



**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
SITUATION REPORT**



February 6, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

06/02/23 23:59* PST

Malcontent News is an independent group of journalists and researchers in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, Israel, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We are part of Badon Hill Group, LLC, and operate independently from all entities.

We are funded through Patreon, grants, and donations and aided by volunteers. For media inquiries, you can contact social@malcontentnews.com. For news tips, you can contact our newsroom at tips@malcontentment.com.

[Patrons at the Bronze level or higher](#) can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patrons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

This update is copyright © 2023, by Badon Hill Group LLC, all rights reserved. Authors: David H. Obelcz, Jeff Davis, and with special thanks to David Batashvili of the [Rondeli Foundation](#) and Linnea Hubbard, the voice of the Russia-Ukraine War Update Podcast.

The reader accepts that the information contained in the Malcontent News Situation Report will not be used for travel, navigation, or personal security assessment. The reader agrees to get real-time information from official channels provided by national, oblast, raion, hromada, city, or local officials and follow their security recommendations.

The assessments and opinions expressed in the Malcontent News SITREP are not representative, endorsed, or reflect the views of the Rondeli Foundation. We are grateful for the foundation's work to assess and verify territorial control changes and their permission to provide maps for our Situation Report.


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, which is the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for *unique claims* about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by units of the Russian Federation 1st Army Corps have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detailed by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate

Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of information as Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after he was fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.



Contents

SUMMARY – DAY 348.....	7
DAILY ASSESSMENT	7
TODAY’S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP.....	10
UKRAINE WEATHER	11
DONBAS REGION	13
LUHANSK	13
NORTHEAST DONETSK.....	18
SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK.....	25
ZAPORIZHIA.....	31
BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION	32
WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE.....	33
NORTH AND NORTHEAST UKRAINE.....	35
RUSSIAN FRONT	35
THEATERWIDE & EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS.....	36
RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION AND MILITARY STATUS.....	36
WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS.....	38
GEOPOLITICAL.....	38
ECONOMIC.....	38

SUMMARY – DAY 348

It has been 3,266 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on February 27, 2014.

Linnea wasn't feeling well today and I have a major project to complete in the morning, so today's Situation Report will be combat only.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malyar confirmed our assessment that Russia's "large-scale" offensive has begun and is not the shock and awe Blitzkrieg that many expected. We assess there remains a significant chance the Russian Federation will launch new offensives in one or more operational directions before February 24.
2. We maintain that the power struggle between military leaders aligned with Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu versus those aligned to Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin has escalated due to statements by State


Duma deputies. We maintain that the political distraction benefits Russian President Vladimir Putin the most.

3. We maintain that the battle for the control of Bakhmut has reached a critical phase with the addition of Russian forces to the axis and the ongoing attempt to create a technical encirclement.
4. We maintain that the significant increase in disinformation and misinformation from Russian sources is being directed by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, as part of his hybrid warfare doctrine.
5. The RAND Corporation agreed with our assessment that Ukraine holds the battlefield initiative – while we maintain the exception for the Soledar-Bakhmut axis.¹
6. We maintain that the Russian military within Ukraine remains combat ineffective.
7. We assess that severe weather in the Black Sea and the Rostov-on-Don region of Russia, which caused property damage and power outages in Sevastopol, has delayed the next Russian punitive missile strike on civilians and civilian infrastructure.
8. We maintain that Russian forces will continue to target electrical, heating, and potable water infrastructure.

¹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/01/28/7386922/>


9. We maintain that the Russian Federation's inventory of Kalibr cruise missiles is critically low based on the continued decline of launches from the Black Sea Fleet.
10. We maintain that the risk of a nuclear accident caused by the deenergization of Ukrainian nuclear power plants caused by Russian electrical infrastructure destruction is possible.
11. We maintain that stealth mobilization has started in the Russian Federation due to stop loss orders for active duty troops deployed in Ukraine and mobilization requests from the Kremlin in the occupied territories.
12. We maintain that the threat of Russian forces in Belarus crossing into Ukraine as part of an offensive operation is negligible, despite contrary claims from Ukrainian and Polish officials.

TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

You can visit our war map at <http://www.rusvukrmap.com>



Snow depth (cm)


Valid for
Tue 02/07/2023, 01:00am CST



There weren't any significant changes to the snowpack, which remains well below average.

DONBAS REGION


LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Integrate oblast into Russian Federation, recapture lost territory, and control insurgency

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

Michael Kofman, Director of Russian Studies at the Center for a New American Security, confirmed our assessment that the large-scale Russian offensive has started in Ukraine and shares our assessment that Russia will likely attempt to recapture Lyman by advancing from Kreminna.²



In the Svatove Operational Direction, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that [Novoselivske](#) was shelled throughout the day.^{3 4 5} A Ukrainian source reported positional fighting in [Kuzemivka](#),


² <https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1622602875338629120>

³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

⁴ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEST](#)

⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/23967 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


with Russian forces attempting to advance on Nvoselivske with two tanks near the train station.



There were no reliable reports of ground fighting from either combatant from [Ploshchanka](#) to [Chervonopopivka](#), with Russia and Ukraine exchanging significant artillery fire along the axis.^{6 7}

⁶ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

⁷ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEST](#)




In the Kreminna Operational Area, there was heavy fighting between squads and platoons west, southwest, and south of the settlement, including in the Serebryansky Woods.^{8 9 10} Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces could not advance, and Russian sources claimed Ukrainians were being pushed back. The truth likely lies in the middle, with the fight swinging back and forth, considering GSAFU reported that the Kuzmyne area was shelled.

⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEST](#)

¹⁰ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8404>

¹¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/15475>




In the Lysychansk Operational Area, we thank GSAFU for sharing a video of Ukrainian troops standing in [Bilohorivka](#) [Luhansk] with [no sounds of fighting or artillery](#).^{12 13} This puts to rest claims by Russian sources, including mercenaries with Rybar, who repeated the false claim today. Luhansk Oblast Administrative and Military Governor Serhei Haidai reported that Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian positions.¹⁴

¹² <https://t.me/informnapalm/15501>

¹³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/15475>


¹⁴ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8404>

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Capture the entire region and integrate the oblast into Russian Federation


Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



In the Siversk Operational Area, Russian forces continued attempts to advance on [Verkhnyokamianske](#) and [Spirne](#) without success.^{15 16}

¹⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

¹⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10731>




In the Soledar Operational Area, the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Brigade didn't have to wait long for Russian forces to launch an attack in their direction. Russian troops tried to advance on [Vasjukivka](#) and [Vesele](#) without success. There were multiple reports that Russian troops and PMC Wagner mercenaries suffered from communication and coordination failures during their attempted advance.^{17 18}

¹⁷ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

¹⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10731>

RMOD took credit for another Wagner advance, claiming that “volunteers of the assault detachments” supported and, in coordination with Russian forces, captured Mykolaivka, which was captured by PMC Wagner last week.¹⁹ Wagner’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin responded to the RMOD claim in a most unusual way – keep reading.

Heavy fighting for control of [Krasna Hora](#) continued, with PMC Wagner stating there was no progress.^{20 21 22}



¹⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/23986 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/15475>

²¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10731>

²² https://t.me/grey_zone/17069

RMOD threw more reserve forces at eastern [Bakhmut](#), where the situation is deteriorating, and house-to-house fighting has started.

Composite forces from Russia and PMC Wagner continued attempts to advance on [Paraskoviivka](#), with no significant gains reported.^{23 24 25}

In eastern Bakhmut, Russian forces were pushing into the residential areas east of the Bakhumtovka River. In our assessment, Ukrainian forces will need to dedicate significant reinforcements in this area or retreat to the river's west bank.²⁶ PMC Wagner also claimed to have made advances in the southern part of Bakhmut from Optyne.

Suppose you're Yevgeny Prigozhin, and a close ally was critically wounded in a botch assassination attempt, possibly by the FSB. The State Duma is hinting that "turbo patriots" are a threat to national security without

²³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/15475>


²⁴ https://t.me/grey_zone/17069

²⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10731>

²⁶ https://t.me/grey_zone/17069

mentioning your name, but describe you perfectly, and the Ministry of Defense keeps taking credit for your mercenaries' work. What do you do?

Prigozhin [released a video of himself](#) in a PMC Wagner Su-24 multirole fighter plane taxiing down a runway, claiming he flew a combat sortie over Bakhmut as the combat navigator.²⁷ The head of PMC Wagner doesn't hide in bunkers, Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.



²⁷ <https://t.me/strelkovii/3878>

In the Kostyantynivka Operational Direction, heavy fighting continued west of [Klischchiivka](#) and south of [Ivanivske](#).^{28 29}
^{30 31} Mercenaries with War Gonzo claim PMC Wagner mercenaries were within 1 kilometer of the T-504 Highway Ukrainian Ground Line of Communication (GLOC – supply line) from Kostyantynivka. PMC Wagner didn't explicitly deny War Gonzo's claim but stated there had been no gains toward Ivanivske.


²⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

²⁹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/15475>

³⁰ <https://t.me/rybar/43361>


³¹ https://t.me/grey_zone/17069

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Capture the entire region, integrate the oblast into Russian Federation, and bring the insurrection across southwestern Donetsk under control

Ukrainian Objective: Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



In the Avdiivka Operational Area, there was a short-lived burst of activity, with the Russian 1st Army Corps launching attacks in multiple directions.

Russian troops tried to advance on Avdiivka from [Vesele](#), technically from the Donetsk International Airport, advancing between Spartak and Optyne without success.³²


³³ Fighting was positional but “fierce,” according to a Ukrainian source.

³² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

³³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/15475>

There were attempts to advance from Optyne in the direction of [Sjeverne](#), as well as an attempt to advance further from parts of [Vodyane](#). None of the attacks were successful.^{34 35}

Elements of the 1st Army Corps made new attempts to advance on [Pervomaiske](#) and the Ukrainian firebase at [Nevelske](#) and could not move the line of conflict.^{36 37}



³⁴ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

³⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/10731>

³⁶ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

³⁷ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/15475>

In the Marinka Operational Area, Russian forces with the 1st Army Corps attempted to advance on [Krasnohorivka](#) without success. In [Marinka](#) itself, Russian troops are attempting to advance into the city center from the south. Despite repeated claims there aren't any Ukrainian forces in the center of Marinka, Russian troops have a problem. The Ukrainian troops in the city's center have made it impossible for Russian troops to enter the area.^{38 39 40}


Russian forces renewed attempts to advance on [Pobjeda](#) without success.⁴¹

³⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

³⁹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/15475>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/rybar/43361>

⁴¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)



In the Vuhledar Operational Area, Russian forces renewed attacks on [Novomykhailivka](#).⁴² RMOD claimed that Russian units inflicted heavy casualties on Ukrainian forces near [Vuhledar](#), which was wishful thinking.⁴³ A series of videos and photos have been published, one extremely graphic, showing up to 30 main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles destroyed.⁴⁴ One photo showed 12 MBTs and IFVs charred in a tight group, representing a completely destroyed Russian tank company.⁴⁵ The loss of 30 vehicles

⁴² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

⁴³ https://t.me/mod_russia/23986 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁴⁴ https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1622653927597514788

⁴⁵ <https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1622837870657511424>

is the equivalent of a fully staffed armored battalion wiped out in a day.

Insurgents in Mariupol reported significant troop movements throughout the city. A convoy of armored vehicles and trucks carrying ammunition was heading toward Berdyansk, while a second convoy traveled northwest toward Polohy in Zaporizhia.^{46 47}


After the fratricide incident in Mariupol on February 5, Russian occupation officials now forbid stores to sell alcohol to Russian troops.⁴⁸ There is still no information on how many soldiers were involved.

⁴⁶ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/6461>

⁴⁷ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/6466>

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/6468>

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Prevent a Ukrainian offensive into Zaporizhzhia, integrate captured territory into the Russian Federation, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate Russian-occupied areas, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and protect civilians

The situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is unchanged.


BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Operational Command South (OCS) reported the Russian Black Sea Fleet only had one warship on patrol.⁴⁹ This was likely caused by severe weather that moved through the area, with near hurricane-force winds ripping into western Crimea. Power was knocked out in parts of Sevastopol and Simferopol. In Sevastopol, officials reported three homes had their roofs torn off.^{50 51}

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/76198>

⁵⁰ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/21984>

⁵¹ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/21967>



In Mykolaiv, Ochakiv was struck by S-300 anti-aircraft missiles used for a ground attack, knocking power in the raion.⁵²

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to maximize casualties by deprivation of heat, water, and medical services and break morale

⁵² <https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4234>

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

In Kherson, Russian and Ukrainian forces continued mutual shelling across the Dnipro River.⁵³ ⁵⁴ In the city of Kherson, a school was shelled, damaging the gym. Of 151 educational institutions in Kherson, 81 have been shelled by Russian forces since November 11.⁵⁵

OCS reported that two civilian boats used by Russian DRG forces were destroyed near the mouth of the Dnipro River.⁵⁶

On the left bank of the Dnipro, Russian-occupied Kakhovka, Nova Kakhovka, and Hola Prystan were shelled. An electrical substation was damaged in Nova Kakhovka, knocking out power in the raion.⁵⁷ ⁵⁸

In Dnipropetrovsk, Marhanets was hit by 48 Russian artillery shells, which damaged the water pumping station.

⁵³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEST](#)

⁵⁴ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEST](#)

⁵⁵ <https://t.me/hueviyherson/34365>

⁵⁶ <https://t.me/hueviyherson/34368>

⁵⁷ <https://t.me/hueviyherson/34360>

⁵⁸ <https://t.me/hueviyherson/34354>

Water was knocked out to 60,000 households due to the attack.⁵⁹

NORTH AND NORTHEAST UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale and maximize casualties by deprivation of heat, water, and medical services

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

RUSSIAN FRONT

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

⁵⁹ https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/3419


THEATERWIDE & EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Taking the day off.

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION AND MILITARY STATUS

Retired Russian Major General Dmytro Ulyanov was killed in Ukraine. He retired from the Russian military under unusual circumstances and was responsible for all the mobik troops deployed from Tatarstan. He was the former commander of the 98th Air Force. He is the 11th Russian general confirmed killed in action since February 24, 2022.⁶⁰

On September 19, we shared a video from Volodarka, 100 kilometers south of Kyiv, showing camels happily eating grass on the side of the road. We had no idea the snark that followed would end up being prophetic.

Puzzled drivers stopped and took photos  [and videos of a herd of camels](#) grazing on the side of the road.⁶¹ We're not sure if they escaped from a NATO biolab researching

⁶⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/76221?single>

⁶¹ https://t.me/pb_032/9802

the development of winter combat camels that only spit at Russian soldiers, the circus is coming to town, or if a camel rancher had their herd escape. They all appeared well-fed and happy to ignore the gawkers while munching on Ukrainian grass. We have so many questions, and we hope they aren't animatronics concealing secret Iranian combat drone launchers.

We have already reported two incidents that left one Russian dead and another injured. In a new video, another Russian man is killed. The surveillance video shows a camel in Russia just being a camel in the snow. A Russian man walks up, and sucker punches the camel in its face. We know that camels can kick, spit, and bite. We had no idea a camel could grab the head of a grown man in its mouth and shake him like a rag doll. It gets a lot worse after that. The video of the Bactrian camel doing unspeakable things to the man's head is graphic, and some people may find it disturbing. You can watch the video by [clicking here](#).⁶²

Editor's Note: *It was a joke when we wrote that. We have no knowledge of NATO biolabs developing genetically engineering winter combat camels in Ukraine, and we can*

⁶² https://twitter.com/RF200_NOW/status/1622402745281179649

only say that real life is stranger than art and war situation reports.

All is going to plan.

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Taking the day off.

GEOPOLITICAL

Taking the day off.

ECONOMIC

The rouble held steady with an exchange rate of 71 for 1 US dollar.

Western oil prices climbed upward, with WTI crude moving to \$76 a barrel and Brent up slightly to \$82. Russian Urals crude dropped to an "official" price of \$52 a barrel, with the new price cap limit of \$45 a barrel now in effect. United

States wholesale RBOB gasoline on the spot market jumped to \$2.43 a gallon (64 cents a liter).

Dutch TTF Natural Gas Futures climbed, with March 2023 advancing to 58 euros per megawatt hour and April 2023 futures at 59.

Chicago SRW Wheat Futures dropped to \$7.45 a bushel for May 2023 delivery.