



**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
SITUATION REPORT**



October 4, 2022



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

10/04/22 23:59* PDT

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SUMMARY – DAY 223

It has been 3,129 days since Russia occupied Crimea on February 27, 2014.

Our chief content officer is traveling due to a personal matter. Today's report will be brief, not include some of our usual features, and will have less detailed maps. We thank you for your understanding.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Our assessment that Russian defensive lines in Kherson were collapsing over a large area was not only accurate but understated how bad the situation was for Russian troops.
2. We maintain our assessment that Russia is incapable of responding simultaneously to three counteroffensives in Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Kherson.
3. We maintain that if a Russian force of company size or larger surrenders in northern Kherson, it will create a cascade of surrendering Russian troops. The defensive


lines in northern Kherson are at high risk of complete collapse.

4. We maintain that mass surrenders could become a logistical problem for Ukraine, which could overwhelm the ongoing counteroffensive.
5. We maintain that using tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield is highly unlikely as it would require striking what the Kremlin believes is Russian soil and Russian forces are incapable of fighting in a conventional environment, let alone a CBRN setting.
6. We assess that the Kremlin's crisis in the information space is expanding and that Russian President Vladimir Putin's reputation has been damaged.
7. The discovery of fresh war crimes in Kharkiv near Borova does not bode well for what Ukrainian forces will find in the liberated territories of Kherson.
8. We maintain Russia's mobilization efforts are ineffective due to corruption, a lack of preparation, violation of the social contract with the Russian people, and conscripts being sent en masse to Ukraine without vital equipment or training.
9. We maintain that the next four days are critical as the Kremlin reveals its border intentions.
10. In our assessment, there is a heightened risk of terror attacks on cities in central and western Ukraine over the next few days with the ratification of the sham referendum borders. To be explicitly clear, we have no

belief or concern that would include weapons of mass destruction.

11. We maintain we are in the Mutually Assured Destruction Instability Paradox due to irresponsible language from the Kremlin, looming decisions from Moscow leadership, and the deteriorating kinetic warfare situation for Russian troops in Ukraine.
12. We maintain our assessment that the Russian military in Ukraine is combat destroyed is accurate, and the Russian military has no meaningful way to respond to the ongoing and accelerating collapse on multiple fronts. Conscripts that were rushed to the Donbas in the past week have not slowed the deterioration and are not contributing to improving combat power.


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



Information about changes made to the map: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgency, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at Saky Naval Airbase. Based on your feedback, we changed the archived offensive flags to "gray circles." The layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted, like [Kherson](#), the link will take you to the exact location explained in the Situation Report.


You can visit our war map at <http://www.rusvukrmap.com>

KHERSON COUNTEROFFENSIVE & MYKOLAIV




Russian Objective: Integrate oblast into Russian Federation, hold existing defensive lines, protect remaining Lines of Communication (LOC – supply lines), defend Kherson, prevent envelopment on the western side of the Dnipro River, restrict insurgent activity


Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the Kherson oblast west of the Dnipro River, push Russian forces back far enough to end multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) attacks on Mykolaiv and Kryvvi Rih



Russian defensive lines completely collapsed in northern Kherson, with Russian troops retreating from the bank of the Inhulets River from Davydiv Bridge to Starosillya. Our assessment from October 3 that Russian positions on the Inhulets had become untenable, or at the minimum, Russian military leaders believed it themselves and ordered the withdrawal.



Pictures and videos showed Ukrainian troops raising the Ukrainian flag in Petropavlivka and Nova Kamyanka. This indicates that the suggestion by some that a new bulge has formed at the center of the oblast is likely overstated. In the last 24 hours, Ukraine has liberated approximately 1,000 square kilometers and close to 1,500 square kilometers in the last two days. Both figures are conservative.



Along the banks of the Dniro, there were multiple reports that Ukrainian troops had advanced past Dudchany and were approaching Mylove. There were claims on October 3 that Russian forces would attempt to set up a defense at Mylove, but that effort appears to have failed. Ukrainian mechanized infantry units are advancing into settlements as fast as the Russians are retreating.


Some analysts had predicted that the roads and fields that Ukrainian forces are advancing on would be heavily mined and prepared, but as noted in the October 3 Situation

Report, Russian military leaders stuck to their doctrine of a 10-kilometer deep defensive line. The “second line” of defense was mostly artillery and antiaircraft units that made minimal defensive preparations. Russian forces didn’t lay mines or build a second set of defenses to fall back to because they believed they would start to advance again in the future.

Numerous videos and pictures show roads covered with the scattered bodies of dead Russian soldiers and destroyed equipment. Private and semiprivate Russian Telegram channels for military units were full of requests for aid, complaints that military commanders weren’t responding to requests, reporting that military units had lost contact, and creating a picture of a chaotic retreat. Operational Command South reported some Russian units attempted to mount counteroffensives while others retreated without coordination. There are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian troops have taken hundreds of prisoners of war, but we can’t verify the veracity of the claim.

The lack of an organized defense has been caused by Russian troops not being provided with secured radio communications and many Russian command and control bases moving to the city of Kherson or the opposite bank of the Dnipro. Unlike Luhansk, where there wasn’t an effective

reserve, Russian military commanders would not or could not deploy available reserve forces from Kherson. Russian aviation was marginally more active and lost two helicopters in the Beryslav area for their troubles. It is, in a word, a catastrophe.



Russian troops are now believed to be attempting to shorten the front and consolidate their defenses in Berstav, Vesele [Kherson], and Kozatske on the north bank of the Dnipro and Nova Kakhovka on the south bank.

ASSESSMENT: If this is the intent of Russian forces, it will be an indefensible position that will risk putting Russian

troops into a Dunkirk-like scenario. Two challenges will be unsolvable.


Reports indicate retreating Russian troops abandoned most of their equipment. The loss of artillery and air defense systems will impact Russian troops' ability to perform counterbattery and provide air defense along a smaller defensive line. Additionally, with the Dnipro River serving as a natural barrier, Ukrainian forces can concentrate more firepower on a smaller area.

That's the second problem for Russian forces. Ukrainian forces will be able to use tubed artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to establish fire control on the east and south bank of the Dnipro River, and if Russian forces consolidate at Beryslav to Nova Kakhovka, over the entire area. Russian troops could attempt to evacuate into the city of Kherson, but that still requires crossing the Inhulets at Darivka. The bridge has been destroyed for weeks, and the pontoon crossings are under constant attack.

If Russian troops create a dense defensive line on the north bank of the Dnipro, Ukrainian forces will not do a head-on attack. They will seek to flank the Russian positions by

taking Darivka and use artillery, MLRS, aviation, and rockets fired by HIMARS, particularly the M31 fragmentation rockets they just received, on the trapped Russian troops. Defensive lines around the dam will only trap thousands of Russian soldiers against the water, with a single-lane dirt bridge to cross and makeshift ferries created from barges.

If Russian troops fall back to Beryslav and then attempt to defend from that location, they will rapidly find themselves in a technical encirclement with no way to retreat and limited resupply options. As it is, the supply depots in Dudchany and Mylove are a lost cause, and Russian troops have not shown the will or capacity to retreat with their military supplies. Looted goods – yes – the tools to fight a war – no.



Pro-Russian sources claim that Ukraine now controls Snihurivka, the next strongpoint on the Inhulets River west of Davydiv Brid. If true, it is a significant development, but it seems unlikely unless Russian troops also are withdrawing from Blahodatne [Mykolaiv].

Ukraine's counteroffensive in Kherson moved approximately 40 kilometers in less than four days. There remains dense fog of war.

The Antonovsky Bridge was hit by rockets fired by HIMARS, with reports that the temporary repairs on the bridge that allowed a small convoy to cross on October 3 have been destroyed. Russian resupply efforts continued using helicopters and ferries. There were renewed reports of explosions in Nova Kakhovka and in Kakhovka at the Karill Factory Complex, which is being used by Russian troops.


The Ukrainian air force performed seven air strikes, and ground forces carried out 290 fire missions. In maintaining operational security, there wasn't information on what was targeted.

ASSESSMENT: After the failures in Kharkiv, the Russian Ministry of Defense didn't make any obvious adjustments to their command and control and defensive structures in Kherson. We are not seeing much evidence that Russian troops can establish a new line of defense capable of protecting Beryslav and keeping the region out of artillery range. On the contrary, we see the risk of a large encirclement of thousands of troops not solved but accelerated by Russian decisions on the battlefield.

DNIPROPETROVSK & NORTHERN ZAPORIZHIA

Russian Objective: Integrate the oblast into Russian Federation, capture the rest of the oblast, break civilian will with continued terror attacks, and turn popular opinion against Ukraine by terrorizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Ukrainian Objective: Prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and prepare the area's civilian population for a nuclear accident



The situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant is stable. International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi reported that Ihor Murashov, Director General of ZNPP, is home with his family in Ukraine after being detained by Russian authorities. Murashov will not be returning to the plant as its director.


The IAEA reported there has not been shelling at or around the plant since October 1, contrary to Russian Ministry of Defense claims. Director Grossi is traveling to Kyiv and Moscow this week to continue negotiations to demilitarize the power plant.

Ukrainian engineers made significant progress on repair work on the plant. They fixed the damage to the sprinkler ponds for Reactors 5 and 6.

Nikopol, Chervonohryhorivka, and Marhanets were shelled and hit by Grad rockets fired by multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). No one was injured, but in Chervonohryhorivka, two specialty schools (lyceums), a church, and gas pipelines were damaged.

DONBAS REGION

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHIA




Russian Objective: Integrate the oblast into Russian Federation, capture the rest of the oblast, defend the existing line of conflict, and end the insurrection that is throughout the Russian-controlled territory

Ukrainian Objective: Fix Russian assets in place to prevent redeployment, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies and disrupt logistics, support and expand the insurrection in occupied territories

The only fighting we can report is sporadic artillery fire from the Donetsk-Zaporizhia administrative border to Hulyaipole to Orikhiv.

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Integrate the oblast into Russian Federation, capture the rest of the oblast, maintain existing defensive lines, and bring the insurrection across southwestern Donetsk under control


Ukrainian Objective: Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and

exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies and disrupt logistics


The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) militia public relations channel didn't release any information today on combat activity, the number of artillery strikes fired by Ukraine on their positions, or equipment destroyed. Pro-Russian milbloggers have started a campaign to suggest significant progress is being made west of Donetsk toward encircling Avdiivka, but there is no proof to support the claims.



The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported fighting west of Donetsk in Pervomaiske, where elements of the DNR 1st Army Corps are still trying to move from Pisky. They also reported fighting in Vesele, where the destroyed Donetsk International Airport is located. We had coded this area as under Russian control. It is unclear what parts of the airport had been recaptured, so we didn't make changes to the war map.




On the southern defensive line, the DNR militia attempted to advance on Novomykhailivka and was unsuccessful.



GSAFU reported that Ukrainian troops repelled an attack on Vuhledar, which is six to eight kilometers from the known line of conflict. The lack of reports from the DNR and Pro-Russian sources leads us to believe this was a reconnaissance group, not a larger assault.

ASSESSMENT: The open source intelligence information space was focused heavily on Kherson and, to a lesser extent, Kharkiv and Luhansk. It is unusual to have this little information about activity west of Donetsk.


NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Integrate oblast into Russian Federation, defend against Ukrainian advances toward Luhansk, capture Bakhmut/Soledar

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Bakhmut-Soldar while managing equipment and personnel losses, minimize civilian casualties, and defend GLOCs


The situation in northeast Donetsk remains unchanged, with an increase in fighting and artillery fire by Russian forces.




Russian forces continued their attempts to advance on [Spirne](#) and [Vyimka](#) without success. We maintain these attempts make no sense tactically or strategically.




Fighting continued on the southern edge of [Bakhmutske](#) led by Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group, with no change in the situation.



There was renewed fighting on the eastern edge of Bakhmut. Journalists were in the city today, hinting that Russian troops may be pushed back further than what is currently known. With journalists on the ground, the reports that civilians were told to stay in their homes due to a larger planned counteroffensive and possible "house-to-house fighting" was inaccurate.




PMC Wagner attempted to advance on Ozarianivka and Kurdyumivka but could not gain new ground.




The 1st Army Corps of the DNR, 3rd Brigade, continued attacks on Zaitseve and Mayorsk, but didn't find any success.

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Integrate oblast into Russian Federation, hold current defensive lines, and control insurgency

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, prevent the retreat of Russian soldiers from Lyman, make opportunistic territorial gains, support insurgents, interdict supplies



Defensive lines for Russian forces remained mostly stable since Lyman fell over the weekend. Pro-Russian sources claimed there was fighting in Krasnorichenske, a town north of Kreminna and that Ukraine had control of the P-66 Highway, the main GLOC from Svatove that supplies Kreminna. There wasn't enough intelligence to update the map.


There were reports that civilian evacuations from Svatove, Lysychansk, and Severodonetsk continued. The status of Svatove remains unchanged.

Forced conscripts continued to surrender or desert due to a lack of pay, basic supplies, including food and drinking water, and no information from their commanders. The numbers remain low, and one group of known deserters has had no contact from any military authority in three days.

ASSESSMENT: We maintain the defensive lines Russian forces are attempting to build from Svatove to Kreminna will not hold. Both towns will likely fall under Ukrainian control in October. Ukrainian forces are possibly entering an operational pause to resupply, reconstitute, and strengthen GLOCs. We see this as a brief pause, not a situation lasting for weeks.




KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Retreat and minimize casualties, prevent Ukrainian forces from advancing from their bridgeheads on the east bank of the Oskil River, and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate all of Kharkiv oblast, sever GLOCs into Luhansk, protect civilian lives, and defend the Ukrainian border



Ukrainian forces liberated Kruhlyakivka, the last town on the east bank of the Oskil River that Russia controlled. The Ukrainian bridgeheads from Hryanykivka to Oskil are now fully connected with control of four wet crossings.

The Russian Ministry of Defense map for Kharkiv, which is optimistic, showed that in the last 24 hours, Russia lost

control of two-thirds of the last sliver of the oblast they held. Ukraine now holds administrative or military control of 98% of the oblast, with the remaining 2% within the range of Ukrainian artillery units.

More information was released about the torture chamber in Pisky-Radkivski, as well as the report of the discovery of a mass grave. Some readers and listeners may find these details disturbing.

Torture included rape and penetration with sex toys, burying people alive, and asphyxiation by forcing victims to wear a gas mask, setting a piece of carpet on fire, and making them inhale the fumes. A plastic tub was filled with crowns, dentures, bridges, and dental implants made of gold that had been ripped out of people's heads. It was unclear if the victims were dead or alive when this happened. Comparisons have been made to Nazi atrocities based on how victims died and the audacity to remove gold dental work and store it. The plastic tub held dozens of pieces. In the interest of full disclosure, no one on our team could complete a tentative count without becoming physically ill or breaking down, including your chief content officer.

During the occupation, the 64th and 38th motor rifle brigades, both participants of the Bucha massacres, were stationed in the area. PMC Wagner and the terrorist organization Imperial Legion, not to be confused with the Russian BARS-13 Russia Legion reserve unit, were also stationed in the area. PMC Wagner and the Imperial Legion maintained training camps in the forests outside Pidlyman and Pisky-Radkivski. Both encampments were hit by rockets fired by HIMARS in July.

In Bohuslavka, Ukrainian forces were greeted by cheering crowds with flowers and food. The Ukrainian national anthem was sung together, ending with a cheer of, "Slava Ukraini!" Along the east bank of the Oskil, in areas where Russian occupation started between February and March, one thing stands out in the liberation videos and pictures. There are few adults in their 20s to early 40s and almost no men of any age. Where did they all go?

CHERNIHIV & SUMY REGION

Dmytro Zhyvytsky, Sumy Oblast Administrative and Military Governor reported the hromadas of Yunakivka, Khotin, and Bilopillia were shelled by Russian troops positioned across the international border. Russian troops only fired 25 shells, and there were no reports of damage or injuries.

KYIV REGION

The town of Bila Tserkva, which is home to a Ukrainian air force base, was hit by six Shahed-136 loitering munitions in two waves of attacks. Only one person was injured, and civilian infrastructure was damaged in the attack. There wasn't any information released about the status of the air force base, with Ukraine maintaining tight operational security.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA & ODESA REGION

There wasn't any significant military action in this region.

WESTERN & CENTRAL UKRAINE

There wasn't any significant military action in this region.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shogui reported that over 200,000 mobiks had been added to the Russian armed forces since partial mobilization was announced. The flood of videos showing crowded buses and large groups of people waiting for the train has turned into a trickle. There were reports that some mobilized men were being sent back home because there weren't enough training resources to process 200,000 people concurrently. They aren't released from service and will be called up when the backlog has been resolved.

THEATERWIDE & EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Only reporting kinetic warfare

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION & MILITARY STATUS



Only reporting kinetic warfare

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Only reporting kinetic warfare

GEOPOLITICAL

Only reporting kinetic warfare

ECONOMIC

Only reporting kinetic warfare