Hello and welcome history friends, patrons all, to the third instalment of our examination of episode 30, the Long War. Last time we hopefully cleared things up a little bit by focusing our attention through the lens of Lorraine. The Duchy of Lorraine, as we discovered, was a great lens through which we could better explain how Louis XIV of France attempted to force through the so called ‘reunions’; a policy of territorial aggrandisement through intimidation, risk and the total manipulation of local history, to pave the way towards bringing further pieces of land into the French sphere of influence. We saw last time that Louis was able to do this by essentially claiming a load of land in the name of his three bishoprics within the Duchy of Lorraine itself. Through such a policy, Louis found himself able to gradually add to his domains and gradually increase his influence over the strategically vital duchy on his borders, in spite of the opinions of the exiled Duke and his more loyal subjects, none of whom the French could coerce into their own service. This time, we take our focus off Lorraine as a case study, but bring the policy of peaceful reunions to a definite halt, when one power in particular, Spain, grew weary of the continued French expansion, after France had expanded into one too many territories. Let’s take you to this very troubled continent, in late 1680…

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*The armies, the councils and all the ingenuity of man would be but a feeble means of maintaining us on the throne if everyone believed he had the same right as us and did not revere a superior powere of which our own power is a part.* Louis XIV, explaining the importance of the divine right of Kings to his son the Dauphin.[[1]](#footnote-1)

The chambers of reunion had proved to be a cynically brilliant method through which Louis could bring about all the changes in peacetime that he had desired to acquire from the previous war. By August 1680 French forces had occupied all of Alsace save Strasburg, while through further annexations the previously unconnected territories of Franche-Comte and Alsace were joined together, further reinforcing French security along the Rhine. Louis was able to do this because he provided increasingly dubious claims on the different portions of land he wished to subsume into the French sphere. Sometimes these portions of land were mere towns and their surrounding farmlands, sometimes they constituted strategically important and historically disputed corridors between different lands, such as that aforementioned strip of land between Alsace and Franche-Comte, the county of Montbéliard. As was to be expected, the larger and more important the lands Louis sought to incorporate, the more attention Europe paid to his advances, even if there seemed to be a general reluctance to act against him. As the new territories were forced to swear oaths of allegiance to the King of France – oaths which often supplanted the old oaths they had made to the HR Emperor – Louis could claim that he stood on legitimate and legal ground in his policy course. His neighbours, of course, saw things differently.

Luxemburg dated its origins to the House of Luxemburg, which had once provided several HR Emperors and competed with the Habsburgs on the continent for dominance before the extinction of its male line. When this occurred, intermarriage and the process of merging the House of Burgundy’s possessions with those of the Habsburgs meant that Philip II came to own a vast swathe of territory in the Low Countries by the time of his accession as King of Spain in 1555. Of course, the seven Dutch provinces within these possessions would soon rebel against Philip’s authority, but the ten remaining provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, which included Luxemburg, remained loyal. So it was that by 1681, Spain owned Luxemburg and its extensive surrounding territories just as surely as it owned the Spanish Netherlands. It was an accepted fact of European relations that Spain owned these lands, even though the concept seems so strange to us now, and even though by 1680 they were proving to be a weakness for Madrid, rather than a strength. When Louis considered the strategic implications of Luxemburg and its surrounding lands, he couldn’t help but imagine the benefits of having a French flag or at least a French influence in that sphere. Such a change in regime would seriously impair the southern border of the Spanish Netherlands, while it would also reinforce the French border along the east and with the Rhine. The question, as with all the other reunions, was how to bring such a regime change about, when the status quo had existed for nearly 150 years.

This is where our story of Lorraine becomes important again. Because Lorraine was about a day’s ride from Luxemburg proper, the chamber deputies in Metz, where French operations in Lorraine were based, set themselves to work. Incredibly, they found that the county of Chiny, which overlapped the lands of Luxemburg, had once belonged to Metz. Following on from this shocking discovery and subsequent absorption of the county of Chiny, they then found that the county of Chiny itself used to possess more territories further afield, and that although these territories were currently in the possession of Luxemburg, they would now belong to the county of Chiny, and thus to Lorraine, and thus to France. The implications were as obvious as they were brazen – Louis was not trying to seize Luxemburg in a military style coup – that would be too risky. Instead, he set his officials the task of gradually isolating and starving out the Duchy of Luxemburg, so that the once great fortress city would be surrounded on all sides by French soldiers and lands. As though throwing aside all niceties, French troops then straight up blockaded Luxemburg and seemed content to starve it into submission. These acts would have been seen in Spain as something akin to an act of war, but Louis did not seem to dwell on Luxemburg long enough for the policy to really inflame Spanish opinion. This is because he had moved on to bigger and more daring things down south.

With Alsace in French hands and several Rhine territories falling under the French sway thereafter, Strasburg seemed to shimmer like a terribly isolated diamond in Louis’ eyes. For so long France had been tormented by the regular sight of Imperial soldiers pouring across that fortress’ bridge and into the French occupied Alsace. This history of invasion and the very Imperial leanings of the city fathers in Strasburg – which was meant to be a free Imperial city as per the terms of the Peace of WP – singled out Strasburg as a definite target even before the policy of the reunions had definitively begun. By singling Strasburg out, Louis proved that he was as content to ignore the provisions of that 1648 set of treaties as he was to manipulate them. Having moved through questionable legal territory at best in his previous acquisitions, Louis proved content to resort to his favourite tactic, that of overwhelming force, when affairs reached a certain pitch. So it was that after building up a large stockpile of stores under Louvois’ careful eye, French troops sallied forth on 30th September 1681, surprising the city fathers of Strasburg with a series of startling ultimatums. Having seen the surrounding lands fall without so much as a shot being fired, and with the additional bridgehead of Kehl on the right bank of the Rhine also seized, Strasburg capitulated on the condition that the city retain its old rights and privileges as per the terms of 1648. After having accepted the French as their overlords, Louis promptly ignored these very terms and demanded that the Protestant church in Strasburg be replaced with that of a Catholic one, in which he heard mass on 23rd October.

The very hostile act Louis had just committed was compounded by another still more brazen act on the very same day. On 30th September 1681, as French soldiers sallied forth into Strasburg, the final details of a startling treaty were being worked out between the Duke of Mantua and French officials. With the agreed for initial payment of 1 million livres and a subsequent annual payment of 60k livres a year, Louis managed to effectively bribe the Duke to hand over the Italian fortress of Casale. The motivation behind taking Casale, a fortress 40 miles east of Turin on the bank of the Po River and on the Italian side of the Alps, was twofold. First, it would ensure French security for future campaigns in Italy in the event of another war between the French and Habsburgs there, and second, the fortress could be used to intimidate the Duke of Savoy and his subjects through the careful application of pressure with French troops. As we’ll see in future Xtra episodes on Louis’ religious policies in the region of Savoy, the use of French forces to acquire the religious uniformity that Louis desired became a common strategy after the Edict of Fontainebleau outlawed Protestantism in France in 1685. More immediately though, John A Lynn noted that the ‘double coup of Strasburg and Casale stunned European statesmen.’[[2]](#footnote-2)

Before we get too involved with Louis’ further expansionist policies though, I thought it might be nice to insert a little break here and take some time to examine a certain individual’s correspondence to lighten the mood somewhat. In our previous FDW, we met the second wife of Monsieur, Elizabeth-Charlotte, Princess Palatine and the sister in law of Louis XIV. Coming from the Palatinate, which endured a series of horrific French campaigns over the course of the latter 17th century, Elizabeth Charlotte, or Liselotte to her friends, was well placed to comment on French policy during this era. Yet, it was her immense amount of correspondence that she sent between her German relatives that provide a unique and invaluable window into the life of a French royal during Louis’ age. Liselotte was both intensely caring and refreshingly humorous considering the stiff and reserved court in which she resided. Compelled to convert to Catholicism as per the arranged marriage with the brother of the King of France, Liselotte wrote reams of letters commenting on how boring, how pompous and how lonely French court life could be. They stand as some of the best sources available on the era, and are doubly valuable because they are from the perspective of a woman.

On 13th April 1681, Liselotte wrote to her aunt, Duchess Sophie of Hanover, who would in time give Britain its Hanoverian line of monarchs through her firstborn son, George I. These incredibly interconnected tales are all the more fascinating because we get to see the actors talk to one another from an early stage. Liselotte for her part was forever commenting on how she would have loved to take a trip to Hannover, but knew full well that her controlling husband Phillipe would never allow such a journey. Thanks to her voluminous correspondence, Liselotte was kept well-informed of the latest amusing tales and rumours from the courts of Europe, one of which I felt had to be shared, if for no other reason than it hilarious, but also because it connects us to the people that lived in the 1680s and reminds us that they laughed at what we laughed at, and found solace in comedy during the long and dreary times. Liselotte wrote:

I know some fine stories, one of which I simply must tell your grace. I heard it three or four days ago, and it happened in a Jesuit college…One of the pupils at the college was full of mischief of all kinds, ran around all night long, and did not sleep in his room. So the revered fathers threatened him with a tremendous beating if he did not stay in his room at night. The boy goes to a painter and asks him to paint two saints on his buttocks, on the right cheek saint Ignatius of Loyola a d on the left Saint François Xavier, which the painter did. With that the boy tidily pulls up his breeches, goes back to college, and starts making all kinds of trouble. When the revered fathers catch him at it, they tell him “this time you’ll be whipped!” The boy begins to struggle and plead, but they say that pleading will not do him any good. So the boy gets down on his knees and says, “O Saint Ignatius, o Saint Xavier, have pity upon me and perform a miracle for me to prove my innocence.” With that the fathers pull down his breeches, and, as they lift up his shirt to beat him, the boy calls out, “I am praying with such fervour that I am certain my invocation will be heard!” When the fathers see the two painted saints, they exclaim, “A miracle! The boy whom we thought is a rogue is a saint!” and with that they immediately fall on their knees to kiss the behind and then call together all the pupils and make them come in procession to kiss the holy behind, which all of them do.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Whatever the truth of the story, it sheds remarkably humorous light on the era in general, considering how serious Louis seemed to be all the time, but this wasn’t all Liselotte talked about. Liselotte proved to be strikingly critical of the general style of French court life, and never truly got used to the stuffy rituals or entrenched hypocrisy which Louis’ varied yes men displayed. Considering how bafflingly foreign the whole concept of Louis’ court can seem to us, it really is refreshing to have someone like Liselotte on the inside, who viewed the court with the same detached disgust that we might do. When she wasn’t criticising it, she was explaining to her relatives how it wasn’t worth her time to get involved in its petty quarrels or struggles for power. Writing again to her aunt Sophie on 19th February 1682, Liselotte said:

I just go along as best as I can, thinking that if I do not seek to harm others, I should be left in peace too. But then when I see that I am being set upon from all sides I become very cross, and as I am quite impatient to begin with, all these vexations make me lose what little patience I have left. And then I have to sort everything out in my own head in order to break out of this labyrinth, and there is no advice or help anywhere because everyone here is so calculating and false that one cannot trust anyone…These are the causes of my recent illness, but as for describing how they came about and what has upset me so much, that cannot be entrusted to paper, for I am quite certain that my letters are being read and opened…I must also confess one thing to Your Grace: all that glitters is not gold, and for all their boasting about the famous French liberty, all diversions here are unbelievably stiff and constrained. And besides, I have become accustomed to so many dreadful things since my arrival in this country that if I could ever return to a place where falseness does not rule everything and where lies are neither the daily fare nor approved of, I should think that I had come to a paradise.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Although Liselotte was able to note that the court was moving to Strasburg – a strategy employed by Louis to reinforce his authority in the newly annexed dominions – we do not hear much from her about the actual pace of the reunions policy of the foreign reactions which certainly accompanied them. Liselotte’s letters instead shed a revealing light on the excesses and leisurely pace of the court, where games could be played for hours on end, and where there was nothing much else to do but play several games of cards. Louis for his part maintained an avid interest in these preserves of the wealthy and royal, but he was certainly more interested in the practical realities unfolding outside of the bloated galleries and salons. As the winter of 1681 approached, it was becoming clear that the Spanish were beginning to tire of the French policies. For one, the Spanish garrison inside Luxemburg took to plundering their previously owned lands, which now belonged to the French in Louis’ mind, in order to avoid starvation. Spanish troops burst through the blockade and ensured that a badly needed wagon train of supplies reached the great bastion at Luxemburg, a miniature victory which directly ruined Louis’ long-term plans to starve the settlement into submission.

With little regard for the consequences, Louis retaliated in early 1682 by ravaging the nearby lands of Coutrai within the SN, even while Franco-Spanish negotiators continued to deliberate the terms of the treaty of Nijmegen a few miles away. The message was sent even louder when the debate over the French ownership of two towns in particular came up for discussion with these Franco-Spanish delegates. As per Nijmegen, France was meant to receive either Charlemont or Dinant; in this case, as Lynn put it, this was ‘a Gordian knot he cut simply by occupying both’,[[5]](#footnote-5) and when it seemed certain that the Spanish would hold on in Luxemburg, Louis authorised his commanders there to begin bombarding it with mortar shells. It seemed as though Louis would stop at nothing to get what he wanted, and that while acting he expected to not encounter much resistance either. Above all, Louis seemed content to prod European opinion with a stick because one of the major opponents of his policy, the HR Emperor Leopold, was fundamentally occupied with matters in the east. Appreciating that Leopold was busy with the Ottomans, and that he would thus be more willing to make a quick peace, Louis seemed eager to push the envelope while he had the chance.

The act of bombarding Luxemburg with mortars was the peak of this opportunistic policy, while Louis had also managed to secure limited approval from Imperial delegates over the future of Lorraine. However, at some point in the course of this bullying foreign policy, Louis seemed to have realised that this opportunism in the face of the Islamic Ottoman threat from the east did not really gel with his self-styled moniker of the ‘Most Christian King’. Noting that attacking a fellow Christian power as it struggled against the forces of Islam was perhaps impolitic, Louis made the decision to withdraw his forces from outside of Luxemburg in March 1682, and proposed that he and the Spanish submit their disputes resulting from the French policy of the reunions to Charles II across the Channel. Whether Louis expected a favourable ruling is not quite the point; Lynn in particular noted that Louis was likely thinking of the bigger game by this stage. Specifically, Louis’ ministers anticipated that Leopold would collapse in the face of the Ottomans, whom Louis believed were the stronger party in the unfolding struggle. With the Habsburgs defeated in the east, Louis desired to them have himself or his protégé elected HR Emperor, and from such a point he could dominate European affairs and ensure the total supremacy of Bourbon France. For this election to be successful though, the German voters would have to like him, and they were far less likely to have a fond view of Louis so long as he continued to lob shells into Luxemburg. In short then, though he did fear the hit to his reputation, this is because he was seeking to mould this reputation into currency within Germany. Not for the first or last time, Louis was seeking to influence HR affairs.

The net impact of the Ottoman thrust towards Vienna was that it threw a wrench into the works of Louis’ plans for the eastern border of France, and that it essentially forced him to delay his operations for about 18 months. Cynically as ever, when it became clear that allied forces were in fact triumphing over those of the Ottomans, and when Jan Sobieski arrived with bells on to lead a crashing charge into the Ottoman ranks, Louis cut short this period of Christian consideration, and began chiding the Spanish for their lack of cooperation with Charles II. On 31st August 1683, Louis’ ambassador in the Spanish Netherlands declared to the governor, the marquis of Grana, that since Spain had been so obdurate, France would send 35k troops over the border into Flanders to subsist as the expense of Spain through the exertion of military pressure that drew nearly 3m livres from the affected citizens. In addition to this, the noose around Luxemburg was again tightened, and Louis’ apparent lapse in determination was decidedly over. In the face of these definite escalations, the marquis of Grana appealed to the Dutch, who sent 8k men across their border with the promise of more.[[6]](#footnote-6)

When the governor had had enough, he sent some men of his own across the border to take some contributions for themselves. This to Louis was akin to a national outrage, and he upped the ante by aggressively burning some towns down on the Spanish side; a tactic which the Spanish then emulated, before the Council of State in Spain made the decision to formalise these measures. On 26th October 1683, perhaps anticipating additional diplomatic and military support from the Dutch and HR Emperor, Spain declared war on France. Incredibly, the peace from the previous war hadn’t even lasted four years, and yet here opened the latest chapter of European conflict yet again. Unfortunately for the Spanish though, this war was to be quite unlike the others. Overwhelmed by the requirements of the Ottoman campaign even with the siege of Vienna turned back, Leopold could offer no aid to his Spanish cousins, leaving them practically on their own. What this meant for Louis was that he had Spain right where he wanted it; the meagre support that the Dutch could provide was not adequate to turn the tables from their position, and Louis’ marshals were ordered into the familiar pressure points armed to the teeth with all the tools and a suspicious level of preparation work already having been done. Before the true extent of the war was realised, Louis tried his hand at some diplomacy.

Negotiating with the Dutch, whose ambassador had not left Paris by that point, Louis presented a series of demands which the Dutch could arbitrate over. Reasoning yet again that he was only seeking what was France’s by right of previous treaties and the tradition of history, Louis looked to begin this so-called War of the Reunions with a diplomatic coup. By threatening Spain with oblivion in its isolated state, Louis planned on making a series of demands against it as he had against the previously annexed territories. Signalling his preference for the reunions policy, Louis proclaimed his willingness to give up all claims on Ghent and a number of other SN fortress towns, if Spain would choose from one of the following five options, each of which focused on a different border region. Failing Spanish cooperation, Louis planned to simply take what he was not given through peaceful means. His options were 1) give up Luxemburg and its dependencies to his realm or 2) give a series of fortress towns in the southern part of Flanders, including Dixmude, Coutrai and Beaumont or 3) surrender a series of fortress towns in Catalonia or 4) surrender a different set of fortified ports in Catalonia or 5) surrender a series of fortress towns attached to the Navarre region in south-west France. Not a single one of these options, as Louis likely well predicted, appealed to the Spanish. Cynically then, as if expecting this refusal, French troops marched even while French officials distracted and occupied the attentions of the Dutch. Although a deadline for 31st December 1683 was supposed to be in place, French troops occupied several towns listed in the demands to Spain, as if to strengthen the French position yet further.

Although Louis did enjoy great successes both along the border in Flanders and Hainault and along the Pyrenees, the real story was the conduct of the French troops stationed there. Such horrified practices of burning and pillage harkened back to darker days of European warfare, and they continued with an increasing bitterness not seen on such a scale since the TYW, certainly not in the SN region. Perhaps Louis was especially peeved at the Spanish for resisting after so many other annexations had been brought about successfully, or perhaps he wanted to hurry the campaigns along out of fear of Leopold turning his attention back west. Either way, Louis conducted French policy horribly, and egged on by Louvois, the two men acted with ‘regrettable brutality’ in Lynn’s words, all in the name of expanding upon the already secure French border. Neither side could be excused of course, but then Spain hadn’t blundered its way into another war in less than five years. The facts seem pretty damning – Louis, used to getting what he wanted and addicted to violent solutions to his state policies, had all but forgotten had to treat carefully in the realm of European diplomacy. So it was that, out of sheer arrogance and ignorance rather than from a genuine desire to take over the continent, French troops marched under Louis’ banner and made a name for France as the burner, the looter, the raper and the aggressor.

Such a view of France was building steam in the halls of diplomacy as well as on the battlefield. Louis proved strikingly resilient in his repeated claims for satisfaction. Because of this France was diplomatically isolated by the spring of 1684, but to Louis it didn’t matter so long as his forces encountered such successes, and successes they indeed enjoyed. Not since the opening phase of the Dutch War had French forces so carried all before them, and Louis was even able to command an army in person in April 1684, where he led 40k around the fortresses of Conde and Valenciennes, the primary goal being not the invasion of the SN, but the cracking of the so far impregnable nut – Luxemburg. In spite of the surrounding of the fortress and the regular mortar bombardments over the previous year, the Spanish had not agreed to Louis’ so-called ultimatum by the end of the previous December, so Louis insisted on the logical conclusion to the choking of that once great duchy. Over the night of 8 to 9th May 1684, trenches were opened and the Spanish garrison of 2,500 were compelled to resist. Long story short, the Spanish resisted bravely considering the disparity in numbers, but by 3rd June Luxemburg was in French hands.

With this success, Louis travelled to his new palace at Versailles to celebrate, and immediately declared himself satisfied with his gains. If Spain would agree to roll the clock back to August 1683, and allow Louis to just have Luxemburg, then Louis would agree to a long truce making the recent gains secure. Note that Louis did not expect a total peace formulated by treaty; this wasn’t so much because Louis didn’t want a lasting peace, moreso that he didn’t expect the Habsburgs to give it to him, and he was right. That said, asking merely for a truce was attractive to the Dutch, who reasoned that the wrongs could be righted at a future date when unified European affairs were more in order. William of Orange was already scheming to develop a coalition against the French, basing his arguments on the manifest aggression and greed of the Sun King, who refused to relinquish Strasburg as per the truce either. By the end of June the Dutch told the Spanish that if Madrid would not agree to terms for a truce with Louis then they would withdraw their troops, further weakening the Spanish military position in the region. With the writing on the wall, the Spanish prepared to agree to the most humiliating terms in recent memory, as Louis continued to ride high.

The Truce of Ratisbon signed on 15th August 1684 was the high point of Louis’ expansionist aims, and he could present it to his subjects as further evidence of his great and glorious success as king. Through this agreement, which also included a commitment from the emperor to agree to peace with France for twenty years, Louis guaranteed the security of his recently gotten gains and the integrity of his borders. No longer could Imperials cross over Strasburg, and no more could French security be undermined by the curious history of the Spanish inheritance in Luxemburg. With his military prestige at an all-time high, Louis again moved further into dangerous territory through his alienation of Europe. By the autumn of 1684 even while he could claim to be triumphant, there was scarcely a power in Europe whom he could rely on as a friend. As if to drive in the knife, French forces had even made a point of occupying the principality of Orange along the river Rhone in 1680, a small territory which was the ancestral homeland of William III. The implications were clear, and now William began to prepare the way for one of the most devastating checks on the Sun King’s power and ego.

The final judgement of Louis’ policy of reunions must be said, on paper at least, to have been an overwhelming success. Louis accomplished all he set out to achieve at the end of the Dutch War, and in many ways this period of four years was more militarily successful than any other stage in his reign. Yet, the unfortunate caveat which always accompanied Louis’ gains was the asterisk of European opinion. Although his military prestige had reached unimaginable heights, his reputation among European princes, and among German princes in particular, had slumped to an all-time low. That said, while they were conducted with a heavy hand and a latent arrogance, at their core the policy of the reunions were defensive in measure, and were the result of Louis’ struggle with French security that he had inherited from his grandfather Henry IV, who had viewed the state of affairs with alarm as he considered the numerous open doors to foreign invasion that French borders provided. That Louis had largely plugged these holes by 1684 was to be applauded, and certainly Louis’ seizures added a greater layer of security to the traditionally more vulnerable regions of France. If Luxemburg for example had remained in Spanish hands, then the opportunities for raiding or jeopardising the new French regime in nearby Lorraine would have been desperately acute. By dealing with these problems as individual strategic threats, Louis eliminated some major sticking points that Vauban in particular had with the French strategic position. Yet, for all that, Louis virtually guaranteed that a league demanding retribution would be launched against him in the near future. Perhaps in a sense he even expected this, asking only for a truce and not a permanent peace with Spain.

Yet in a sense this did not matter to Louis, because with the borders so reinforced and the fortifications now expanding, the French state expenditure was content to denote that 2.3m livres had been spent on improving the French defensive belt across the north and north east of the country.[[7]](#footnote-7) As if anticipating that he would have to soon defend his recently gotten gains, Louis seemed perfectly willing to invest in these gargantuan building projects. If his neighbours wished to take them back, they were now welcome to try.

Try they would in the not too distant future, but before we look at that, we need to swing our focus determinedly towards the east. Though we glossed over it in this episode, the siege of Vienna by the Turks was arguably the watershed moment in the history of Habsburg and Ottoman fortunes, if not early modern Europe itself, so it’s only right that we do it justice here by putting it in the military, diplomacy and cultural context that it deserves. If that sounds good to you, then I hope to see you next time, as we switch gears to begin our story of the last siege of Vienna. I’m for one am seriously excited, so thanks for listening to this latest instalment of the LW, and I will see you all soon.

1. Cited in Ian Dunlop, *Louis XIV*, p. 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Lynn, *Wars*, p. 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Letter to Duchess Sophie, 13th April 1681, from Erberg Forster (trans. ed.), *A Woman’s Life in the Court of the Sun King*; *Letters of Liselotte van der Pfalz, Elizabeth Charlotte, Duchess of Orleans, 1652-1722* (London, 1997), pp. 30-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Ibid*, pp. 33-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Lynn, *Wars*, p. 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Lynn, *Wars*, p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Lynn, *Wars*, p. 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)