [released pictures](#) and videos of  [Gerasimov being briefed on the situation in Ukraine](#).<sup>50</sup> <sup>51</sup>The bigger question the video raises is that General of the Army Segey Surovkin was not present in person or virtually and has remained missing since June 24.

It's been a while since Russian forces have broken operational security (OPSEC) in a way that hurts the brain, but we have one for you. In a video, [a Russian soldier](#)

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<sup>48</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/5326](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5326)

<sup>49</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/5326](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5326)

<sup>50</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678291277132234752>

<sup>51</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678282381088931840>

[showed a repair depot](#), highlighting a damaged BMP Terminator (not previously documented), a KamAZ truck, and a T-90M tank. The video had more than enough information to geolocate the repair facility.

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## Notes on Sourcing Information


**Malcontent News** uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.